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In the post-Cold War world, the world's most powerful states have cooperated or 
avoided conflict with each other, easily defeated smaller state governments, engaged 
in protracted conflicts against insurgencies and resistance networks, and lost civilians 
to terrorist attacks.  This dissertation explores various explanations for this pattern, 
proposing that some non-state networks adapt to major international transitions more 
quickly than bureaucratic states.  Networks have taken advantage of the information 
technology revolution to enhance their capabilities, but states have begun to adjust, 
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They said September 11th changed the world, but they didn't say for how long.  When al Qaeda 
operatives flew passenger jets into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, scholars and strategists 
proclaimed an era of asymmetric warfare, with security threatened by shadowy networks and rogue 
states, rather than symmetric Great Power armies.  Walter Laqueur, of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, confidently predicted in 2003 that “terrorism is bound to remain high on the list 
of our priorities;”1 while Israeli scholar Martin van Creveld implored the “developed world” to “shake 
off its lethargy” and recognize “insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, possibly, one day, armed 
with weapons of mass destruction” as its primary security concern.2  This followed a series of 
predictions from RAND scholars John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt that the information age 
empowered networks of individuals, increasing the threat from terrorist organizations, criminal cartels, 
and extremist groups.3  American security officials, such as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff, argued that al Qaeda represents an existential threat to the United States,4 while Michael 
Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's Bin Laden Issue Station,5 declared that “America is in a war for 
survival.  Not survival in terms of protecting territory, but in terms of keeping the ability to live as we 
want.”6  According to this view, the 21st century would prominently feature international terrorism, and 
the United States should expect a steady stream of attacks from networks of individuals on airplanes, 
landmarks, shopping malls, train stations, and crowded city centers, with machine guns, explosives, 
poison gas, biological agents, and radioactive material.   
1 Laqueur, “No End to War,” p.7 
2 Van Creveld, “The Changing Face of War,” p. 277-278. 
3    Arquilla and Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp and Networks and Netwars. 
4 Harris and Taylor, “Homeland Security chief looks back, and forward.” 
5 The CIA's Bin Laden Issue Station was a unit devoted to tracking Osama bin Laden and senior al Qaeda leadership.  
Scheuer ran the Station from 1996-1999 and advised the Station Chief from 2001-2004. 
6 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, p. 242. 
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 At first, this harrowing vision seemed to be coming true, as a series of American officials 
received mail tainted with anthrax spores in late 2001, and self-proclaimed al Qaeda member Richard 
Reid attempted to destroy an American Airlines plane flying from Paris to Miami in December with 
explosives hidden in his shoe.  In May 2002, U.S. Customs agents arrested suspected al Qaeda 
associate Jose Padilla for a plot to release a “dirty bomb,” in which radioactive material would spread 
over a major American city.  The threat appeared to encompass American allies as well, perhaps all 
economically advanced Western nations, as Madrid (March, 2003) and then London (July, 2005) 
suffered bombings on their transportation systems that killed 191 and 52, respectively.  The 
perpetrators of these attacks were “inspired by,” rather than directly sent by the organization behind 
9/11,7 suggesting the frightening possibility that terrorism could come from self-starters with a shared 
ideology, as well as sleeper cells of trained operatives.  With the US, UK, Spain, and their NATO allies 
engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq while facing terrorist threats at home, the predictions of a 
prolonged and bloody struggle between the West and radical Islamists appeared to be coming true.    
 But then nothing happened.  At least not much.  The United States, Spain, and Great Britain 
faced few credible threats after the original attacks in, respectively, 2001, 2003, and 2005, and were 
able to prevent anything on a similar scale.  In the decade after September 11th no terrorist managed to 
detonate a bomb on U.S. soil.8  The RAND Corporation records 83 terrorist attacks in the United States 
between 9/11 and the end of 2009, almost all with zero casualties.  Over half of these were perpetrated 
by environmental and animal rights groups, and only three were connected to jihadist causes.  This 
contrasts sharply with the 1970s, during which 60 to 70 terrorist incidents occurred annually, primarily 
bombings by the Weather Underground, New World Liberation Front, and other radical domestic 
7 On Madrid attacks, see Nash, “Madrid bombers 'were inspired by Bin Laden address.”  On London, see “Leak reveals 
official story of London bombings.” 
8 Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion,” p. 88. 
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organizations.9  From 1970 to 1978, 72 people died in America from terrorism,10 compared to 24 from 
October 2001-December 2009, 16 of which were linked to jihadists.11  All 16 were killed in three 
shooting incidents: two at the El Al ticket counter in Los Angeles airport in July 2002,12 one at a 
military recruitment center in Little Rock in May 2009, and 13 by U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan 
at Fort Hood in November 2009.13  Comparatively, disgruntled college student Seung-Hui Cho shot 
and killed 32 at Virginia Tech in April 2007,14 in an incident that was not considered terrorism because 
the shooter lacked a political agenda. 
 This apparent lack of threat to the American homeland led some strategists and scholars to 
downplay al Qaeda, as well as terrorism in general.  Asking “what Islamic terrorist threat?,” Shikha 
Dalmia argued in 2011 that the absence of post-9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States reveals that al 
Qaeda is “a rag-tag band of peasants whose malevolent ambitions are far beyond the capacity of their 
shallow talent pool to deliver.”15  Similarly, former CIA interrogator Glenn L. Carle warned America 
that “Osama bin Laden and his disciples are small men and secondary threats whose shadows are made 
larger by our fears.”  Al Qaeda may threaten “to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
weapons,” he wrote in 2008, “but its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”16  Putting it less 
acerbically, security scholar John Mueller asks “if it is so easy to pull off an attack and if terrorists are 
so demonically competent, why have they not done it?”  Perhaps, he argues, “almost no terrorists exist 
in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad.”17 
9 Jenkins, “Would-Be Warriors,” p. 9. 
10 Jenkins, “Would-Be Warriors,” p. 8. 
11 Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion,” p. 88. 
12 “Los Angeles airport shooting kills 3.”  The deaths included two victims and the shooter.   
13 “Shootings at Fort Hood.” 
14 Hauser and O'Connor, “Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead.”  The deaths included 32 victims and the shooter. 
15 Dalmia, “What Islamist Terrorist Threat?” 
16 Carle, “Overstating Our Fears.” 
17 Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” p. 1. 
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 Terrorism is difficult.  It requires immense discipline, skill, and sacrifice to prepare without 
getting caught and then execute successfully.  Few are sufficiently committed to a cause to devote their 
lives to acts of spectacular violence against non-combatants, of which only a small subset possess the 
know-how and ability to commit mass murder.  As Shikha Dalmia points out, to present a threat to the 
United States, terrorists “would have to be: radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized 
enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security 
apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; 
self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them 
away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy, and—above all—psychologically tough 
enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending 
death.”18  Along these lines, it is probably best to think of the September 11th attackers as al Qaeda's 
equivalent of Special Forces, an elite product of recruitment and training, rather than common foot 
soldiers that can be easily replaced or copied. 
    Noting the paucity of post-9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, John Mueller and Mark G. 
Stewart declared in 2012 that the original threat was exaggerated, and that America is operating under a 
“terrorism delusion,” devoting far more resources to the problem than necessary.19  Tabulating the 50 
cases of “Islamist extremist terrorism that have come to light since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, whether based in the United States or abroad, in which the United States was, or apparently 
was, targeted,” Mueller and Stewart find that only seven “actually reached the stage of committing, or 
trying to commit violence in the United States,” of which only the three shootings (El Al ticket counter, 
Little Rock, Fort Hood) resulted in casualties.  Of the 43 remaining cases, 16 were disrupted by 
authorities, 24 were egged on or assisted by undercover agents until enough evidence had accumulated 
18 Dalmia, “What Islamist Terrorist Threat?” 
19 Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion.” 
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to issue arrest warrants, and three were conspiracy charges in which no violence had actually been 
planned or attempted.20  In contrast to the predictions of an Age of Terrorism, this evidence presents a 
picture of a relatively small problem that is largely under control. 
 However, on April 15, 2013, two pressure-cooker bombs exploded near the finish line of the 
Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring 264.21  Images of bystanders with mangled limbs, bloodied 
children crying, and security services rushing to the chaotic scene rapidly spread around the world.  
The horrified public reaction presented a challenge for those who had downplayed the threat of 
terrorism. 
 Nevertheless, Mueller and Stewart quickly dismissed the perpetrators as “hapless, disorganized, 
and irrational.”22  The attackers dropped the bombs near the finish line of a major international race in 
a developed city, an area covered with cameras.  Media photographers, official race cameras, 
spectators' cell phones, and store security cameras provided hundreds of hours of videos to FBI and 
police investigators, who spotted two men that entered the area with large backpacks and left without 
them.  Within three days, the FBI publicly released photographs of two suspects, later identified as 
brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.  This seems to have sent them into a panic.  In the next 
eight hours, the two suspects killed an MIT campus officer, carjacked an SUV, and engaged police in a 
firefight that killed 26-year old Tamerlan.  The next evening, acting on a tip from a homeowner who 
noticed blood on his boat, police arrested 19-year old Dzhokhar.23 
 The Tsarnaevs did not appear to have a plan for the aftermath of their attack or an idea of what 
the bombings would accomplish beyond an expression of anger at the United States, and therefore do 
not fit the picture of competent, strategic terrorists painted by the worst post-9/11 fears.  The attack 
20 Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion,” p. 7. 
21 Kotz, “Injury toll from Marathon bombs reduced to 264.” 
22 Mueller and Stewart, “Hapless, Disorganized, and Irrational.” 
23 Herbert, “Boston Marathon timeline: from attack to capture.” 
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created a horrific scene, but caused fewer fatalities than mass shootings in 2012 at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Connecticut, in which Adam Lanza killed 20 children and six adults,24 and in a 
Colorado movie theater, in which James Holmes killed 12 and injured 70.25  The Marathon attack was 
first successful bombing in the United States since 9/11, more than 11 years later, and it only killed 
three people.  It therefore does not disprove the claim that terrorism poses a relatively small threat to 
Americans.   
 However, graphic images of maimed bystanders, disruption of normal life in Boston and the 
associated economic costs, and the widespread fear associated with unexpected violence gave the 
Marathon bombing, like other terrorist attacks, a greater impact than the casualties alone.  Furthermore, 
investigations revealed that Tamerlan Tsarnaev sympathized with al Qaeda and the international 
jihadist cause, especially insurgents in Dagestan fighting against Russia;26 participated in discussions 
on jihadist websites where he passionately criticized American foreign policy; and learned how to build 
the pressure-cooker bombs from an article in Inspire, al Qaeda's English-language online magazine, 
called “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”27  This suggests the possibility that jihadist self-
starters—individuals who sympathize with the global movement but act without direction from an 
organized terrorist group—will attempt similar attacks against the United States in the future.  Like the 
Tsarnaevs, these individuals stoke their grievances and learn terrorist techniques on the internet, rather 
than in a training camp, which increases the difficulty of tracking them and anticipating their actions.  
It is unlikely that self-starters could pull off an attack that approaches the scale of 9/11, but the Boston 
Marathon bombings, and other attacks perpetuated by self-starters such as the London transportation 
24 “As nation mourns, investigators try to figure out what led to tragedy in Newtown, Conn.” 
25 “Officials release complete list of injured victims in Aurora massacre.” 
26 Dewey, “The obscure Russian jihadist whom Tamerlan Tsarnaev followed online.” 
27 Jefferson, “Here's the Jihadist Magazine that Taught the Boston Bombers to Kill.” 
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bombings, indicate that the United States and other developed countries continue to face a threat from 
jihadist terrorism. 
 
The Future of International Asymmetric Warfare 
Claims that terrorism represents a never-ending existential threat or a hyperbolically 
exaggerated nuisance both go too far, because both overrate their immediate circumstances.  One 
spectacularly large attack does not indicate an uninterrupted torrent of terrorism, and a string of failed 
or thwarted attempts does not mean that a spectacularly large terrorist attack will never happen again.  
The history of security threats tends to follow a back-and-forth pattern, in which powerful states 
establish security and another state or non-state actor figures out a way to threaten that security.  Every 
once in a while this overturns the prevailing international order, but usually the dominant states find a 
way to address the threat some time after the vulnerability is revealed.  Loophole exploited, loophole 
closed, new vulnerability discovered.  History has shown that every weapon, every strategy, no matter 
how successful at first, can be countered, by either a new technology or an innovative use of existing 
capabilities.  It is thus possible that September 11th represented a peak of this cycle, the relative paucity 
of post-9/11 terrorist attacks represents a trough, and another terrorist attack will exploit a different 
loophole in the future, creating a another peak.   
 Even though the United States has not suffered a repeat of September 11th, terrorism in general 
and al Qaeda specifically feature prominently in all American National Intelligence Estimates and 
Annual Threat Assessments since 2001.  This includes Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair's 
testimony to Congress on February 2, 2010, which declares that, despite some successes, the “terrorist 
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threat to the homeland remains.”28  Since September 11, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan 
and Iraq—justified primarily to stop ongoing and potential future support for terrorist groups—altered 
domestic privacy policies to deter and defend against terrorism, and massively expanded intelligence 
capabilities.  Clearly, the United States perceives a significant threat from al Qaeda, and has made the 
War on Terrorism (or alternative labels like the “Long War,” the “Struggle against Violent 
Extremism,” and the highly euphemistic “Overseas Contingency Operations”29) one of the most central 
national and international security concerns of the early 21st century.  But should this continue?  And to 
what extent? This dissertation explores the future of international terrorism, insurgency, and other 
types of conflict between adversaries that control dramatically uneven levels of material resources.  
Will al Qaeda, a successor organization, or another transnational network with a different ideology be a 
major feature of the international system, threatening the security of the United States and allies for the 
indefinite future?  Will more localized asymmetric conflicts, like those against the Iraqi and Afghan 
insurgencies, continue to be the main type of war fought by the United States and other nuclear 
powers?  Or will history look back on this period when terrorism and insurgency were considered 
major challenges as ephemeral; a brief interlude between the end of the Cold War and another era of 
competition between powerful states? 
 To predict whether asymmetric conflicts between powerful states and non-state networks will 
prominently feature in the 21st century international security environment, the following explores 
competing explanations for the threat posed by al Qaeda and the relative success of various 
insurgencies, and then forecasts the likelihood that these trends continue.  Given the United States' 
prominent global position, some people will be unhappy with America's military, institutional, 
economic, and cultural influence, and a small subset of them will want to use violence in an attempt to 
28 Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010, p. 8. 
29 Wilson and Kamen, “'Global War on Terror' is Given New Name.” 
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resist or change this.  The desire to fight the United States won't disappear, but the factors that enabled 
al Qaeda to threaten American and allied security, and the conditions that allowed the Iraqi and Afghan 
insurgencies to resist the United States-led efforts to eliminate them, may not persist. 
 Perhaps prominent terrorist and insurgent groups have developed especially effective strategies 
that exploit features inherent in asymmetric warfare, elevating the techniques that relatively weak 
combatants used against stronger opponents in previous conflicts.  Alternatively, it may be a function 
of the type of actors involved.  Perhaps the United States has certain vulnerabilities due to its adherence 
to international norms abroad or the open nature of its society at home, while al Qaeda might be 
particularly dangerous because of its religious identity.  However, asymmetric warfare is hardly a 
recent phenomenon, and there have been many conflicts throughout history between different types of 
governments and organizations with religious, nationalist, ethnic, class-based and other motivations, 
producing various results.  Therefore, some feature of the current international system will probably 
contribute to a comprehensive explanation of modern asymmetric warfare.  Recent weak actor 
successes could be due to a structural feature of the 21st century material environment, a factor of the 
strategies made available by the spread of weapons and information technology.  In that case, al Qaeda 
or something similar will continue to threaten the international order and insurgencies will continue to 
frustrate powerful countries until a significant technological change shifts the advantage back to states.  
Finally, the threat posed by al Qaeda could be a temporary result of recent international transitions, 
whether political or technological.  Non-state networks could be able to adapt to major changes in the 
global system, such as the end of the Cold War or spread of the internet, more quickly than 
bureaucratic states, which implies that states will gradually neutralize al Qaeda or another practitioner 
of transnational terrorism, relegating the threat that defined the first decade of the 21st century back to 
the nuisance it was considered in the 20th; at least until another political or technological transition 
opens a new opportunity for networks to exploit.    
9 
 
Al Qaeda's Grand Strategy  
The transnational jihadist organization known as al Qaeda has the most ambitious goals of any 
non-state actor in history.  Founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s in the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, and merging with Ayman al Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
in the early 1990s, al Qaeda seeks to defeat what it believes is a global conspiracy against Islam.30  
Members and sympathizers embrace a particularly expansive interpretation of jihad, which can refer to 
either a personal religious struggle or efforts to defend Islam against foreign attack.  Al Qaeda's prime 
targets are the regimes in Muslim countries it believes are apostate, such as Saudi Arabia.  However, al 
Qaeda believes that to overthrow these governments requires defeating their external allies, namely the 
United States, or the West in general.  In contrast to the more hysterical accusations of Western media, 
al Qaeda's grievances are political—primarily American support for Israel and repressive Muslim 
governments—rather than cultural (hatred of freedom, democracy, Hollywood, women in skirts, etc).  
The organization sees itself as the tip of the spear of a broader jihadist struggle against “Jews, 
Crusaders, Apostates, and Hypocrites”31 to remove Western influence from the Muslim world, defined 
broadly to include any land ever controlled by the Muslim Caliphate.  This places a loosely connected 
network of individuals and organizations in a global struggle against the largest military and economy 
in the world. 
 The war between al Qaeda and the United States has a greater scope, and features a larger 
material disparity, than any previous asymmetric conflict.  At most, there is only one precedent of a 
non-state network challenging the prevailing international order, the late 19th-early 20th century 
European Anarchists.  Even this comparison is somewhat strained, as the Anarchists, though 
transnational, were based in Europe and focused exclusively on the European state system.  Al Qaeda, 
30  Brachman, Global Jihadism, p. 82; see also Bergen, The Longest War, p. 28. 
31  Brachman, p. 83, paraphrasing jihadist strategist Abu Musab al Suri. 
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by contrast, targets civilians and governments in North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe as part of a 
strategy to overthrow governments in the Middle East, and Central and South Asia.  To fight this 
globalized insurgency against the American-led international order, al Qaeda's strategists must draw 
lessons from historical examples of more localized state-network conflicts, and invent the rest. 
 
Nature of the Actors  
While the war between al Qaeda and the United States is asymmetric, and therefore subject to 
the factors inherent in all asymmetric conflicts, it is likely influenced by its unique characteristics: the 
nature of the adversaries and the environment in which the conflict takes place.  It is possible that the 
United States' democratic political system and relatively open society make it ill-suited for asymmetric 
warfare and a particularly attractive target for strategies that utilize terrorism.  Additionally, as some 
scholars have argued, al Qaeda's religiosity may increase its resiliency, capabilities, and resolve. 
 
Democracy 
 Regime type may affect a strong actor’s ability to prosecute an asymmetric conflict, endure the 
associated material costs, stifle domestic opposition, or resist international political pressure.  Gil 
Merom argues that democracies are more likely to lose asymmetric conflicts than authoritarian regimes 
“because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can 
secure victory.”32  All powerful states hope to turn their material advantage into rapid, low-cost victory, 
but democratic polities may hold their soldiers to a higher standard.  Employing torture, indiscriminate 
bombing, or mass killings defies democratic norms of human rights and proper conduct in war, creating 
additional political costs that increase domestic and international pressure on powerful democracies to 
32 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, p. 15. 
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withdraw forces.  If democracies are less capable of sustaining the political will necessary for victory in 
asymmetric conflicts, regime type could account for the prolonged nature of America's 21st century 
counter-insurgency wars, as well as the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and other democracies' 
inability to eliminate networks like al Qaeda or Hamas. 
 However, there is no clear evidence that brutal violence grants victory in asymmetric conflicts, 
or that authoritarian regimes win asymmetric conflicts more often.33 It is possible that attacks on the 
weak actor’s civilians galvanizes rather than discourages an insurgency, as it confirms their 
expectations of the strong actor’s brutality;34 which is exactly the reaction some terrorism seeks to 
provoke.35 While an alleged democratic distaste for sustained brutality may play a role in the outcome 
of some asymmetric conflicts—such as France’s decision to withdraw from Algeria36 or the US 
withdrawal from Vietnam37—it cannot possibly explain any wars in which the strong actor was not 
democratic. The authoritarian Soviet Union employed brutal tactics against the Afghan mujahideen and 
still did not achieve victory.  Furthermore, France and the United States killed masses of civilians in the 
Algerian and Vietnam wars, and recent studies have found no support for the general claim that 
democracies kill fewer civilians in international conflicts.38  As demonstrated by the Abu Ghraib 
torture scandal and the sustained Israeli policy of bulldozing homes belonging to Palestinian suicide 
bombers’ families, democracies employ tactics that, while far short of mass murder, violate democratic 
norms; but they are still able to continue fighting despite the accompanying domestic dissent and 
international criticism.  Additionally, non-democratic leaders must also deliver some perceived success, 
albeit among a smaller pool of influential domestic actors, or risk losing power.  Therefore, regime type 
might influence which costs a strong actor is willing to tolerate in certain conflicts, but cannot 
33 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, p. 28. 
34 Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed.” 
35 Arce and Sandler, “Terrorist Signaling and the Value of Intelligence.” 
36 Galula, Pacification in Algeria. 
37 Summers, On Strategy. 
38 See, Valentino et. al., “Covenants without the Sword”; or Downes, “Restraint or Propellant?” 
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sufficiently explain why terrorist or insurgent networks can pose a security challenge for powerful 
states. 
 Nevertheless, democracies may be attractive targets for networks because of the public's 
influence on political leaders.  By frightening a country into concessions39 or prolonging the conflict to 
“create contradictions in the enemy's camp”40 (i.e. prompting a domestic anti-war movement calling for 
the government to divert resources to other interests)41 networks can take advantage of democracies' 
decision-making processes to achieve their goals, such as the withdrawal of foreign forces.42  Rapid 
American withdrawals from Beirut (1983) and Mogadishu (1993), or eventual withdrawal from 
Vietnam (1973) demonstrate the potential of these strategies for networks fighting against the United 
States.  Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon (2000 and 2006) and Gaza (2005) offer additional 
examples of networks utilizing asymmetric violence against a democracy to at least partially achieve 
their goals. 
 It must be noted that powerful democracies that have fought non-state networks, including 
Israel, Britain, and the United States, have the resources to destroy their enemies with indiscriminate 
bombing, yet choose strategies designed to avoid civilian casualties when possible.  By contrast, Nazi 
Germany crushed the Warsaw Ghetto uprising (1943) by killing everyone inside, and Syria, another 
non-democracy, defeated the Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion by indiscriminately bombarding Hama 
(1982).  This suggests that authoritarian regimes may, on rare occasions, be willing to employ total war 
in asymmetric conflict, obliterating weaker opponents with overwhelming force, while democracies 
will refrain from utilizing this level of violence.  However, the instances of governments of any type 
doing this are sufficiently rare to conclude that regime type's effect on asymmetric warfare is limited. 
39 Pape, Dying to Win. 
40 Mao, “On Protracted War.” 
41 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.” 
42 Pape, Dying to Win. 
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Religion 
 Al Qaeda is a religious organization and its interpretation of Islam is central to its worldview.43  
Therefore, individuals committing violence in the name of al Qaeda or other organizations that espouse 
jihadist ideology could be religiously motivated.  Scholars such as Jessica Stern argue that religion is 
the primary driver of Islamic terrorists.44  Under this interpretation, the terrorist act is a religious 
sacrament, with God as the intended audience rather than humanity.  The bombers expect to go to 
heaven and receive a reward—immediately, in the case of suicide attacks—which makes them 
unconcerned with death.  Following this line of argument, religious fanaticism is the problem, and al 
Qaeda will continue to be a threat as long as the ideology that prompts some Muslims to murder others 
in the name of jihad remains sufficiently unchecked.  This implies that a non-religious transnational 
terrorist organization would be less threatening. 
 However, it is more likely that religion plays a role similar to nationality, ethnicity, class, or any 
other method of group identification: binding the group together and contrasting members with 
outsiders.  There are a number of historical incidents of religious terrorist groups, such as the Jewish 
Zealots, Hindu Thugs, and Shia Assassins, but also ideological non-religious networks and states that 
employed suicide attacks, including the Tamil Tigers and Japanese kamikazes.45  In the 20th century, 
various communist groups, who adamantly rejected religion, proved among the most successful 
insurgents.46  While religion may motivate individual fighters, the organizations to which they belong 
pursue earthly, political goals.  Al Qaeda's strategies and those utilized by Islamic insurgents appear 
similar to those of non-religious groups, indicating that religiosity cannot primarily explain the threat 
posed by jihadist organizations.  Religion is not the only type of ideology that produces fanatics. 
43 Bergen, The Longest War. 
44 Those emphasizing religion include Stern, Terror in the Name of God; Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Mind of God,” and 
Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
45 Pape, Dying to Win. 
46 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, p. 4 and ch. 17. 
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Information Technology and Networks’ Capabilities  
 In the 21st century, the United States suffered the largest mainland attack by a foreign entity 
since the War of 1812 at the hands of a non-state network rather than a state; easily defeated two 
governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, but had difficulty suppressing the subsequent insurgencies; and 
engaged in a global war against al Qaeda and the international jihadist movement.  The experience of 
other nuclear weapons states in the 21st century has been remarkably similar, as Russia, the United 
Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Israel have all mostly cooperated or at least avoided direct confrontation 
with symmetric adversaries, easily defeated smaller state governments, engaged in difficult conflicts 
against non-state networks, and lost civilians to terrorist attacks.  (The world's two other nuclear 
weapons states, China and France, did not engage in any conflicts in the period from January 2000 to 
July 2013 that caused 25 or more battle-related deaths).47   
 Russia easily won an interstate war against Georgia in 2008, but proved unable to defeat 
insurgencies in the Caucuses, and lost 186 children in the Beslan school massacre in September 2004.48  
The United Kingdom quickly deposed Saddam Hussein's government in 2003 as part of the American-
led coalition, but faced considerably more military casualties in a six-year fight against the Iraqi 
insurgency and over ten years fighting against the Afghan insurgency, while losing more civilians in 
the terrorist attack on London's transportation system in 2005 than in any international conflict.  India 
mostly avoided violent confrontation with its longstanding rival Pakistan, losing more soldiers to 
insurgents in Kashmir, while an attack on Mumbai by Lashkar e Taiba in November 2008 killed 164 
and injured an additional 308.49  Similarly, Pakistan mostly avoided confrontation with India while 
fighting ongoing conflicts with various non-state networks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
along its northwest border with Afghanistan.  For comparison, Pakistan lost 1,174 soldiers in its last 
47 “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.” 
48 “Putin meets angry Beslan mothers.” 
49 “HM announces measures to enhance security.” 
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major engagement with India in the 1999 Kargil War,50 but constantly fought non-state networks 
throughout the 2000s, suffering 3,318 fatalities in 2009 alone.51  Finally, Israel cooperated with former 
adversary Egypt to maintain a partial blockade of the Gaza Strip, avoided direct confrontation with 
current rival Iran while carrying out covert action that has delayed Iran's nuclear program,52 and 
destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria on September 6, 2007 with no repercussions.53  However, Israel 
failed to achieve its goals in a war against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, while enduring ongoing 
rocket fire from Hamas and other Palestinian resistance networks in the Gaza strip that killed 45 Israeli 
civilians and injured 1,994 from 2006 through 2012. 
 In the 21st century thus far, global and regional powers have cooperated or avoided direct 
confrontation with each other, and faced a much greater security challenge from non-state networks 
than from states.  This pattern is widespread and apparent, suggesting that something about the current 
international security environment is the cause.  Part of the explanation likely rests with 21st century 
information technology, as the spread of the internet, global media, and mobile phones have greatly 
enhanced non-state networks' information acquisition and dissemination capabilities. 
 The internet raises new international security concerns by granting transnational networks the 
ability to thrive without attachments to territory.  Great power retaliation can easily destroy bases and 
training camps, but does not eliminate networks’ ability to organize, recruit, strategize, fund-raise, and 
spread ideology online.  While fleeing or hiding from attacks in the physical realm, non-state networks 
can remain active on the internet, inspiring followers, sharing information, and planning attacks.  This 
enables networks to extend their reach beyond a specific location and provide sympathizers with the 
information they need to become self-starters, making networks with a significant internet presence 
50 “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.” 
51 “Growing Terrorism in Pakistan.” 
52 Vick, “Spy Fail: Why Iran Is Losing Its Covert War with Israel.” 
53 “IAEA: Syria tried to build nuclear reactor.” 
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more difficult for powerful states to destroy.54  Every group on the US State Department's list of 
designated terrorist organizations maintains an internet presence, including over 4,300 separate 
terrorist-related websites documented by Gabriel Weimann.55  This demonstrates terrorists’ “evaluation 
of the medium’s effectiveness,” and suggests additional undiscovered sites, chat-rooms, and forums.56 
 As CIA bin Laden expert Michael Scheuer argues in Imperial Hubris, use of the internet is 
essential to al Qaeda’s expansion into a global movement.  Through a variety of websites, jihadists 
debate strategy, spread propaganda, gather intelligence, and educate new recruits or potential allies.  
“The internet,” Scheuer wrote in 2004, “allows militant Muslims from every country to meet, talk, and 
get to know each other electronically, a familiarization and bonding process that in the 1980s and early 
1990s required a trip to Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan or Pakistan.”  Additionally, websites directly or 
indirectly related to al Qaeda’s cause share intelligence on targets, justifications by religious scholars, 
and spread “online military training: small unit-tactics; the use and manufacture of toxins and poisons; 
trade craft for intelligence activities; martial arts manuals; textbooks, or sections thereof, dealing with 
the theory and construction of weapons of mass destruction; al Qaeda’s now-famous Encyclopedia of 
Jihad” and more.57  This rapidly increasing trove of information is readily available in English and 
Arabic to any non-state actor interested in attacking states, not just those that support al Qaeda's cause; 
and because of the increasing proliferation of information technology and internet cafés, it can be 
accessed and debated with relative anonymity. 
Beyond computer terminals, rapidly proliferating mobile devices with internet access grant 
networks real-time open-source intelligence as they conduct operations.  In November 2008, 10 
members of Lashkar e Taiba entered Mumbai by sea, split into five two-man teams, and killed 164 
54 See Atran, “The Moral Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” 
55  “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” designated by the U.S. State Department. 
56  Weimann, Terror on the Internet, p. 105. 
57  Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, p. 81. 
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people with automatic rifles and grenades over the course of three days.58  According to Indian 
officials, the attackers utilized BlackBerry smart phones, planning the route from Karachi to Mumbai 
by GPS, familiarizing themselves with Mumbai’s streets by reviewing online maps, and monitoring the 
events via internet news sites.59  Continuous access to news coverage granted the attackers up-to-date 
details on the actions of their cohorts and the movements of Indian security services.  If they did not 
have mobile internet access, the Mumbai attack probably would not have been as deadly, and may not 
have occurred at all. 
Sharing information on the internet enhances the capabilities of insurgent networks as well as 
terrorist groups.  For example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) proved to be the most successful 
weapon Iraqi insurgents deployed against the American-led occupying forces.  From 2003 through late 
2007, IED attacks in Iraq occurred, on average, every 15 minutes, and accounted for approximately two 
thirds of American casualties.60  Instructions on building IEDs proliferate on the internet, with many 
designs utilizing cheap, commercially available technology.  Iraqi insurgents have made bombs out of 
artillery shells, fertilizer, gasoline, and propane canisters, triggered by cell phones, car key fobs, 
walkie-talkies, toy remote controls, wireless doorbell buzzers, and garage door openers.61   
Additionally, because of internet-based information sharing, the United States had difficulty 
keeping up with IED adaptability.  Iraqi insurgents created websites that featured videos of successful 
attacks, experimental explosions, and counterinsurgent troop movements, providing a forum to share 
techniques to overcome American countermeasures.  According to the United States military, after the 
58  “Pakistan Admits India Attack Link.” 
59 “Mumbai Attacks: Terrorists Monitored Coverage on UK Sites Using Blackberry Phones.” 
60 According to “Left of Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs,” by the Washington Post’s Rick Atkinson, as of 
September 2007, IEDs account for 63% of 3,092 American deaths and 69% of the 28,009 American wounded since the 
war began in March 2003.  
61 Saletan, “Technology Lessons from the Iraq War.” 
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US introduced new anti-IED technology, insurgents typically posted instructions on how to defeat it 
within five days.62 
The rise of the global media improved network effectiveness as well.  Terrorist attacks had a 
greater psychological and political impact as footage of them played over and over on screens around 
the world.  Meanwhile, the media kept the public informed about distant asymmetric conflicts, 
highlighting the excesses of strong actors.  For example, images depicting the United States' 
destruction of Fallujah and torture scandals at Abu Ghraib received significant coverage in numerous 
countries, motivating the insurgency and undermining domestic and international support for the 
American war effort in Iraq.  Similarly, global media coverage of America's “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” and treatment of “enemy combatants” held extra-judicially in the prison at Guantanamo 
Bay increased international opposition to the War on Terrorism.  
 
Robotics and States’ Capabilities  
The spread of the internet, expansion of the global media, and proliferation of cell phones all 
enhanced the capabilities of non-state networks, improving their performance in asymmetric conflicts 
against states.  However, focusing entirely on how information technology empowers individuals 
ignores how powerful states have reacted to these developments.  While strong actors may have been 
surprised by the challenges posed by non-state networks in the wake of the information technology 
revolution, they have adjusted strategies and cultivated new technologies in response. 
 To anticipate attacks and protect against terrorism, the American intelligence budget has 
increased dramatically in the last ten years, while over 1,000 new companies related to homeland 
security have arisen.63  Meanwhile, the United States' strategy against al Qaeda has evolved, from 
greater information sharing across American intelligence agencies and those of other countries, to 
62 See Saletan, “Technology Lessons from the Iraq War,” or Bush, “President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Iraq.” 
63 Priest and Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control.” 
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increased attacks on suspected al Qaeda leaders and operatives on foreign soil, including Yemen and 
Pakistan.  In Iraq, after failing to suppress an insurgency composed largely of Sunni Arabs, the United 
States courted Sunni leaders and switched to a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, 
decreasing the frequency of insurgent attacks.64  Perhaps most significantly, the United States and other 
advanced countries have developed various types of military robots, which may be able to neutralize 
some of networks' advantages in asymmetric conflict. 
 Robots have already taken on some of the most dangerous tasks in warfare, such as transporting 
supplies through hostile areas, searching for and dismantling roadside explosives, and conducting aerial 
reconnaissance and attack missions.  This reduces the risks to strong actor soldiers, limiting the costs 
insurgent networks can impose on powerful militaries.  Robotic systems do not need to eat, sleep, or 
use the bathroom; they do not panic or fear attacks by opposing forces.  Unmanned aerial vehicles 
armed with missiles can hover for hours, waiting for the opportune moment to fire, thereby increasing 
the chances of success while potentially reducing collateral damage.  Additionally, whether in the air or 
on the ground, autonomous machines can gather information using cameras and a variety of sensors.  
Potentially, a swarm of robots could collectively gather enough information to give soldiers and 
commanders a detailed, real-time understanding of a given battlespace.   
 With this in mind, this dissertation argues that networks’ exploitation of post-Cold War 
technological and geopolitical developments helps explain the heightened challenge posed by non-state 
networks in the early 21st century.  In the aftermath of a major international transition, networks' 
organizational agility enables relatively rapid development of new strategies, while bureaucratic 
rigidity creates an institutional drag on the development of state counter-strategies.  The rise of al 
Qaeda coincides with world-changing geopolitical and technological transitions: the end of the Cold 
War and the spread of the internet, mobile phones, and global media.  The changes in the international 
64 Petraeus, “Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq.” 
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order and information technology-driven enhancement of individuals’ capabilities created an 
opportunity for al Qaeda and more localized insurgent networks to develop strategies that achieved 
some success against great powers. 
 It is important to note that not every network will rapidly and successfully adapt to changes in 
the international system, just that some will.  Therefore, major geopolitical transitions and 
technological changes that empower individuals will likely be followed by an increase in weak actor 
success in asymmetric warfare in general, not by improvements in every weak actors' capabilities.  
Many non-state networks, probably most, will fail to adapt, and either stagnate or decline; but those 
that successfully adapt will find themselves with a window of opportunity to challenge stronger state 
opponents. 
 However, this logic would then predict a gradual decline of weak actor success in international 
asymmetric conflict, as powerful countries turn the ship of state to face the new challenge.  This 
decline will presumably continue until another significant international transition creates a new window 
of opportunity for networks to exploit.  That transition may already be on the horizon, as increasingly 
sophisticated robots become commercially available, cheaper and easier to acquire.  With information-
gathering robots, networks can monitor strong actor troop movements, helping them anticipate raids 
and respond to ground advancements, and case potential targets without needing to send a human 
operative.  By loading small, commercially available robots with explosives, non-state networks could 
create a kamikaze drone capable of crashing into a target and exploding, almost the weak actor 
equivalent of a guided missile.  Unfortunately, it would not be particularly surprising if someone flew 
an explosives-laden robotic plane or helicopter designed for aerial photography or another commercial 
purpose into a building or bridge in the United States or another developed country.  However, if 
networks develop innovative ways to use robots to threaten or resist powerful states, advanced 
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countries will develop anti-robot measures in response, reasserting their resource advantage until 
another transition facilitates the rise of a new challenge. 
 
Chapter Outline  
Part 1: Asymmetric Warfare 
1) Chapter 1 – A General Theory of Asymmetric Warfare 
This chapter lays out a theory of asymmetric conflict, highlighting the conditions that sometimes 
enable weaker actors to win confrontations against stronger opponents.  I propose that conflicts 
featuring a large resource asymmetry inherently feature non-material asymmetries as well, of resolve, 
expectations, organizational structure, responsibility, information, and institutional agility.  While 
material asymmetry benefits the side with more resources, these non-material asymmetries often favor 
relatively weak actors. 
 
2) Chapter 2 – Testing and Applying the Theory 
This chapter introduces some hypotheses derived from the theory of asymmetric warfare that help 
explain why recent conflicts against non-state networks have proven more challenging for powerful 
countries than conflicts against weaker states.  I test these hypotheses using an original data set 
consisting of every conflict in which at least one side possesses nuclear weapons and find strong 
support for the claim that networks are superior to small states when it comes to fighting nuclear 






3) Chapter 3 – The War on Terror: Al Qaeda the Organization and Al Qaeda the Idea 
Chapter three applies the framework laid out in the first two chapters to analyze the United States' 
War on Terror.  In particular, I distinguish between the challenge of fighting al Qaeda, the organization 
responsible for the September 11th attacks, and combating the larger international jihadist movement, 
which al Qaeda helped catalyze. 
 
Part 2: Robotics 
4) Chapter 4 – Asymmetric Warfare and the Robotics Revolution 
The first chapter in Part 2 catalogues the ground-based and aerial military robots developed by the 
United States and other advanced countries since the end of the Cold War.  Existing and forthcoming 
robotic technologies have the potential to significantly improve strong actors' capabilities against non-
state networks, and in many ways they already have. 
 
5) Chapter 5 – Robotics and Non-State Networks 
Building on the previous chapter, chapter five considers the ways robotics could enhance the 
capabilities of weak actors in asymmetric warfare.  As autonomous machines, especially small 
unmanned aerial vehicles, become commercially available and decline in price, it will become 
progressively easier for non-state networks to acquire robots and put them to use in their fights against 
stronger opponents. 
 
6) Chapter 6 – Robotics and Strong Actor Strategy against Localized Insurgencies: Pursuing 
Information Dominance 
This chapter discusses Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), a military doctrine developed by the 
United States that utilizes information technology to improve coordination between military units.  
23 
 
After laying out some criticisms of NCW, I argue that robotics can help practitioners approach their 
goal of information dominance.   
 
7) Chapter 7 – Robotics and Strong Actor Strategy in Irredentist Conflicts: Defending Israeli 
Civilians 
While the previous chapter focuses on localized insurgencies, chapter seven considers the effect of 
the robotics revolution on strategies of irredentist conflicts.  Analyzing Israel's conflict with Hamas and 
other Gaza-based groups, I argue that robotic anti-missile systems can potentially protect Israeli 
civilians from rocket attacks, Hamas' most effective method of imposing costs on Israel since it gained 












Chapter 1: A General Theory of Asymmetric Warfare 
 
 
 Asymmetric warfare is armed conflict between materially disparate adversaries.  While 
symmetric opponents possess similar levels of material resources and military technologies, 
asymmetric combatants fight at significantly different resource levels.   If everything else is equal, the 
side with greater resources will win military conflicts.  Therefore, the entities that control the most 
resources, Great Powers, dominate the international system.65  These powerful states can engage each 
other in symmetric warfare, while all other entities that wish to challenge a Great Power must fight 











 As this graph depicting the relationship between resources and capabilities shows, powerful 
states are a serious threat to each other, but can neutralize threats more easily as their material 
65 The central insight of structural international relations theory.  See Waltz, Mearsheimer, etc. 
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advantage increases.  This represents the foundation of modern international relations theory,66 and fits 
the general form C (capabilities) = -aX2 - bX.   
 I chose to portray this relationship as exponential (with an X2) rather than linear (with just X) 
for two reasons.  First, military theory argues, and the history of warfare confirms, that small resource 
gaps are rarely decisive.  For example, in a conflict between 10,000 and 10,050 equally armed soldiers, 
factors such as strategy, tactics, and resolve will likely be more important than the slight resource gap.  
However, as resource disparity increases, the rate at which the material gap affects the outcome also 
increases, making resource advantages increasingly decisive.  A force of 10,000 should easily dispatch 
an equally armed force of 50.  This is consistent with Lanchester's Square Law,67 which predicts that 
the ratio of casualties in mechanized warfare will be the inverse square of the ratio of forces.  (A simple 
example: in a conflict of 500 airplanes vs. 100 airplanes of the same type, the force ratio is 5:1.  
Therefore, Lanchester would predict a casualty ratio of 1/52 or 1:25, with the force of 500 eliminating 
its opponent at the cost of four planes).  Second, while I theorize that non-material dimensions of 
warfare affect the outcome of asymmetric contests, I accept the realist assumption that material 
resources are the most important factor in any military conflict, and have captured this by depicting the 
relationship between resources and capabilities as exponential, and the effect of other, non-material 
factors on capabilities as linear (elaborated below and demonstrated in the graph depicting the 
Asymmetry of Agility). 
 While the quantity and quality of soldiers and weaponry may be the most important factor in 
warfare, a basic glance at history shows that the relationship portrayed in the graph between resources 
and capabilities does not always hold.  Sometimes the weaker side achieves its goals; and Great Powers 
66 Known as structural realism or neo-realism, as introduced by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War and laid out in 
Waltz' Theory of International Politics.  Many international relations scholars have expanded upon, challenged, or 
provided alternatives to structural realism, but few, if any, dispute the claim that more resources can provide greater 
military capabilities. 
67 Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare, especially chapters 5 and 6. 
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have occasionally found small enemies more troublesome than midsized opponents.  Therefore, an 
additional factor must affect asymmetric conflicts that enables relatively weak actors to overcome their 
material disadvantages.  Otherwise the side with more resources would always win. 
 
Weak Actor Strategies in Asymmetric Conflict: Guerrilla Warfare, Insurgency, 
and Terrorism  
 Guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, armed resistance, “freedom fighters,” rebels, and 
revolutionaries all fight stronger opponents.  Though these non-state actors are all influenced by the 
dynamics imposed by material disparity, realities of conflict frequently blur the distinction between 
them.  The same individual could be most accurately described as a guerrilla when ambushing or 
resisting engaged military units, an insurgent when destroying government infrastructure or attacking a 
police station, and a terrorist when targeting non-combatants.  Most terrorist and insurgent 
organizations utilize a combination of these tactics; and all justify their actions as legitimate resistance, 
while governments inevitably denounce unsanctioned violence as illegal.  Therefore, this study sets 
aside questions of legitimacy and legality as inherently subjective, and focuses on the adversaries’ 
objective material disparity.  Though not perfectly synonymous, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and 
terrorism overlap significantly, and together form the set of weak actor strategies in asymmetric 
conflict. 
Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap explicitly defined guerrilla warfare as the strategy “of the 
people of a weak and badly equipped country who stand up against an aggressive army which 
possesses better equipment and technique.”68  Echoing earlier guerrilla theorists, al Qaeda strategist 
Abd Aziz al Muqrin writes that insurgency “is a war waged by a poor and weak party using the 
68 Giap, People’s War People’s Army, p. 103. 
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simplest methods and the cheapest means against a strong opponent who has a superiority in arms and 
equipment.”69 Given this material asymmetry, guerrillas must adopt a long-term view of the conflict, 
aiming to gradually defeat their enemies both politically and militarily.  “Another fundamental 
characteristic of the guerrilla soldier” Che Guevara writes, “is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself 
to all circumstances, and convert to his service all the accidents of the action.”70  Guerrilla warfare is 
based on counter-strategy, creatively employing whatever resources become available, acting 
underhanded, sneaky, and generally fighting dirty.  Guerrillas do not wear uniforms or announce 
allegiances, which allows them to blend in with the civilian population and hide from retaliation, like 
fish swimming in a sea of people according to Mao Zedong.71  They embrace surprise, sabotage, and 
assassination, and design hit-and-run raids to exploit enemy weaknesses.  While traditional armies aim 
to capture and hold territory, guerrillas move constantly, harassing the enemy wherever possible. 
To succeed in asymmetric warfare, writes Andrew Mack, a relatively weak actor must first 
“refuse to confront the enemy on his own terms.”72  In symmetric conflicts, adversaries possess 
comparable levels of material power and similar military technologies.  Though not perfectly equal, 
symmetric antagonists have the means to compete on the same plane, and rely on superior 
mobilization, discipline, maneuver, and luck to succeed.  By contrast, in direct combat against 
asymmetric adversaries, strong actors can usually translate material advantage into overwhelming 
victory.  As Ivan Arreguin-Toft demonstrates, of 173 asymmetric wars from 1800-2000, weak actors 
won only 23.2% of 151 conflicts when directly confronting their stronger opponents, but defeated more 
69 Al Muqrin, Al-Qaida's Doctrine for Insurgency, p. 92. 
70  Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 20. 
71  See Mao, “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains,” 1928; “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 
1936; “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan,” 1938; “On Protracted War,” 1938. 
72  Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” p. 176. 
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powerful adversaries in 63.6% of 22 confrontations in which they took an indirect approach and 
refused to fight on the stronger actor’s terms.73 
 Arreguin-Toft's study is perhaps the most prominent international relations research on 
asymmetric conflict, and offers empirical support for Mack's main contention that weak actors will 
probably lose if they meet stronger opponents in direct military confrontation.  However, his categories 
of “direct” and “indirect” strategies are too broad to advance the understanding of weak actor 
successes, and most asymmetric conflict strategies combine elements of both types.  “Direct strategic 
approaches—e.g., conventional attack and defense,” he writes, “target an adversary’s armed forces 
with the aim of destroying or capturing that adversary’s physical capacity to fight, thus making will 
irrelevant.”74  This category straightforwardly captures the traditional model of large scale maneuver 
warfare, which focuses on counterforce attrition and holding territory.75  In conflicts between a direct 
offense and a direct defense, “nothing mediates between relative material power and outcomes,”76 and 
the stronger actor usually wins decisively, as depicted in the Resources and Capabilities graph above.  
By contrast, indirect approaches seek to undermine an opponent’s will to continue the fight, thus 
making the balance of forces irrelevant.     
 However, few weak actors in the modern era are naive or overconfident enough to line up on a 
battlefield against a materially superior enemy, and most lack the means to even consider primarily 
direct strategies.  Arreguin-Toft's study includes wars between strong states and weak states, along with 
conflicts between states and non-state actors, which explains the presence of many direct strategic 
interactions in his database.  Nevertheless, his theory fails to capture the strategies of most terrorist, 
73  Arreguin-Toft, p. 45.  His database includes all conflicts from the years 1800-2000 with more than 1,000 battle deaths in 
which the combatants have a measurable material power ratio of 5:1 or greater. 
74  Arreguin-Toft, p. 34. 
75 “Counterforce” attacks target opponents' military resources, reducing war-fighting capabilities.  By contrast, 
“countervalue” attacks target opponents' non-military assets, such as civilian population centers, aiming to cause enough 
pain to convince opponents to abandon their war effort.  See Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System. 
76  Arreguin-Toft, p. 34. 
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insurgent, and guerrilla groups, leaving an opening for this study to explore the variety of weak actor 
strategies that fall under the broad category of “indirect.” 
 
Overcoming Material Disparity  
While avoiding direct engagement with more powerful enemy forces, relatively weak non-state 
actors hope to achieve their primary goals by one of two main strategies: 1) acquire more power while 
wearing down the enemy’s capacity, until material asymmetry is no longer the defining feature of the 
conflict; 2) impose military, economic, and political costs until the enemy abandons its military 
campaign, withdraws forces, or alters a particular behavior.  Domestic conflicts typically classified as 
revolutions, civil wars, or guerrilla insurrections fit the first form, as weak actors intend to take over the 
state, like the Bolsheviks, or become the dominant governing force of a given geographical area, like 
the American Confederacy.  These conflicts end when the challenger to the government becomes the 
strong actor and can use the state apparatus to crush opponents, or achieves relative symmetry and can 
oppose the government using conventional military means.   
   However, many weak actors cannot plausibly reach relative symmetry, and must rely on the 
second strategy of compellence.77  This especially applies to localized insurgencies, like Vietnam or 
Iraq, as the weak actor seeks the withdrawal of foreign forces or a decrease of foreign influence, rather 
than control of the foreign state’s territory.  Additionally, the second main strategy describes the early 
asymmetric phases of domestic conflicts that finish as symmetric, as in the case of Mao and Che’s 
communist revolutions.  The greater the weak actor’s material disadvantage, the more asymmetric the 
conflict, and the more restricted weak actors become to strategies that avoid the enemy’s strengths.  
77 Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence, defined “compellence” as using a limited amount of force to convince an 
opponent (i.e. “compel” them) to abandon a particular behavior.  “The threat that compels rather than deters,” Schelling 
writes, “requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts,” p. 70.  
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Given this restriction, weak actors must develop strategies that exploit the non-material dimensions of 
asymmetric warfare.   
 
Non-material Asymmetries  
Resource disparity defines asymmetric conflicts, but not the entire difference between relatively 
strong and weak actors.  Discussing guerrilla strategy, Mao argued that “the enemy has advantages 
only in one respect…but shortcomings in all others,” while insurgents “have shortcomings in only one 
respect but advantages in all others.”78  This implies that material power is only one element of 
asymmetric warfare, and that weaker actors can overcome their resource disadvantage by exploiting the 
non-material asymmetries inherent in material disparity.  Controlling vast resources conveys a number 
of benefits, but can be burdensome as well, creating fixed targets that need defending.  Relatively 
strong actors tend to have numerous interests and responsibilities beyond the conflict, heightened 
expectations of low-cost victory, more information to process and protect, and less flexible institutional 
structures.  Overall, the tradeoff for greater resources is less agility.  
 
Asymmetry of Interest/Resolve 
 Andrew Mack proposed that resource asymmetry leads the weaker actor to have greater interest 
in the conflict.  The stakes in asymmetric warfare, he argues, are inherently higher for the weaker party 
because the price of their defeat is the loss of independence or total destruction.  By contrast, the strong 
actor does not face a threat to its survival.  When survival is at stake, as in the symmetric World Wars, 
or domestic revolutions, the war effort takes “automatic primacy above all other goals.”79  However, in 
international asymmetric warfare the strong actor’s interest in the conflict is limited, which allows for 
78  Mao, “On Protracted War,” p. 208. 
79  Mack, p. 184. 
32 
                                                 
 
debates within the foreign state over the ideal allocation of resources, creating the political conditions 
that could lead to withdrawal. 
 Beyond material costs—money, soldiers, equipment—an asymmetry of interest leads the strong 
actor to suffer greater political costs.  According to Mack, “when the survival of the nation is not 
directly threatened, and when the obvious asymmetry in conventional military power bestows an 
underdog status on the insurgent side, the morality of the war is more easily questioned.”80  This 
implies that domestic and international opposition to the war will grow due to moral outrage over the 
death and destruction caused by a powerful state asserting a less-than-vital interest.  By contrast, when 
survival is at risk, as it is for the weaker actor, “the propensity to question and protest the morality of 
the means used to defeat the enemy is markedly attenuated.”81 
 By avoiding direct combat, where material advantage could prove decisive, guerrillas can force 
their opponents into a “protracted war.”82  According to Mao, denying the enemy victory extends the 
conflict, and creates a situation in which insurgents’ can slowly bleed powerful armies, imposing costs 
that weaken resolve.  Given enough material advantage, a stronger actor will win any contest of force, 
which implies that weak actors can win only if they can make the conflict a contest of will.  As Mack 
notes, in cases of weak actor victory, “success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory on 
the ground—though military successes may have been a contributory cause—but rather from the 




80  Mack, p. 186. 
81 Mack, p. 187. 
82 Mao, “On Protracted War.” 
83 Mack, p. 177. 
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Asymmetry of Expectations 
 Following the relationship between resources and capabilities as depicted in the graph above, 
strong actors’ material advantage leads them to expect rapid, low cost victory.  Weaker actors, on the 
other hand, face an overwhelmingly powerful foe, and cannot expect that victory will be easy or cheap.  
As a result, prolonged confrontations disadvantage stronger actors by enhancing the weak actors' 
relative resolve advantage.  As conflicts drag on, the resource toll grows, creating “guns-or-butter”84 
debates in actors with multiple interests, which Mao referred to as “contradictions within the enemy's 
camp.”85  The more a strong actor expects a quick and easy victory, the more protracted conflicts and 
their accompanying resource drain lead to arguments within the strong actor to shift resources to other 
priorities. 
 The asymmetry of expectations also disrupts traditional war assessment metrics.  Expecting an 
easy victory, strong parties are particularly affected when they lose soldiers, and less encouraged by 
enemy casualties.  Expecting safety at home, as well as in embassies or bases, strong actors are more 
affected by the deaths of civilians or off-duty soldiers.  Weak parties, by contrast, expect to lose most 
battles and suffer greatly in pursuit of victory, and therefore consider individual casualties less costly.  
Small victories greatly encourage weaker actors, while any developments that do not portend decisive 
victory discourage strong actors.  As a result, as Henry Kissinger noted, “the guerrilla wins if he does 




84 See Powell, Robert, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy” for the role this plays in state decision-making in international 
relations. 
85 Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan.” 
86 Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations,” p. 214. 
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Asymmetry of Organization 
 To utilize large amounts of resources, states have adopted bureaucratic institutions.  
Bureaucratic organizations are based on centralized power and clearly-defined positions arranged in a 
top-down structure (frequently depicted as an inverted tree).  The positions and the structure outlast any 
individual members, who can be replaced with another person fulfilling a similar function.  All states 
utilize this structure to organize their governments and militaries, as do all large businesses, with the 
most powerful states possessing the largest bureaucracies.   
 By contrast, many non-state actors control considerably fewer resources than states, and have 
adopted a networked structure.  Networks are organized based on nodes (i.e. individuals), and 
structured by the connections between them.  They are “bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse,” and an “exchange of information and services.”87  Networks are thus more fluid than 
bureaucracies, changing as individuals leave or join and as the relationships between the members 
evolve.  Insurgencies, transnational terrorist organizations, drug cartels, political activists and many 
smaller businesses organize as networks.  This institutional form is less able to concentrate resources or 
coordinate individual actions than bureaucracy, but more capable of changing rapidly and more open to 
individual initiative.  In other words, compared to bureaucracies, networks have less material power, 
but greater agility. 
 To prevent a decisive defeat in asymmetric warfare, relatively weak actors need to minimize 
their vulnerability to strong actors’ militaries.  Unlike the vertical hierarchies of state armies, terrorists 
and insurgent groups tend to organize as horizontal networks to avoid decisive counterattacks or 
decapitation strikes.  As a result, non-state networks are less attached to specific territory, fleeing areas 
where their enemy is strong, only to regroup and attack elsewhere.  Members tend to avoid uniforms or 
other readily identifiable characteristics, and thus can blend in among local populations.  Networks 
87 From Keck and Sikkink's definition of a transnational advocacy network in Activists Beyond Borders, ch. 1.   
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keep the location—or sometimes even the identity—of their leaders hidden, denying their opponents a 
clear target. 
 In addition to enhancing the prospects of survival, a networked organization enhances weak 
actors' ability to surprise opponents with unanticipated attacks and fluid strategies.  Networks can 
employ “idiosyncratic approaches” due to their “cellular and compartmented nature.”88  In Networks 
and Netwars, Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that this looser organizational form grants networks a 
“capacity for swarming,”89 in which they attack unexpectedly, disperse, and later reform to attack in a 
different manner.  This poses a particular difficulty for militaries and security services accustomed to 
fighting bureaucratic opponents, who utilize consistent strategies, and have known identifies and fixed 
targets.  Unlike bureaucratic state militaries, non-state networks cannot wield vast amounts of material 
power, but can adapt quickly to changing circumstances.  For example, as Gen. Montgomery Meigs 
argues, the threat al Qaeda poses to the United States “derives from its ability to change its operational 
system at will in response to the methods needed to approach and attack each new target.”90  
Furthermore, non-state networks grant greater operational independence to sub-units, decreasing the 
value of individual captures, and creating the possible threat of sleeper cells.   
 However, there are numerous disadvantages to networked organizational forms, primarily an 
inability to exercise concentrated power.91  Decentralization limits strategic coordination by decreasing 
the reliability of communications and efficiency of information sharing.  Separate nodes may have 
similar ideologies or long-term goals, but different immediate circumstances or preferences.  “As a 
result, resources may be used poorly, contradictory tactics selected, and activities carried out that serve 
88  Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare,” p. 8. 
89  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, p. 12. 
90 Meigs, p. 10. 
91 See Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks.” 
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parochial short-term interests rather than the larger mission.”92  Notably, the importance of trust and 
interpersonal connections limits scalability, and subjects larger networks to splintering.  Therefore, 
bureaucratic organization is probably necessary for symmetric confrontation between powerful 
adversaries.  However, a networked organization mitigates the disadvantages for weak actors facing 
dramatic material asymmetry.  Though their capabilities may be limited, non-state networks pose a 
greater challenge for powerful states than weak actors organized bureaucratically, because they lack 
clear targets or reliable negotiating partners, and can changes strategies more easily.   
 
Asymmetry of Responsibility 
The less powerful an organization, the fewer its responsibilities to non-combatants.  “The 
insurgent is fluid,” writes David Galula, “because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets; the 
counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both.”93  Compared to governments, non-state networks are 
less concerned with maintaining infrastructure, protecting civilians, managing an economy, and 
honoring international agreements.  They depend on commercially available products, makeshift 
workshops, the black market and theft for military supplies, rather than an industrial base or 
international trade.  To the extent that they provide government-like functions, networks are exceeding 
expectations.   
States, by contrast, have greater responsibilities to their respective populations.  All but the 
most coercive states must provide some security and basic services or face rejection.  When non-
combatants have the option of assisting or joining an insurgency, a state’s need to live up to its 
governing responsibilities increases; not necessarily because the insurgency has a greater ability to 
provide government functions, but because it stands in opposition to the failing government.  The 
92 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, p. 21. 
93 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 7. 
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state’s failure to meet its responsibilities undermines popular support, which decreases a source of 
material power and intelligence, thereby granting the resistance an advantage. 
As a result, violence by the weaker actor can be primarily disruptive.  Insurgents or terrorists 
can hurt states by destroying infrastructure or denying civilians a sense of security, while governments 
need to protect all major assets at once, requiring far more resources.  A disruptive strategy is attractive 
to materially disadvantaged combatants because, as Galula argues, “disorder... is cheap to create and 
very costly to prevent.”94  By sowing disorder, insurgents force states to devote more resources towards 
guarding against attacks, increasing the material and political costs of the conflict.  Therefore, the 
asymmetry of responsibility suggests a refinement of Kissinger’s maxim: the guerrilla wins if he 
disrupts the state’s ability to function normally, while the state wins only when it eliminates or prevents 
the guerrillas’ capacity for disruption. 
 
Asymmetry of Information 
 A networked organization is particularly advantageous to weaker actors because it capitalizes 
on the asymmetry of information.  Guerrillas possess specific information regarding group 
membership, the allegiance of local non-combatants, and the timing and location of idiosyncratic 
attacks.  The aim of a terrorist group, therefore, is to keep this information hidden from its enemy; and 
a networked organization compartmentalizes the information so that revelation of a given operation or 
identity does not compromise the entire organization. 
 Powerful states, by contrast, possess an immense amount of general information.  From this 
general information, strong actors try to identify enemies and anticipate attacks.  Though fairly 
straightforward in symmetric battles, “identifying the adversary” is far more difficult in asymmetric 
94 See Galula, “Insurgency is cheap, counterinsurgency is costly,” in Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 6-7. 
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conflicts,95 and this is compounded by the difficulty of routing the relevant information through 
bureaucratic channels in time to act.  The inability to identify terrorists or insurgents sometimes leads 
states to employ indiscriminate violence, in the hope of killing combatants along with civilians, or 
intimidating them into switching their allegiance and providing more specific information;96 though 
this often backfires by galvanizing opposition.97   
 As a result, popular support plays a more significant role in asymmetric wars between states and 
networks than in symmetric wars between bureaucratic armies.  Among military and academic 
scholars, there is a virtual consensus that terrorists and insurgents utilize violence to “alter the attitudes 
and behavior of multiple audiences.”98  Due to their material inferiority, non-state networks cannot 
hope to defeat state armies in direct combat, and are forced to design strategies that undermine political 
support for the conflict among the state’s decision-makers.  To survive, prolong the conflict, and 
advance their goals, networks require some local and international legitimacy, which helps a network 
acquire the sanctuary, financial support, freedom of movement, and steady stream of recruits it needs to 
counter a state’s material superiority.     
 Localized insurgents will usually have greater knowledge of local preferences and forms of 
communication, and can exploit this asymmetry of information to frame foreign opponents as 
exploitative and imperialistic.  Some organizations, like Hamas or Hezbollah, further enhance their 
domestic legitimacy by providing social services.99  In general, states will have greater access to 
networks’ private information if local populations consider the network’s actions illegitimate, or if non-
combatants perceive themselves as sharing an identity with the state.  If networks use coercion to 
95  Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, p. 23. 
96  Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea.” 
97  Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War.” 
98  Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, p. 4. 
99  See Norton, Hezbollah, especially ch. 5, or Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. 
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garner popular support, the state will be unable to counter this intimidation unless non-combatants 
believe the state wants to protect them.   
Networks can enhance their international legitimacy by actively promoting their political 
position and using local knowledge to highlight the most brutal of their opponents’ actions.  This helps 
networks acquire financial assistance or state sponsorship, granting them some of the resources of a 
state unaccompanied by the responsibilities of governing.  Strong actors possess greater material 
resources to communicate intentions and spin events, but face considerable informational asymmetries 
when they try to delegitimize resistance networks, decreasing the chances of decisive strong actor 
victory. 
This enforces the notion that wars between materially disparate adversaries are fundamentally 
political contests.  Unless a massively larger party employs unlimited force, like the Nazis in response 
to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,100 asymmetric conflicts are won or lost based on hearts and minds.  
“All insurgencies,” notes the latest U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “even today’s highly 
adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people.”101  Therefore, the “battle for the population” is 
central to any asymmetric conflict.102  This does not suggest, as Charles Dunlap mockingly argues, that 
“defeating an insurgency is all about winning hearts and minds with teams of anthropologists, 
propagandists, and civil-affairs officers armed with democracy-in-a-box kits and volleyball nets.”103  
Capturing or killing committed insurgents plays a prominent role, but “there is a more certain way of 
eliminating the guerrilla than seeking to hunt him down among the civilians; it is to turn the civilians 
against him.”104  If the stronger actor is unwilling to massacre whole populations, the asymmetric 
conflict, by its nature, takes place in the political arena.  As Audrey Kurth Cronin demonstrates, 
100 “The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,” The United States Holocaust Museum Online. 
101 “Counterinsurgency Field Manual,” the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, foreword. 
102 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, p. 4. 
103 Dunlap, “We Still Need the Big Guns.” 
104 Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience, p. 161. 
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“reducing popular support, both active and passive, is an effective means of hastening the demise of 
some terrorist groups.”105  Strong actor victory requires considerable political and military efforts, but, 
as Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly asserts, “there is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq, 
to the insurgency of Iraq.”106 
Weak actors engaged in dramatically asymmetric conflicts, like transnational terrorist 
organizations and anti-colonial resistance, face insurmountable material power disadvantages, and must 
rely on informational strategies.  They utilize violence primarily to demonstrate capabilities and 
resolve, spread fear, embarrass security services, inspire followers, and provoke overreactions.107  
Along these lines, terrorism can be defined as a strategy of asymmetric warfare that uses violence 
against non-combatants or civilian infrastructure to disrupt normalcy, creating a larger 
psychological/social/political impact on various audiences.108  As Brigitte Nacos argues, “unlike 
common criminals, terrorists have the need to communicate in mind when they plan and stage their 
violent incidents; terrorists go out of their way in order to provide the mass media with cruel, shocking, 
and frightening images.”109  These images and the signals they send are far easier to create than 
suppress or control, creating an informational asymmetry that favors weaker actors.   
 
Asymmetry of Agility 
 Conflicts between states and networks are shaped by the adversaries' resource disparity, which 
creates asymmetries of resolve, expectations, organization, responsibility and information.  Taken 
together, these asymmetries suggest that networks enjoy greater institutional agility than their state 
105 Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” p. 42. 
106 “No Military Solution to Iraq, U.S. General Says.” 
107 See Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” for a discussion of the various signals sent by terrorist attacks. 
108 Non-combatants are anyone other than actively engaged military.  This definition of terrorism draws upon, but differs 
somewhat from, those offered by Bruce Hoffman (see Inside Terrorism, pp. 39-40) and Brigitte Nacos (see Mass-
Mediated Terrorism, pp. 24-28).  
109 Nacos, p. 14. 
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opponents.  With lower expectations, less responsibility to maintain infrastructure or provide security, 
superior knowledge of their immediate circumstances, and a more flexible organizational structure, 
relatively weak actors have the potential to adapt more quickly than their stronger, more bureaucratic 
opponents.  Therefore, while conflict between powerful states and weaker states may be determined by 
the effect of resource disparity on military capabilities (C = -aX2 - bX, as depicted in the Resources and 
Capabilities graph above), conflicts between states and networks are influenced by the effect on agility 









 As the graph shows, in symmetric war, with no resource disparity, neither actor is significantly 
more agile than the other.  However, as the resource gap increases, a smaller organization becomes 
relatively more agile than its larger opponent, fitting the general form A = X.  This does not assume 
that every large organization will be less agile than all smaller organizations, just that resources have to 
be stored and managed, implying a tradeoff in which greater resource levels tend to create a drag on 
agility.  I chose to portray the relationship as linear (with an X), in contrast to the relationship between 
resources and capabilities, which is portrayed above as exponential (with an X2), to reflect the standard 
international relations claim that resources have a more significant effect on capabilities than on agility.  
Resource Disparity 
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Material disparity thus remains the most significant factor in asymmetric warfare, while non-material 
asymmetries have an effect, but play a secondary role.   
 Combining agility (A) with material capabilities (C) by adding the two equations and the effect 
of their interaction (C+A+CA), creates the pattern demonstrated in the following graph, which takes 
the general form Threat (T) = -aX3 - bX.  It implies that a Great Power would face the greatest threat 
from a powerful state adversary, but that a network is more threatening than a small state, even though 
the latter possesses greater resources.  Applying this to 21st century asymmetric conflicts, al Qaeda has 
developed a strategy that takes advantage of the agility associated with a networked form of 
organization, which, when fighting an opponent with significantly greater resources such as the United 
States, is superior to a bureaucracy like that of the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein.  
     
 As the graph demonstrates, resources remain the primary determinant of which actors could 
threaten a Great Power.  However, after material power falls below a certain threshold, it corresponds 
with an increasing agility advantage from proprietary information and decreased responsibility.  This 
creates a hump in the tail of the curve, in which small state armies, like Iraq’s in 2003, are less capable 
of threatening powerful states or the globalizing international order than non-state networks like al 
Resources and Threat 
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Qaeda.  With large economies, militaries, and stockpiles of nuclear weapons, states like Russia and 
China remain highly relevant actors in the global arena.  However, with its ability to exploit non-
material asymmetries, al Qaeda presents a greater challenge for the United States than the Iraqi army, 
despite less material power.   
 
Conclusion  
Strategies based in terrorism frequently fail to achieve perpetrators’ ambitious long-term goals, 
and their success should not be exaggerated.110  Surprise attacks and mass-murder of civilians may 
backfire by motivating opponents or alienating potential allies.  However, whether hoping to eventually 
achieve relative symmetry, or coerce considerably more powerful opponents, networks have utilized 
terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare to threaten state security, resist power projection, disrupt 
efforts to impose order, and influence political decision-making.  When facing massive material power 
disadvantages, weak actors have little choice but to utilize political strategies based on the interplay of 
violence and communication.  To pursue their goals against stronger opponents, non-state networks 
must exploit non-material asymmetries of interest, expectations, organization, responsibility, and 
information. 
 
110 See Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.”  
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Chapter 2: Testing and Applying the Theory  
 
 
The central insight of the general theory of asymmetric warfare laid out in the previous chapter 
is that strong actors face a greater challenge from relatively weak actors organized as networks than 
from those organized as bureaucratic states.  This is a testable proposition, one that has not been 
examined by previous international relations studies.  Utilizing data on strong actor fatalities, conflict 
duration, and conflict outcome, I find strong support for the claim that powerful states have an easier 
time achieving their goals in conflicts against relatively weak states than against non-state networks.  
The results imply that the United States and other powerful countries should focus technological and 
strategic development more on improving their capabilities against networks than against smaller 
states. 
 While every asymmetric conflict is subject to the basic dynamics of material disparity, all wars 
between states and networks are not identical.  The proximity of the conflict to the strong actor's main 
territory affects the strategic options available to both sides.  In Localized Insurgencies, such as the 
United States-led occupation of Iraq, the conflict takes place far from the strong actor, enabling weak 
actors to design strategies aimed at convincing the strong actor to withdraw.  However, in Irredentist 
conflicts, such as that between Israel and various Palestinian resistance groups, the strong and weak 
actors are close together, increasing the ability of the weak actor to threaten the strong actor's civilians 
and decreasing or eliminating the possibility that the strong actor will withdraw.  Therefore, strong 
actor resolve is higher in irredentist conflicts, and the weak actor’s strategy focuses more on improving 
its negotiating position and winning concessions than compelling withdrawal.  Testing these 
propositions, I find that irredentist conflicts, on average, feature significantly higher strong actor 
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civilian fatalities and are significantly less likely to end with strong actor success than are localized 
insurgencies. 
 Additionally, prominent studies of asymmetric conflict have noted a trend towards greater weak 
actor success beginning in the early 20th century, attributing this pattern to the spread of a particularly 
successful weak actor strategy111 or strong actors' increasing reliance on mechanized weaponry.112  I 
offer an alternative explanation based on networks' ability to take advantage of geopolitical and 
technological transitions.  To test this, I divide the sample of asymmetric conflicts into two time 
periods: post-WWII through the end of the Cold War and post-Cold War.  Besides marking a major 
geopolitical transition, the latter coincides with the spread of the internet and other information 
technology, which enhanced networks' information acquisition, recruiting, and communication 
capabilities.  I find that the split between small states and networks becomes more dramatic after the 
end of the Cold War, with powerful states succeeding more often and suffering fewer fatalities when 
fighting weaker states, and succeeding less often and enduring more fatalities in conflicts against 
networks, lending support to the argument that particular features of the information age help explain 
networks’ relatively greater success against great powers.  
 
Big States vs. Small States and Big States vs. Networks: Hypotheses  
This section briefly introduces the main hypotheses tested in this chapter.  To examine the 
performance of powerful states in conflicts against weaker states and networks, I utilize measures of 
civilian fatalities, military fatalities, conflict duration, and conflict outcome.  Many studies focus on 
only one of these measurements, usually outcome.  However, by looking at fatalities and duration in 
addition to outcome, the hypotheses below provide a more comprehensive examination of the 
111 Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. 
112 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.” 
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differences between big state-small state and big state-network conflicts, and which type of opponent is 
more capable against powerful countries. 
 Opponents that cause more civilian fatalities are more threatening.  One of the primary 
responsibilities of any state is to provide civilians with security from foreign attack.  While 
governments utilize various degrees of forceful coercion against their own citizens, any that cannot 
protect their citizens from foreign attack risk losing power due to popular rejection.  In particular, 
citizens of great powers expect their government to protect them from attacks by relatively weaker 
actors.  Therefore, I hypothesize that, compared to small states, networks tend to cause more big state 
civilian fatalities. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (threat): Networks cause more civilian fatalities than small states. 
 
 Opponents that cause more military fatalities make wars more costly.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, due to the asymmetry of expectations, the ratio of casualties is not especially 
important in asymmetric warfare.  Weak actors expect to suffer many casualties when fighting stronger 
opponents, while strong actor military fatalities can create political costs that weaken resolve.  In wars 
in which the great power's survival is not at stake, those with high costs can lead domestic actors to 
question the conflict and advocate shifting resources to other priorities.  Therefore, I hypothesize that, 
compared to small states, networks tend to cause more big state military fatalities. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (cost): Networks cause more military fatalities than small states. 
 
 Opponents that prolong conflicts and prevent great powers from achieving their goals are more 
challenging.  Big states fighting small states or networks expect to translate their resource advantage 
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into rapid success.  Prolonging the confrontation enables weaker actors to impose costs upon their 
stronger opponents which can lead to war weariness and a decision to abandon the conflict.  Even if 
they are unable to kill many strong actor soldiers, weak actors impose financial and political costs 
merely by avoiding defeat and extending the resources, time and effort a big state spends in pursuit of 
its goals.  Therefore, I hypothesize that conflicts between big states and networks tend to last longer 
than conflicts between big states and small states.  Additionally, I hypothesize that strong actors will 
achieve their goals more often against small states than against networks.   
 
Hypothesis 3A (challenge): Conflicts against networks last longer than conflicts against small states. 
Hypothesis 3B (challenge): Conflicts against networks end in success less often than conflicts against 
small states. 
 
Data and Research Design  
 To test the hypotheses described above relating to the claim that networks are better than small 
states at fighting great powers, I constructed an original data set of every conflict involving a nuclear-
weapons state.  Each opponent state is categorized as either another nuclear weapons state (big state), a 
non-nuclear weapons state (small state), or a non-state actor.  Deliverable nuclear weapons provide a 
qualitative military advantage over any non-nuclear opponent, and a powerful deterrent that influences 
any opponent's strategic considerations.  Additionally, based on 2013 figures, nuclear weapons states 
have the world's largest military budgets (based on total dollars, not percentage of GDP), with the US, 
China, Russia, and the UK making up the top four, France following at number six, and India at 
number eight (Japan is fifth and Saudi Arabia seventh).113  Nuclear weapons are therefore a simple way 
113 “SIPRI military expenditure database.” 
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to separate big states from small states, and isolate which actors are most threatening to the United 
States and other powerful countries. 
 The data set features every post-WWII conflict involving a nuclear weapons state listed in the 
UCDP database, a standard resource for international relations research that includes every conflict 
with at least 25 battle deaths, as well as those listed in the 2008 edition of Warfare and Armed 
Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, which includes conflicts with 
fewer than 25 battle deaths. The data set therefore includes every conflict that began after a state's first 
nuclear weapons test, along with any that were in progress at the time of the test, but did not conclude 
until after.  Israel is an exception, as the country did not conduct an official test and maintains a policy 
of “nuclear ambiguity,” but is widely believed to possess over 100 nuclear weapons.  For Israel, I used 
January 1967 as the starting point based on a CIA assessment from early 1967 that Israel had produced 
bomb components and enough enriched fissile material to construct a couple of warheads.114  These 
inclusion criteria resulted in a data set of 105 armed conflict dyads in which at least one side was a 
nuclear weapons state.  
 However, while India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all tested nuclear weapons, they are not 
included in the analysis for various reasons.  First, North Korea has not demonstrated an ability to 
deliver a nuclear warhead over distance, and therefore does not fit the definition of a nuclear weapons 
state articulated above.  India possesses deliverable nuclear weapons, and, since its first test in 1974 has 
engaged in two wars and some smaller skirmishes with a small state (pre-nuclear Pakistan), one 
conflict with a big state (nuclear Pakistan) and at least 26 conflicts with non-state networks, many of 
them domestic.  Unfortunately, acquiring accurate data on Indian civilian and military casualties in 
these asymmetric conflicts proved especially difficult.  Anecdotally, India's numerous lost-lasting 
conflicts with non-state actors, including insurgents in Kashmir, and relatively quick wars with 
114 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 298. 
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Pakistan, which either ended with an Indian victory or a ceasefire upholding the pre-war status quo, 
appear to support the claim that networks are more threatening and challenging to great powers than 
small states.  However, without sufficient fatality data, I could not incorporate India into the 
quantitative study.  Similarly, Pakistan fought one war against a big state since its first nuclear test in 
1999, the Kargil War against nuclear India, and at least four against non-state networks, including 
insurgent groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas near the Afghan border.  With no wars 
against a small state since becoming a nuclear power, Pakistan's experience also supports the claim that 
networks pose a greater threat than small states.  However, without detailed fatality figures I could not 
include Pakistan in the data analysis below.   These exclusions resulted in a dataset with 88 conflict 
observations used in the empirical analysis (see the appendix for a complete list).   
The first thing that jumps out from a glance at this data is that only two of the conflicts are 
between nuclear weapons states.  A border clash between the USSR and China in 1969 and the Kargil 
War between India and Pakistan in 1999 are the only times since World War II that the military forces 
of one nuclear weapons state have killed the soldiers or civilians of another.  Furthermore, these big 
state-big state conflicts were limited and relatively quick.  The Sino-Soviet border clash lasted only 
nine months and resulted in zero civilian deaths.  Russia suffered only 58 military fatalities while 
killing approximately 600 Chinese soldiers.  Similarly, the Kargil War was more limited than conflicts 
between India and Pakistan before Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test in May 1998.  It lasted less than 
three months and caused considerably fewer deaths on both sides than the wars in 1965 and 1971, 
ending with a return to the pre-war status quo. 
 This provides strong support for the claim that powerful states in the post-World War II period 
have mostly checked each other.  Despite this apparent success of mutually assured destruction, 
perhaps supplemented by economic interdependence and participation in international institutions, I do 
not argue that great powers are less threatening or pose less of a challenge to each other than non-state 
50 
 
networks.  As demonstrated by the final graph in chapter one portraying the relationship between 
resources and threat, great powers are capable of symmetric war against each other.  Nuclear 
capabilities give them greater ability to threaten other powerful states and, coupled with large 
conventional military budgets, greater ability to deny other great powers success in the event of armed 
confrontation.  Nevertheless, in 103 out of 105 conflicts involving a nuclear state, the other side has 
been a non-nuclear state or a non-state actor, which demonstrates the prominence of these types of 
conflict pairs in the post-WWII environment.  Therefore, the data analysis presented below excludes 
the two conflicts between nuclear states, instead focusing on conflicts that involve nuclear states 
fighting small states or non-state networks. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 The proposition that nuclear powers pose the greatest potential threat to each other is hardly 
novel; less intuitive is the claim that networks are more dangerous than non-nuclear states.  To test this 
theory, I collected data on civilian and military fatalities, conflict duration, and conflict outcome and 
used these figures to evaluate a series of hypotheses comparing networks' and small states' ability to 
threaten, impose costs, and challenge nuclear weapons states.  Since this project focuses on the security 
challenges for great powers, each of these dependent variables is measured from the perspective of the 
big state.   
First, I collected information on civilian and military fatalities suffered by the nuclear state in 
each conflict.  Using fatality data is uncommon in international relations research and, to the best of my 
knowledge, unprecedented in studies of asymmetric warfare.  Most conflict studies, especially of 
asymmetric warfare, focus on war outcomes, while some consider conflict duration.  These variables 
capture important aspects of warfare, but miss the costs combatants pay on their way to victory or 
defeat.  An exception is a study by Valentino, Huth and Croco, who argue that democratic 
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accountability leads democracies to suffer fewer military and civilian fatalities in interstate wars than 
non-democracies.115  Given the prominent role imposing costs on stronger opponents plays in weak 
actor strategy, analyzing fatality data in addition to duration and outcome is especially appropriate for 
studying asymmetric conflict.  
Existing data sources either pool the war-time fatalities of all sides of a conflict into a single 
measure, regardless of which side they are suffered by (e.g. UCDP dataset, Correlates of War dataset), 
or provide actor-specific fatality data but limit the scope of their coverage to only large-scale (greater 
than 1000 battle deaths) conflicts (e.g. Valentino, Huth and Croco 2006).  It was therefore necessary to 
supplement existing data using a variety of sources—including academic studies, official government 
statistics, and media reports.  Using these sources, I gathered information on civilian and military 
fatalities suffered by the nuclear state in each conflict.  The first two dependent variables used in the 
analyses presented below count the total number of (1) civilian and (2) military deaths suffered by the 
nuclear state in each conflict. The natural log of these values is used in the analysis to account for the 
highly skewed distribution of both variables.  Civilian fatalities range, in the dataset, from a minimum 
of 0 to a maximum of 3,025 (the natural log ranges from 0 to 8.015).  Military fatalities, on the other 
hand, display much greater variation, ranging from 0 to a maximum of 58,178 (the natural log ranges 
from 0 to 10.971). 
 To measure conflict duration I coded the beginning of each conflict as the month in which 
strong actor forces first entered a foreign country or when weak actors first attempted an attack on 
strong actor civilians or military forces, whichever came first.  For the end of a conflict, I used the 
month in which the strong actor withdrew forces or otherwise abandoned its military effort, the strong 
actor comprehensively achieved its main goal, or the two combatants reached a peace agreement or 
ceasefire.  For ongoing conflicts I used July 2013 as the end date for duration purposes.  The war 
115 Valentino et. al., “Bear Any Burden?” 
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duration dependent variable is therefore a count of the number of months a conflict lasted.  It ranges 
from 1 to 433, with a mean of 45 months. 
 This coding process is fairly straightforward for most cases, except some involving Israel.  For 
the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I coded any official agreement—such as the Oslo Accords, signed 
in September 1993—as the end of a conflict and the next instance of violence or the start of any 
codenamed Israeli military operation as the beginning of a new conflict.  It is possible to consider the 
entire history between the Israelis and Palestinians after Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip in 1967 as one ongoing conflict, but this does not allow for evaluation of Israel's goals in each of 
its military operations.  Alternatively, one could treat the fight between Israel and each Palestinian 
group as a separate dyad (Israel-PLO, Israel-Hamas, Israel-Islamic Jihad, etc.), but this creates 
difficulties regarding fatality data.  Sometimes a specific Palestinian group publicly claims an attack 
against Israelis and sometimes no one does.  Even more problematic, when the Israeli Defense Forces 
conduct a ground operation in the Palestinian territories, it is almost impossible to determine which 
Palestinians fired the shots or set off the bombs that killed Israeli soldiers.  Therefore, I treat all 
Palestinian militant groups as one resistance network that has fought multiple conflicts against Israel.     
 Finally, to measure conflict outcome, I considered the declared military and political goals of 
strong actor leaders at the beginning of the conflict and then determined whether these had been 
achieved on a three point scale: success (2), mixed outcome (1), and failure (0).  To code an outcome as 
a success, the strong actor needed to clearly achieve its primary goal.  For example, in the Gulf War in 
1991, the American-led coalition succeeded in restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty by forcing Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait.  To code an outcome as mixed, the strong actor needed to partially but not 
entirely achieve its main goal, or achieve some tactical military success while still falling short of its 
primary strategic goal.  For example, in the Gaza War in December 2008 and January 2009, Israel 
aimed to stop rocket fire from Gaza into Israel by Hamas and other Palestinian groups and eliminate 
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their ability to fire rockets in the future.  The Israelis destroyed many rockets and launchers, killed 
numerous Palestinian militants, and secured a ceasefire declaration from Hamas.  However, while 
rocket fire decreased significantly after the conflict it did not cease entirely, and Hamas remained in 
control of Gaza and continued to import rockets and rocket parts.  Finally, to code an outcome as a 
failure, the strong actor needed to withdraw forces before achieving the military operations' aims or 
make significant political concessions that ran contrary to its leaders' stated goals.  For example, in 
1979, the Soviet Union sent forces to Afghanistan to support the government's efforts against various 
rebel groups, but withdrew in 1989 without defeating the Mujahideen insurgency or securing a friendly 
government's rule.  Any conflicts that remain unresolved as of July 1, 2013, I coded as ongoing.  
Ongoing conflicts are included in the fatality and duration tests, but not in the outcome analysis. 
 This coding scheme places the burden of success on the strong actor.  Given big states' resource 
advantage, realist theory indicates that they should achieve their goals against small states or networks, 
so it is noteworthy when they do not.  By contrast, many recent studies consider asymmetric conflict 
from the weak actors' perspective.   In “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” Max Abrahms argues that 
terrorism is an “ineffective means of coercion” because terrorist groups typically fail to achieve their 
often maximalist policy objectives.116  Similarly, in “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” Mette 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones argue that “the prevailing pessimism about the ability of states 
to combat illicit networks is premature,” because networks inherently have difficulty sustaining large 
coordinated actions.117  These studies convincingly dispute hyperbolic fears that terrorist networks pose 
an existential threat to powerful states and that insurgent networks present an insurmountable 
challenge.  However, by taking the weak actors' perspective and considering only whether networks 
116 Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” p. 51. 
117 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” p. 8. 
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achieve their goals, they do not address the question of which type of opponents are relatively more 
capable of threatening and challenging great powers. 
 In the main empirical analysis presented below, the three-category outcome scale is used.  The 
strong actor is coded as failing to achieve its aims in 16 cases (20%), as achieving a mixed outcome in 
23 cases (28.75%), and as succeeding in 41 cases (51.25%).  In the secondary analysis, which focuses 
on the effects of localized insurgencies versus irredentist conflicts in the subset of big state wars against 
networks, this three-category DV is collapsed into a dummy variable coded 1 if the strong actor 
achieves success, and zero otherwise (mixed or failure).  This is done because the small sample size 
(N=47) prevents a multivariate analysis of a three-outcome dependent variable using multinomial logit.  
The two-category war outcomes variable is coded 0 (unsuccessful) in 39 cases (48.75%) and is coded 1 
(success) in 41 cases (51.25%). 
 
Key Independent Variable 
 The key explanatory variable in the main analysis below is the nuclear state’s Opponent Type.  
The theoretical argument developed in the previous chapter, and the hypotheses laid out above, suggest 
that networks pose a greater threat to nuclear states than small states do, that big-states’ wars against 
networks are more costly than those fought against small states, and that networks pose a bigger 
challenge to big states than small states do.  The important variation in each of these relationships is the 
type of opponent the nuclear state faces (i.e. small state or network), and this is the key independent 
variable in the analysis presented below.  To measure Opponent Type, I code each opponent of a big 
state as either a small state (coded 1) or a network (coded 2).  Thirty-three cases (37.5%) involve a 
small state, while 55 conflicts (62.5%) are against a network. 
 To be coded as a small state, an actor must exercise sovereignty over a given area, openly 
operate out of official government buildings, control borders, and be recognized by the international 
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community.  All other actors are coded as networks.  Many non-state networks exhibit some of the 
qualities of states, such as controlling territory, providing social services, or participating in 
government.  For example, the Irish Republican Army was linked to a political party, Sinn Fein, 
representatives of which have held elective office in Northern Ireland.  Hezbollah controls a section of 
southern Lebanon where it provides social services, and its political wing holds seats in the Parliament 
of Lebanon.  Hamas’ political wing won a majority in Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, and 
forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip after the Palestinian National Authority and its foreign allies 
rejected the election’s outcome.  However, while these organizations and others like them exhibit some 
qualities of states, none are sovereign or recognized as states internationally, and are therefore coded as 
networks.   
  
Control Variables 
 The empirical analysis includes several control variables, which are expected to influence 
fatalities, conflict duration, and war outcomes.  First, I control for the presence of military support for 
the opponent from a nuclear power.  This control accounts for the possibility that, as Jeffrey Record 
argues, examples of weak actor success may be driven by external assistance.118  If a small state or 
network utilizes a big state's resources, then the conflict features a smaller resource gap than other 
asymmetric wars, and the outcome may depend more on material assistance than on the weak actors' 
organizational type.  Of the 88 big state-small state and big state-network conflicts in the data set, this 
check applies to four: pre-nuclear China and North Korea in the Korean War (6/1949 – 7/1953) 
received assistance from the Soviet Union when fighting the United States, North Vietnam in the 
Vietnam War (7/1959 – 5/1973) received assistance from China and the Soviet Union when fighting 
the United States, the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (7/1972 – 3/1976) received assistance from China 
118  Record, Beating Goliath. 
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when fighting the United Kingdom, and the Afghan Mujahideen (6/1979 – 2/1989) received assistance 
from the United States when fighting the Soviet Union. 
 Additionally, I include standard control variables that have been shown to influence the 
outcome of conflict, including the nuclear state’s level of democracy and military capabilities.  For 
democracy, I use the Polity IV scale, coding any country with a score of seven or higher as a 
democracy; and for military capabilities, I use the CINC score from the Correlates of War project.  
Finally, in each of the four models (civilian casualties, military casualties, conflict duration, conflict 
outcome) I control for the other three factors to isolate the effect of each dependent variable (e.g. when 
conducting the civilian casualties test I control for military casualties, duration, and outcome). 
 
Results  
It is useful to first examine the distribution of the data and the bivariate relationships between 
Opponent Type and each of the dependent variables.  Figures 1 through 4 below present the average 
civilian and military fatalities, war duration, and war outcome across the different opponent types, and 
provide preliminary support for the hypothesized relationships.  
First, the left-hand side of Figure 1 presents the average civilian fatalities for conflicts against 
small states versus networks, while the right-hand side of Figure 1 presents the same relationship, but 
excludes conflicts in which the opponent receives military support from a nuclear state.  The 
relationship depicted in Figure 1 provides strong preliminary support for the proposition that networks 
are more threatening than small states.  Few small states have managed to kill big state civilians, and 
those who have did not kill many.  By contrast, networks killed an average of 39.1 times more strong 
actor civilians per conflict.  The data may even under-represent the relatively higher threat from 
networks, as the data set includes every civilian of a nuclear state killed by a non-nuclear state's forces, 
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but does not include isolated terrorist attacks from networks that were not listed in the UCDP database 
or the Warfare and Armed Conflict encyclopedia, such as the four coordinated bombs against the 
London transportation system on July 7, 2005 that killed 52.  The relationship remains largely the 
same, and supportive of the hypothesized relationship, after removing the four cases in which the weak 
actor received big state assistance. 
 





























































Excluding Opponents w/ Strong-State Support
 
Civilian Fatalities by Opponent Type
 
 
 Figure 2 presents the bivariate relationship between Opponent Type and military fatalities.  
Interestingly, small state opponents caused, on average, more than three times as many military 
fatalities as networks (left-hand side of Figure 2).  However, this effect reverses when the conflicts in 
which the weak actor received big state assistance are excluded, largely because American military 
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fatalities in the Korean and Vietnam wars dwarf all other conflicts in the database.  The United States 
lost 36,516 in Korea and 58,178 in Vietnam, while the total number of military deaths caused by small 
states in all other conflicts combined is only 16,109.  This suggests that big state assistance greatly 
enhances small states' ability to impose costs on strong actor militaries.  Meanwhile, military fatalities 
in the set of big state-network conflicts are more balanced.  The Soviet Union lost 13,310 military 
personnel in Afghanistan, which is second most after France's 17,456 in Algeria.  This indicates that, 
while external assistance helps small states kill big state soldiers, networks are more capable of 
imposing military costs without assistance.  After accounting for strong-state support, this bivariate 
relationship provides preliminary support for the relationship between opponent type and military 
fatalities hypothesized above. 
 



























































Excluding Opponents w/ Strong-State Support
 




 Figure 3 presents the bivariate relationship between average conflict duration and Opponent 
Type.  Again the left-hand side of Figure 3 presents this relationship for all conflicts, while the right-
hand side of Figure 3 excludes conflicts in which the opponent receives big-state support.  The 
relationships depicted in Figure 3 once again provide strong preliminary support for the hypothesis that 
big states find networks more challenging than small states.  Conflicts against networks last, on 
average, almost six times as long as conflicts against small states, a gap of four and a half years.  The 
results are even more dramatic when excluding weak actors with strong state support.  Korea and 
Vietnam respectively lasted 49 months and 166 months, which is considerably longer than the average 
conflict against a small state.  Removing those two cases drops the average duration to under 5 months.  
The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted 116 months, while the UK fought the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman 
for 44 months.  The two lasted an average of 80 months, but other big state-network conflicts were 










































































Excluding Opponents w/ Strong-State Support
 
Conflict Duration by Opponent Type
 
 The data on outcomes also provide preliminary support for the theory that networks are more 
challenging opponents for big states than small states are.  Figure 4 presents the distribution of conflict 
outcomes for small states versus networks across all conflicts in the data set.119  Strong actors were able 
to achieve their goals in 73% of conflicts against a small state, while only 12% ended in failure.  By 






119 The distribution excluding cases with strong state assistance is nearly identical to that presented in Figure 4, and is 
therefore not presented here.  
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 While these bivariate relationships provide relatively strong initial support for the hypotheses 
enumerated at the start of this chapter, further empirical tests are necessary to ensure that these 
relationships are statistically significant and robust to inclusion of a variety of control variables.  This 
section presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses on civilian fatalities, 
military fatalities, and war duration, and Multinomial Logistic regression analysis on war outcomes. 
 Table 1 presents the results of OLS regression analyses run on the natural log of civilian 
casualties (model 1), the natural log of military casualties (model 2), and war duration (model 3).  The 
key independent variable, Opponent Type, is positive and significant in all three models, indicating that 
big states suffer significantly higher civilian casualties and significantly higher military casualties when 
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they fight network opponents versus small state opponents.  Further, big states fight significantly longer 
wars when their opponents are networks rather than small states.   
 












    








    















    








    






    






    













Observations 86 86 88 
R-squared 0.41 0.28 0.20 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Nuclear State. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 The results of the multinomial logit analysis of war outcomes, presented in Table 2, are 
similarly supportive of the relationship hypothesized above.  The baseline category for comparison is 
big-state success in the conflict.  The results in the first column demonstrate that when a big state faces 
63 
 
a networked opponent rather than a small state, failure in the conflict is significantly more likely than 
success.  Similarly, the second column shows that a mixed outcome is also significantly more likely 
than success in the conflict when the nuclear state faces a network rather than a small state opponent.   
 
Table 2: Multinomial Logit Results for War Outcome 




   




   






   




   




   






   









Observations 80 80 
Comparison outcome category is Success. Standard errors in parentheses,  
clustered on Nuclear State. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
The substantive impact of Opponent Type on each of these dependent variables, furthermore, is 
large (see Table 3).  Moving from a small state to a network opponent increases civilian casualties from 
a baseline expected value of just under 10 to a post-change value of nearly 56.  This is an increase in 
the expected number of civilian deaths of nearly 46, or a 462% increase in the number of civilians 
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killed.  Military fatalities, furthermore, increase by an average of 120 deaths when moving from a small 
state opponent to a network, from a baseline expected value of 167 to a post-change value of 287 
military deaths.  This corresponds to a 72% increase in military deaths when a nuclear state faces a 
network opponent rather than a small state.  The substantive impact on war duration is similarly large.  
The baseline expected duration when facing a small state opponent of just over 9 months increases by 
close to 55 months when the opponent is a network, producing a post-change expected duration of 
close to 64 months.  This represents over a 600% increase in expected war duration when moving from 
a small state to a network opponent.     
 










First Difference Percentage Change 
DV: Civilian 
Fatalities 9.95 55.92 
45.97  
(21.68, 98.16) 462% 
DV: Military 
Fatalities 167.08 287.46 
120.38  
(66.01, 209.66) 72.1% 
DV: War 
Duration 9.04 63.74 
54.70  
(40.69, 68.83) 605% 
  
DV: War Outcome 
Failure 13.78 24.37 10.59 (-8.72, 21.57) 76.85% 
Mixed 15.48 39.29 23.81 (3.84, 46.58) 153.85% 
Success 70.74 36.34 -34.40 (-55.90, -9.29) -48.63% 
Note: Substantive results calculated using Clarify, holding control variables at values predicting high threat/challenge.  95% 
confidence intervals surrounding first differences reported.  Percentage change calculated by dividing the first difference by 
the baseline value/probability and multiplying by 100. 
 
 
 The substantive results for war outcomes are similarly supportive of the hypothesized 
relationship.  The predicted probability of big state success in war drops from over 70 percent to just 36 
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percent when moving from a small state to a network opponent type.  This is over a 34 percentage 
point, or 49%, reduction in the likelihood of success.  Failure and mixed outcomes, on the other hand, 
are more likely when the opponent is a network.  The likelihood of a mixed outcome increases from 
about 15% to over 39%, or a nearly 154% increase in the likelihood of this type of outcome.  The 
probability of failure, similarly, increases when moving from a small state to a network opponent, 
increasing the probability of this outcome type by over 10 percentage points, or nearly 77%, though 
this first difference just misses statistical significance at the 0.05 level.   
  Overall, these four tests provide relatively strong support for the main insight outlined in 
chapter one.  The final graph depicting the relationship between resources and threat with a hump in the 
tail presents a more accurate portrayal than the original realist graph depicting a smoothly declining 
relationship between resources and capabilities.  Networks appear to be more capable of threatening 
and challenging great powers than small states, even though small states control more resources than 
non-state networks. 
 
Secondary Analysis: Situational and Strategic Variation  
All state-network conflicts are influenced by the dynamics inherent to asymmetric warfare, but 
not all asymmetric conflicts are the same.  The degree of various non-material asymmetries, such as 
resolve and responsibility, is partially determined by the circumstances of the conflict.  Strategy is a 
function of preferences and incentives—what do actors want and what external conditions must they 
consider in pursuit of these goals?—and the strategic dynamic of a given asymmetric conflict is 
affected by the aims of each combatant. 
 With this in mind, I divided the set of conflicts between a nuclear weapons state and a non-state 
network into three categories based on the weak actors' main goal and the geographic proximity of the 
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weak actor to the strong actor's main territory.  This influences the ease with which weak actors can 
threaten strong actor civilians and the resolve of strong actors to accomplish their goals or at least 
achieve a mixed outcome instead of failure.  Accordingly, each category of conflict presents weak 
actors with a different set of available strategies.  This leads to testable hypotheses that complement 
those presented above. 
  
Localized Insurgency (Weak Actor Goal: Expel Distant Foreigners) 
Strategies in these conflicts are shaped by the strong actor's option to withdraw forces from 
territory claimed by the weak actor without sacrificing a piece of its homeland or directly creating a 
neighboring threat.  Therefore, the weak actor can compel strong actor withdrawal by raising the 
military, monetary, and political costs of the conflict beyond the strong actor's tolerable threshold, 
which will lead to its government choosing to allocate resources towards other priorities.  This is the 
most commonly studied type of asymmetric conflict, usually under the category of guerrilla wars, 
insurgencies, or “small wars.”120 
 Localized insurgencies are fought at considerable distance from the strong actor's main 
territory, perhaps across a sea or ocean.  Due to this distance, and the asymmetry of resources, it is 
difficult for the weak actor to threaten strong actor civilians or disrupt their normal lives, with the 
exception of strong actor settlers, tourists, or non-military officials that travel to the area where the 
weak actor operates.  This type of conflict includes anti-colonial wars, such as the French in Algeria, 
and foreign occupations by distant powers, such as the United States in Iraq.  In many cases, the strong 
actor works with and through local government allies to control the contested territory.     
 The modern version of weak actor strategy in localized insurgencies draws heavily from the 
writings of Mao Zedong.  Mao honed his version of guerrilla insurgency in response to the Japanese 
120  See, for example, Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. 
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invasion of China that began with the attack on Manchuria in 1931.  He utilized a three-stage strategy 
designed to prolong the conflict and impose escalating costs upon the Japanese to convince the 
invading power to withdraw.  Given Japan's resource advantage, the Chinese could not prevent 
Japanese forces from occupying China.  In the first phase, “the enemy's strategic offensive and our 
strategic defensive,” Mao recommended retreat deeper into China, extending Japan's forces and forcing 
the Japanese to spend money on the conflict.  Meanwhile, Chinese fighters would stage hit-and-run 
raids and harass supply lines to impose costs on Japan.  This would slow, but not stop, the progress of 
the invasion, frustrating Japanese soldiers in China and creating doubt among Japanese citizens and 
government officials in Japan.121  
 Mao called the second stage “strategic stalemate,” or “the period of the enemy's strategic 
consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive.”  Having conquered a large amount of 
territory and stretched its forces, Japan had to “safeguard these areas and to make them his own by the 
fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments.”  By surprising Japanese forces throughout 
occupied China with attacks behind enemy lines from guerrillas that had blended in with the civilian 
population, Mao's forces continued imposing costs and creating doubt among the Japanese.  This also 
forced Japan to turn its efforts towards consolidation, allowing the Chinese to establish bases, recruit, 
and acquire weaponry, preparing for the third and final stage.122   
 In the third stage, Chinese forces went on the offensive, utilizing the capabilities developed 
during the second stage to retake territory Japan had captured.123  Mao referred to this as an 
acceleration to “mobile war,” in which the guerrilla units “gradually transform themselves into regular 
forces.”124  This three-stage strategy thus moved from asymmetric to symmetric warfare.  Chinese 
121  Mao, “On Protracted War,” no. 36. 
122  Mao, “On Protracted War,” no. 37. 
123  Mao, “On Protracted War,” no. 38. 
124  Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War,” Chapter VIII, p. 181. 
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forces began by prolonging the conflict and imposing costs upon Japan in the first stage, acquired 
additional resources while eroding Japan's capabilities in the second stage, and then, in the third stage, 
engaged the Japanese in pitched battles while openly defending re-conquered positions.  However, 
Japan's final defeat in China was part of the allied victory in the Pacific theater of World War II, which 
makes it virtually impossible to evaluate if Mao's strategy would have successfully compelled Japanese 
withdrawal on its own. 
 Nevertheless, the intermediate successes of the three-stage approach led subsequent weak actors 
to emulate and adapt Mao's strategy.  For example, Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap advocated a 
strategy of protracted war, first against France and then when fighting the United States.125  The Viet 
Minh's effort to expel France began with isolated guerrilla attacks and advanced to mobile war, 
“annihilating” French forces in a conventional siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.126  Similarly, North 
Vietnam and the Vietcong's strategy in pursuit of American withdrawal began with strategic retreat, 
followed by consolidation and cost imposition, and ended with a more symmetric conflict, in which a 
“final North Vietnamese blitzkrieg” consisting of infantry and armored units captured Saigon in 1975 
as the last American forces left the country.127 
 Che Guevara adapted Mao's three-stage strategy to a domestic revolution.  Che and Fidel 
Castro's takeover of Cuba began with a small guerrilla band conducting raids from mountainous 
jungles, then grew by gathering equipment and recruits while imposing costs on the forces of the 
Batista government, and completed with more symmetric battles.128  Abdel Aziz al Muqrin, the late 
leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, proposed a similar three-stage guerrilla revolution against 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Middle Eastern governments, but with a more urban focus.  Unlike 
125  Giap, People's War, People's Army. 
126  Giap, p. 25. 
127  Summers, On Strategy, xiii. 
128  Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. 
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many previous insurgency manuals, al Muqrin's explicitly advocates assassination, terrorism, and 
hostage-taking to impose costs on stronger opponents during the earlier stages of the conflict.129  Che 
recommended against these techniques for fear of alienating the civilian population, but, in contrast to 
communist strategists like Mao, Giap and Che, al Muqrin argued that religious ties, demonstrations of 
dedication, and tactical successes would garner enough popular support for the insurgency to 
succeed.130  
 Many relatively weak actors fighting in localized insurgencies do not have the population of 
China to draw upon and face enemies with considerably more resources than the Cuban government, 
and therefore cannot close the resource gap enough to attempt Mao's third stage.  For example, the 
Afghan Mujahideen utilized a compellence strategy throughout their conflict against the Soviet Union, 
denying the USSR victory and imposing costs until Soviet forces withdrew.  Twenty-first century 
Afghan insurgents, some of whom fought against the Soviet Union, cannot hope to achieve material 
symmetry with the United States-led International Security Force, and therefore aim to emulate their 
predecessors by prolonging the conflict until the foreign forces leave rather than forcing a withdrawal 
with symmetric battles.  For non-state networks resisting occupation by a distant nuclear weapons state, 
this strategy of extending the conflict while killing or injuring strong actor soldiers is often the best 
available means of imposing costs upon occupying powers and preventing them from achieving their 
goals.  
 
Irredentist: (Weak Actor Goal: Gain Control of Homeland from Local Power)  
Unlike the previous category, strong actors in irredentist conflicts do not have the option of 
complete withdrawal.  In irredentist conflicts, weak actors seek to control part of the strong actor's 
129  Al-Muqrin, 'Abd Al-'Aziz, A Practical Course for Guerrilla War. 
130  Al-Muqrin, 'Abd Al-'Aziz, A Practical Course for Guerrilla War, chapter 2 “The Basic Preconditions for Conducting a  
Successful Guerrilla War.” 
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main territory, or an area adjacent to the strong actor's mainland.  If successful, this could weaken the 
strong actor by requiring it to relinquish strategic or economically valuable territory, such as a port, a 
defensible border, or natural resources, and might presage further conflict by creating a potentially 
hostile neighboring state.  The costs of failure for strong actors are greater in irredentist conflicts than 
in localized insurgencies, which means it is less likely that weak actors can simply impose costs until 
the strong actor decides to leave.  Therefore, weak actor strategy often seeks to push the strong actor to 
a desirable negotiation point, as opposed to coercing a unilateral withdrawal. 
 However, few weak actors in irredentist conflicts fight for the ultimate goal of increased 
political representation, semi-autonomy, reduced restrictions on movement, the release of prisoners, or 
any other mixed outcome that results from direct negotiations or indirect bargaining with their stronger 
opponent.  Like networks fighting localized insurgencies against foreign occupiers, weak actors in 
irredentist conflicts typically embrace maximalist goals.  The IRA sought to liberate Northern Ireland 
from Great Britain; Chechen rebels seek independence from the Russian Federation; and various 
Palestinian groups seek an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, with some ultimately hoping 
to eliminate Israel.  Given the proximity of their opponent, these ambitious aims often remain 
unrealized.  Therefore, weak actors in irredentist conflicts end up pursuing more intermediate goals, 
utilizing violence to improve their negotiating position and extract concessions from their stronger 
opponents, perhaps with the intention of resuming the struggle in pursuit of their maximalist goals if 
they remain unsatisfied. 
  The proximity of weak actors to the strong actor's territory in irredentist conflicts increases 
weak actors' ability to threaten the strong actor's civilians.  While localized insurgents would have to 
travel considerable distances to launch an attack on the strong actor's homeland, weak actors in 
irredentist conflicts can stage cross-border raids, fire projectiles over borders, or infiltrate the strong 
actor's territory to attempt a terrorist attack.  This heightened threat to strong actor civilians could make 
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big states more willing to make concessions, increase their resolve, or both, leading to more mixed 
outcomes and fewer successes.  I therefore hypothesize that irredentist conflicts will, on average, 
feature more big state civilian fatalities, last longer, and end in strong actor success less often than 
localized insurgencies. 
 
Global Insurgency (Weak Actor Goal: General Opposition to the International Order) 
 In this category, a transnational movement attempts to overthrow or disrupt the general 
international order.  This is the most expansive of goals, and virtually impossible for the weak actor to 
win conclusively.  Compared to the other two categories, global insurgencies are more dispersed and 
driven more by ideology than territorial claims.   
 With little direct precedent, both weak and strong actor strategy for global insurgency draw 
upon the lessons of localized insurgency and irredentist conflict and adapt them to a larger situation.  
Al Qaeda, for example, seeks American withdrawal from distant territory, such as the Arabian 
Peninsula and Afghanistan, which resembles localized insurgencies.  Additionally, al Qaeda and allied 
local forces aim to control territory in countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which resembles 
irredentist conflicts.   
 Global insurgency therefore manifests itself as a series of localized insurgencies and irredentist 
conflicts mixed with the threat of terrorism in the strongest enemy states.  It features the common 
strategic elements of more localized conflicts as well as elements unique to its transnational nature.  
While numerous non-state networks are transnational, operating in more than one country, there is only 
one case of global insurgency: al Qaeda and the international jihadist movement.  For this reason, every 
hypothesis in this section considers the differences between the 27 cases of localized insurgencies and 





Based upon the above discussion of the differences between localized insurgencies and 
irredentist conflicts among the set of big state-network conflicts, I hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4A (threat): Irredentist conflicts cause more strong actor civilian fatalities than localized 
insurgencies. 
Hypothesis 4B (resolve): Irredentist conflicts tend to last longer than localized insurgencies. 
Hypothesis 4C (challenge): Irredentist conflicts end with strong actor success less frequently than 
localized insurgencies. 
 
Key Independent Variable 
In this secondary analysis, which focuses on the effects of conflict type (localized insurgency 
versus irredentist) among conflicts against networks, the key independent variable is a dummy variable 
identifying the type of conflict.  This variable is coded 1 if the nuclear state is fighting a localized 
insurgency, and is coded 2 if the nuclear states is fighting a network opponent in an irredentist conflict.   
 
Results 
 An initial analysis of the bivariate relationships between conflict type (i.e. localized versus 
irredentist) and civilian fatalities, war duration, and outcome provides preliminary support for 
hypotheses 4A, 4B, and 4C.  First, Figure 5 presents the bivariate relationship between conflict type 
and civilian casualties.  As Figure 5 shows, weak actors in irredentist conflicts, on average, kill more 
civilians than those in localized insurgencies.  This result is not especially surprising, since irredentist 
conflicts, by definition, take place closer to strong actors' civilians than localized insurgencies.  
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Nevertheless, it demonstrates that strong actors face a greater threat to their civilians in irredentist 
conflicts, which both shapes weak actor strategy and could also increase strong actor resolve. 
 





























Localized Insurgency vs. Irredentist
Civilian Fatalities in Wars against Networks
 
 
Figure 6 presents the bivariate relationship between conflict type and war duration.  As with 
civilian casualties, irredentist conflicts are, on average, longer than localized insurgencies, which 
provides initial support for Hypothesis 4B.  The logics are related.  Strong actors are less likely to 
abandon their war efforts if it means that their civilians will remain in danger.  Since localized 
insurgencies take place far from strong actors' mainland, they can withdraw forces without giving away 
central territory.  Pulling out of a distant country removes soldiers from harm's way, and may also 
decrease whatever risk there is to strong actor civilians.  From the weak actor's perspective, once the 
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strong actor has left there is little to gain from attacking strong actor civilians at home and much to 
lose, because an attack might prompt the strong actor to reinvade.  Meanwhile, once the foreign power 
is gone, localized insurgents can turn their attention towards domestic political control.   
  
































 By contrast, strong actors do not necessarily reduce the threat to their civilians by abandoning 
an irredentist conflict.  Given the close proximity of the two parties, the weak actor retains the ability to 
attack the strong actors' civilians.  The weak actor may interpret the strong actors' withdrawal as a 
signal of weakness, and attack again in the hopes of further improving upon an already improved 
position.  Therefore, the strong actor is likely to have a greater interest in an irredentist conflict, 
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accompanied by a higher public tolerance of the military, economic, and political costs incurred during 
the war, leading to higher strong actor resolve and longer conflicts than in localized insurgencies. 
 
































Localized Insurgency vs. Irredentist
Conflict Outcomes in Wars against Networks
 
 
 Finally, Figure 7 presents the bivariate relationship between conflict type and war outcomes, 
measured as success (1) versus everything else (0).  The data distribution provides initial support for 
hypothesis 4C.  Close to half (44%) of localized insurgencies end in strong state success, while only 
27% of irredentist conflicts end with the stronger actor achieving its war aims.  This supports the 
notion, developed in Hypothesis 4C, that irredentist conflicts pose a greater challenge to strong actors 





 Building upon these results, this section presents the results of multivariate OLS and logistic 
regression models to test the impact of conflict type on civilian casualties, war duration, and war 
outcomes among networked opponents when controlling for a variety of other factors expected to 
influence these outcomes.  The expectation, based upon hypotheses 4A-4C, is that moving from a 
localized insurgency to an irredentist conflict (i.e. increasing Conflict Type) will increase civilian 
casualties and war duration, but will have a negative impact on war outcomes, decreasing the 
likelihood of success.   
 Table 4 presents the results of these multivariate analyses.  As expected, conflict type is positive 
and significant in the model of civilian casualties, indicating that strong states lose significantly higher 
numbers of civilians in irredentist conflicts than in wars fought against localized insurgencies.  Column 
2 of Table 4 presents the results for war duration.  The coefficient estimate for conflict type is positive, 
as predicted in hypothesis 4B, but fails to reach standard levels of significance.  While hypothesis 4B is 
not strongly supported by the empirical evidence, this non-significant result may be attributable to the 
relatively small sample of conflicts against networks.  The non-significant result should therefore not 
be taken as conclusive evidence against hypothesis 4B.  The final column of Table 4 presents the 
results for war outcome, measured as success (1) versus all other outcomes (0).  The results of the logit 
model for war outcomes indicate, as predicted by hypothesis 4C, that strong states are significantly less 
likely to succeed against networks in irredentist conflicts than against networks in localized 















    















    








    








    













Observations 53 54 47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 Table 5 presents the substantive results for the impact of conflict type on these outcomes.  The 
average expected number of civilian casualties in a localized insurgency is just over 30.  This increases 
by 146 deaths, to a post-change expected value of nearly 178 civilian deaths, for irredentist conflicts.  
This represents a percentage increase of 490%.  Turning to war outcomes, the predicted probability of 
strong actor success in a localized insurgency is just over 58 percent.  This probability drops to under 
23 percent probability of success when the strong state is fighting an irredentist conflict.  This is a 35 
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of strong state success, or a nearly 69% reduction in this 
probability.  Duration is excluded from Table 5 because conflict type has no significant impact on war 
duration.  However, the OLS results suggest that, although not statistically significant, moving from a 
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localized insurgency to an irredentist conflict increases war duration by just over 30 months, on 
average. 
   










First Difference Percentage Change 
DV: Civilian 
Fatalities 30.12 177.63 
147.51  
(17.61, 1118.16) 490% 
DV: War 
Outcome 58.1 22.73 
-35.35  
(-64.63, -3.85) -68.9% 
 
 
Secondary Analysis II: Explaining the Increasing Frequency of Weak Actor 
Success  
Multiple studies of asymmetric conflict have noticed a pattern of increasing weak actor success 
beginning in the early 20th century.  Using a data set of asymmetric wars from 1800-2000 with over 
1,000 battle deaths per year, Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that improvements in weak actor strategy 
explain the trend.  Analyzing the set of counter-insurgency campaigns from 1800-2005, Jason Lyall 
and Isaiah Wilson III argue that strong actors' increasing reliance on mechanized weaponry reduces 
soldiers' interaction with the population, weakening counter-insurgent strategy.  My data show a related 
trend of decreasing strong actor success in wars against networks, but I offer an alternative explanation 
derived from the general theory of asymmetric warfare laid out in chapter one.   
Networks, but not small states, appear especially capable of threatening, imposing costs upon, 
and challenging powerful states in recent decades.  Given their greater organizational agility, networks 
can adapt more quickly than bureaucratic states to major international transitions.  I therefore divide my 
data set into conflicts that took place during the Cold War, and those that took place after the fall of the 
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Berlin Wall in November 1989.  The period after 1989 not only includes this geopolitical transition, but 
major technological transitions as well, most notably the spread of the internet. 
Dividing the period of 1800-2000 into 50-year segments, Arreguin-Toft shows that an 
increasing percentage of asymmetric conflicts ended with weak actor victory.  While weak actors won 
11.8% of conflicts from 1800-49 and 20.5% from 1850-99, the weaker party emerged victorious in 
34.9% from 1900-1949 and 51.2% from 1950-1999.131  Arreguin-Toft theorizes that weak actors are 
more likely to win when they take the opposite strategic approach of their stronger opponents.  
Therefore, he asserts that “the trend toward increasing strong actor failure is suggested both by the 
timing of the biggest shift in outcomes favoring weak actors (1950-99), and by the logic of Kenneth 
Waltz’s argument that actors in a competitive international system ‘socialize’ to similar policies and 
strategies.”132   
Essentially, Arreguin-Toft argues that Mao figured out how the weak can win asymmetric wars, 
and subsequent insurgents and guerrillas copied his tactics.  “Mao’s long fight for and eventual 
conquest of China was a model consciously imitated by Algerian rebels, the Vietminh, the Hukbalahap, 
Cuban insurgents, Malayan communists, and, to a large extent, Afghanistan’s mujahideen.”133  
According to Arreguin-Toft, when European armies socialized to direct assaults came into contact with 
Asian resistance networks socialized to Maoist guerrilla insurgency, as “they did with greater 
frequency following World War II—the strong actor lost more often.”134        
 While Arreguin-Toft’s theory helps explain weak actor victories in the mid-1900s, it is too 
limited to that time period to offer a sufficient explanation of the overall trend.  His socialization theory 
would predict a return to material domination as more powerful actors become socialized to warfare 
131  Arreguin-Toft, p. 4. 
132  Arreguin-Toft, p. 36. 
133  Arreguin-Toft, p. 37. 
134  Arreguin-Toft, p. 37. 
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against weaker foes.  However, though “armies learn” from fighting insurgencies, powerful states have 
failed to build upon the lessons of the adaptable British counterinsurgents in Malaya in the 1950s.135  
Furthermore, Arreguin-Toft limits his study to wars with over 1000 battle-related deaths per year, 
which leaves out dramatically asymmetric conflicts like Israel-Hezbollah, or U.S.-al Qaeda, and 
ignores many conflicts that are shaped by asymmetry, but did not last long enough or cause enough 
death to make it into his database.  His sample is thus biased in favor of protracted wars, ignoring 
modern conflicts where the strong actor rapidly leaves when faced with asymmetric resistance, such as 
the United States withdrawing forces from Beirut in 1983, after losing 241 soldiers from truck 
bombs,136 or withdrawing from Mogadishu in 1993, after losing 18 soldiers and two black hawk 
helicopters.137  Including these quicker and smaller state-network conflicts makes the pattern more 
pronounced.  Nevertheless, Arreguin-Toft’s data still show a constant increase in weak actor victory in 
each 50 year period after 1800.138  Mao began fighting in the 1920s.  Strategic socialization is thus an 
insufficient explanation for the broader trend towards weak actor victory. 
 Lyall and Wilson's explanation for the pattern centers around developments in military 
technology and the associated effect on strong actor strategy.  Their study analyzes 286 insurgencies 
from 1800-2005, which they define as “a protracted violent struggle by non-state actors to obtain their 
political objectives—often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities—
against the current political authority.”139  Dividing this time period into 25-year segments (except for 
the most recent segment, 1976-2005), they find that, beginning with 1876-1900, each segment features 
progressively fewer strong actor victories.  While counter-insurgents defeated their weaker opponents 
135  Nagl, section 2, especially pp. 103-107. 
136  “Beirut Barracks Attack Remembered,” CBS News. 
137  “Ambush in Mogadishu,” PBS Frontline. 
138  Arreguin-Toft., p. 4. 
139  Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” p. 70. 
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in over 60% of the cases from 1901-1925, that declined below 50% in 1926-1950, below 40% for 
1951-1975, and below 30% in the most recent segment from 1976-2005.140 
 Lyall and Wilson attribute this pattern to increasing strong actor reliance on mechanized 
weaponry.  As powerful militaries began using artillery, tanks, airplanes and helicopters that executed 
stand-off attacks against enemy positions with shells, bombs, and missiles, they relied less and less on  
infantry.  The result was fewer soldiers moving among the civilian population.  This shift in force 
structure increased the lethality of modern militaries, and decreased the risk to their soldiers.  However, 
this bias towards reducing friendly military casualties “inhibits soldiers from assuming the same risks 
that fence-sitting populations face daily.  It therefore becomes harder to recruit reliable collaborators 
among local populations, further compounding information starvation.  The result is a counterinsurgent 
that fuels, rather than deters, insurgent recruitment.”141 
 Improvement in weak actor strategies and an increasing strong actor reliance on mechanization 
likely play a role in explaining the general trend towards weak actor success, but they do not account 
for the divergent performance of small states and networks.  Additionally, both Arreguin-Toft's general 
study of asymmetric conflicts and Lyall and Wilson's more specific study of insurgencies arbitrarily 
divide their samples into, respectively, 50-year and 25-year segments, which seems driven by a 
preference for round numbers, rather than any applicable theory.  To build upon these studies, and 
account for the distinction between small states and networks, I argue that technological and 
geopolitical changes in the international environment explain the recent increase in non-state network 
success in asymmetric warfare.  Therefore, the end of the Cold War, the improvement in strong actors' 
ability to execute precision strikes from distance, and the spread of the internet account for the post-
1989 trend of improving big state success against small states and declining success against networks.    
140  Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” p. 69. 
141  Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines” p. 75. 
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End of the Cold War 
 The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the global geopolitical landscape.  The collapse of 
the USSR not only removed Soviet influence from many parts of the world, but also led the United 
States to reorder its foreign policy.  In a noteworthy example, the United States and Russia both paid 
considerably less attention to Afghanistan in the 1990s than in the 1980s, allowing the Taliban to win 
the Afghan civil war, while veterans of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union spread to Saudi 
Arabia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Sudan and elsewhere.  Non-state networks in the former Yugoslavia, the 
Caucuses, central and south Asia, and the Middle East thus benefited from the increased freedom of 
movement and shifts in the global arms trade in the post-Cold War environment, as travel restrictions 
eased and surplus Soviet weaponry, from AK-47s to Katyusha rockets, flooded the market. 
 Additionally, given the difficulties the US faced in Vietnam and the USSR faced in 
Afghanistan, great powers may have become wary of launching wars-of-choice against weaker 
opponents due to the possibility that their opponent would receive external support.  The end of the 
Cold War greatly reduced this possibility, while also freeing great powers' resources to pursue new 
conflicts.  It is therefore possible that various big state-small state and big state-network conflicts in the 
1990s and 2000s would not have happened, or would have at least happened differently, if the Cold 
War had continued. 
  
Strong Actor Military Technology 
 The period after the fall of the Berlin wall also marks considerable advancements in military 
technology that enabled the most advanced states to execute precision attacks at considerable distance.  
Improvements in precision-guided weaponry, or “smart bombs,” allowed powerful states to fire 
missiles from ships hundreds of miles away or drop bombs from planes flying tens of thousands of feet 
in the air that could score direct hits.  Stealth aircraft—such as the B-2 Spirit, which first flew in July 
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1989—enabled penetration of all but the most advanced air defenses; and the introduction of unmanned 
aerial vehicles, or “drones,” enabled reconnaissance missions and airstrikes without risking human 
pilots.  These technological improvements empowered advanced militaries to launch strikes against 
weaker enemies at will, increasing their advantage over relatively weak states.  However, due to the 
asymmetry of responsibility, non-state networks present their enemies with fewer fixed targets, 
partially neutralizing the advantage powerful states gained from these new weapons. 
 
The Information Age 
 The post-Cold War era also coincides with the information technology revolution.  The spread 
of the internet exponentially increased the information acquisition and dissemination capabilities of 
individuals.  Members of non-state networks can now communicate, share tactics, debate strategy, and 
spread propaganda more easily than before.  Insurgents and terrorists have adapted to this new 
technological environment, researching bomb-making techniques, approaching new recruits, and 
highlighting the suffering of their people without needing to reveal themselves in public, thereby 
decreasing their vulnerability to strong actor countermeasures.  Additionally, the internet loosens 
networks from territory, allowing them to communicate over greater distance and grow larger than 
when they relied on meeting in person, sending letters, or speaking on the telephone. 
 Meanwhile, the internet, cable and satellite television create a global media environment, which 
informs people all over the world about what happens in various conflicts.  This enhances weak actor 
strategies based on convincing strong actors to withdraw troops or make concessions.  Strong actor 
citizens are informed of their military's difficulties in protracted conflicts, which could accelerate the 
development of war-weariness.  Networks can highlight the actions of their stronger opponents to 
garner sympathy from third parties, who then add additional political pressure for the strong actor to 
withdraw.  For example, photos of Americans torturing and humiliating Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib 
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rapidly spread around the world, leading to strenuous criticism, while strengthening the resolve and 
assisting the recruiting and fund-raising efforts of the Iraqi insurgency.  Additionally, the global media 
broadcasts images from terrorist attacks and researches the attackers' motives, providing terrorist 
groups with elevated exposure.  This increases the disruptive capacity of attacks, spreading fear among 
targeted populations while increasing the public's perception of the terrorists' importance. 
 With the end of the Cold War and advancements in weaponry that can accurately strike from 
distance, big states' ability to achieve their goals against small states has improved.  By contrast, 
various non-state networks quickly adapted to the end of the Cold War and the spread of the internet 
and global media, developing new strategies and improving upon old techniques.  Therefore, I 
hypothesize that big state-network conflicts will feature greater strong actor civilian and military 
fatalities, last longer, and end in strong actor success less frequently in the post-Cold War environment 
compared to those that ended before November 1989.  
 
Hypothesis 5A (threat): Networks cause more big state civilian fatalities relative to small states in the 
post-Cold War period than during the Cold War. 
Hypothesis 5B (cost): Networks cause more big state military fatalities relative to small states in the 
post-Cold War period than during the Cold War. 
Hypothesis 5C (challenge): Big State-Network conflicts last longer relative to conflicts with small 
states in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. 
Hypothesis 5D (challenge): Big state-network conflicts end in strong actor failure more often and 
strong actor success less often relative to big state-small state conflicts in the post-Cold War era than 






An initial examination of the bivariate relationships between Opponent Type and each of the 
outcome variables in the Cold War versus the Post-Cold War eras provides preliminary support for 
hypotheses 5A-5D.  Figure 8 presents the relationship between Opponent Type and Civilian Fatalities 
for the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  The relationship depicted in Figure 8 supports the claim that 
networks have become more threatening in the post-Cold War era.  Big states have suffered, on 
average, 101 additional civilian fatalities when fighting networks after 1989 than before.  At the same 
time, the number of big state civilian fatalities caused by small states declined from an average of 9.1 
per conflict to less than one, increasing the gap between small states and networks.  Networks were 
more capable of killing strong actor civilians during Cold War-era asymmetric conflicts than small 
states, but that effect has increased significantly in the period after November 1989. 
 































































Cold War/Post-Cold War Eras




 Figure 9 presents the bivariate relationship between opponent type and military fatalities in each 
of the relevant time periods.  The data on military fatalities supports the claim that conflicts against 
networks have become more costly relative to conflicts against small states in the post-Cold War 
period.  Whereas small states killed an average of 4,696 more soldiers than networks in Cold War-era 
conflicts, they caused an average of 648 fewer big state military fatalities compared to networks in 
conflicts taking place after the end of the Cold War.  While the relative cost imposed by small states 
and networks flipped after the Cold War, it is also worth noting that the average number of military 
fatalities caused by both small states and networks declined in the post-Cold War period compared to 
conflicts that took place during the Cold War.  This suggests that strong actors have altered their 
strategies or acquired equipment to protect military personnel from asymmetric attacks, or perhaps that 
medical techniques have improved so that attacks that would have killed soldiers in the Cold War era 
now result in injuries but not fatalities. 

































































Cold War/Post-Cold War Eras




 Figure 10 presents the bivariate relationship between opponent type and conflict duration during 
the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era.  Once again, the bivariate relationship provides 
considerable preliminary evidence demonstrating the increased challenge posed by networks in the 
post-Cold War period.  The average length of a big state-network conflict more than doubled, while the 
length of big state-small state conflicts shrunk considerably.  Conflicts against networks now take 
almost 27 times as long as conflicts against small states, while big state-network conflicts only lasted 
2.33 times as long as big state-small state conflicts in the Cold War era, lending support to the claim 
that relative network capabilities have improved in the information age. 
 



























































Cold War/Post-Cold War Eras
Conflict Duration by Opponent Type
 
 
 The data on war outcomes provide the most striking illustration of the difference between Cold 
War era and post-Cold War asymmetric conflicts.  Figure 11 presents the distribution of conflict 
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outcomes by opponent type for cases that took place prior to 1989.  During the Cold War, strong actors 
succeeded and failed at fairly similar rates when fighting small states and networks.  Twenty-seven 
percent of conflicts against networks ended with the big state failing to achieve its goal, while only 
22% of wars against small states ended with failure, suggesting a slight advantage for networks, but 
this is a fairly small difference.  Meanwhile, big states achieved their goals in 50% of conflicts against 
both states and networks, indicating that the two types of weak actors posed a relatively equal 
challenge. 
 































Failure Mixed Outcome Success
 
War Outcome
Small State Opponent Network Opponent
Cold War Era
Conflict Outcomes by Opponent Type
 
 
 However, the picture in the post-Cold War era is dramatically different.  Figure 12 presents the 
distribution of conflict outcomes by opponent type for conflicts that took place in the post-Cold War 
era.  Strong actors achieved their stated aims in every single conflict against small states after 1989.  
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This result cannot be explained by a shift to modest goals, as the set of post-Cold War conflicts 
includes the US/UK invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which both rapidly achieved the maximalist 
goal of vanquishing the small state's army and overthrowing its government, as well as the Russia-
Georgia war in 2008 in which the small state lost control of land it considered part of its main territory. 
 By contrast, strong actors achieved their goals in only 19% of conflicts against non-state 
networks after 1989.  24% of big state-network conflicts ended in failure, while 57% ended with a 
mixed outcome.  This not only shows that networks have become more challenging relative to small 
states, but also that networks have become more challenging in the information age than they were 
during the Cold War.  The rate of failure in conflicts against networks is fairly similar during (27%) 
and after (24%) the Cold War, but the rate of success declined considerably from 50% to 19%.  And 
this does not include ongoing wars against networks in the data set that have proven challenging for 
great powers, such as irredentist conflicts between Russia and rebels in the Caucuses and a localized 

























































Failure Mixed Outcome Success
 
War Outcome
Small State Opponent Network Opponent
Post-Cold War Era
Conflict Outcomes by Opponent Type
 
 
 This provides additional support for the general trend towards weak actor success noted by 
Arreguin-Toft's study of asymmetric wars and Lyall and Wilson's study of counter-insurgency 
conflicts.  However, those studies arbitrarily group conflicts into 50-year and 25-year segments, while 
this study uses a theory-driven categorization of post-World War II conflicts into two periods: post-
WWII through the end of the Cold War and post-Cold War.  It therefore provides evidence suggesting 
that networks’ ability to adapt to the 21st century global environment contributes to the pattern of 
increasing weak actor success.  Additionally, by distinguishing between big state-small state and big 
state-network conflicts, this study demonstrates that the decrease in strong actors' ability to achieve 
their goals in asymmetric warfare in the most recent period is entirely due to declining success against 
networks.  Strong actors have actually proven more capable of defeating small state opponents, but find 
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wars against networks more threatening, more costly, and more challenging in the information age than 
during the Cold War. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 The preliminary evidence presented above is supplemented in this section with multivariate 
analysis of civilian casualties, military casualties, and war duration.  It is not possible to run a statistical 
analysis on the war outcome dependent variable because there are no cases, in the post-Cold War era, 
in which a strong state either fails or experiences a mixed outcome in a conflict with a small state.  In 
other words, there is no variation on the dependent variable in that subset of cases, and it is therefore 
not possible to analyze the relationship using this method.  However, the fact that every case of big 
state-small state conflict in the information age ends in big state victory and many cases of big state-
network conflict do not provides noteworthy support for the argument that the 21st century 
technological environment altered the dynamics of asymmetric warfare.   
 For each of the other dependent variables, I run an OLS model using the same set of control 
variables used to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  To account for the conditional impact of opponent type 
during the Cold War versus after the Cold War, I interact opponent type with the Cold War control 
variable.  This allows me to examine whether the threats and costs faced by big states when fighting 
small states or networks have changed over time.   
 Table 6 presents the results of the analyses of civilian casualties (model 1), military casualties 
(model 2) and war duration (model 3).  As expected, Opponent Type is a positive, significant predictor 
of all three outcomes.  That is, moving from a small state to a network opponent increases civilian 
casualties, military casualties, and war duration.  Because of the inclusion of an interaction term, 
however, the coefficient estimates for Opponent Type must be interpreted as the effect of a network 
versus small state opponent only when Cold War equals zero, or in the post-Cold War period only.  It is 
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necessary, therefore, to examine the substantive results – in particular the predicted values and first 
differences from these models, to more directly assess the accuracy of hypotheses 5A-5C. 
 















    






    








    

















    








    






    













Observations 86 86 88 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on Nuclear State. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 Table 7 presents the predicted values and first differences for the impact of opponent type, 
conditional on Cold War, on civilian fatalities, military fatalities, and war duration.  As the first row in 
Table 7 indicates, moving from a small state to a network opponent during the Cold War era resulted in 
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a relatively small, though significant, increase in civilian fatalities by an average of 14 additional 
deaths.  In the post-Cold War era, on the other hand, moving from a small state opponent to a network 
opponent results in a much larger increase in civilian fatalities of just over 44 additional civilian deaths.  
Importantly, the first difference for the post-Cold War era is significantly larger than that for the Cold 
War era, as evidenced by the fact that the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the Cold War 
era does not cross the point-estimate for the post-Cold War era.  This result provides strong support for 
hypothesis 5A, demonstrating that networks do, in fact, cause more big state civilian fatalities relative 
to small states in the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War. 
 The second row of Table 7 presents the predicted values and first differences for military 
fatalities.  During the Cold War, there was no significant difference between small states and networks 
in terms of the number of military fatalities caused.  In the post-Cold War era, on the other hand, 
networks have caused significantly more military fatalities than small states, with an average difference 
of nearly 469 additional military deaths.   
 Finally, the last row of Table 7 presents the expected values and first differences for war 
duration.  During the Cold War, big state wars against networks lasted approximately 26 months longer 
than wars against small states, a difference which is statistically significant.  After the Cold War, wars 
against networks lasted an average of more than 83 months longer than wars against small states, also a 
statistically significant increase.  As expected by hypothesis 5C, the first difference in the post-Cold 
War era is larger than that during the Cold War.  Furthermore, the upper bound of the 95 percent 
confidence interval surrounding the first difference for the cold-war era is lower than the point estimate 
of the first difference for the post-Cold War era, indicating that there is a significant difference between 
the effects of networks versus small states in the two different time periods.  Taken together, these 
results provide strong support for hypotheses 5A and 5C, and moderate support for hypothesis 5B.  
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Table 7: Predicted Values and First Differences 
 















































The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that networks are more formidable opponents for 
nuclear powers than are small states.  However, this effect is especially pronounced after the end the 
Cold War, which indicates that changes in the international environment in the 1990s and early 2000s 
enhanced networks’ capabilities in asymmetric warfare.  In particular, advancements in computing and 
networking technology empowered individuals, dramatically improving their ability to acquire and 
disseminate information.  This created new opportunities for networks that were able to adapt.   
The proposition that non-state networks can rapidly adapt to major international transitions 
derives from the asymmetry of agility, as laid out in the previous chapter, but this does not imply that 
every non-state network will develop strategies that take advantage of the window created by 
geopolitical and technological transitions.  Whether due to a lack of imagination, sclerotic ideology, 
poor access to new technologies, bad timing, or many other possible reasons, most networks probably 
do not adapt successfully.  However, given networks' capacity for adaptation, some will; and those that 
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do will present greater challenges for powerful states that have not yet adjusted to the new 
environment.  Therefore, major geopolitical transitions and the spread of revolutionary information 
technology would likely both be followed by increased network success in asymmetric conflict in 
general, rather than improvement for every non-state actor. 
 For this to have merit as a theory of international asymmetric conflict, as opposed to simply an 
idiosyncratic explanation for the effects of the end of the Cold War and the information technology 
revolution, it should apply to earlier transitions as well.  Along these lines, the printing press, one of the 
few inventions that changed the dissemination of information to a degree anywhere near the internet, 
was introduced to Europe in the mid-15th century and had spread throughout by the early 16th century.  
Among other mass produced works, the press enabled exponentially greater dissemination of the Bible, 
sometimes translated into common vernaculars, which likely contributed to various popular rebellions 
associated with the Protestant Reformation and the Wars of Religion. 
 For an example of a geopolitical transition, the Napoleonic Wars dislodged established power 
structures throughout Europe, while spreading ideas associated with the French Revolution, such as 
nationalism and a more modern concept of liberty.  The decades after Napoleon's defeat saw numerous 
uprisings in various European countries, culminating in the revolutions of 1848.  Similarly, the World 
Wars in Europe dramatically weakened many colonial powers, creating openings for independence 
movements and rebellions in Asia and Africa.  Other studies of asymmetric conflict lend this idea some 
support, such as Lyall and Wilson's, which finds a significant decrease in counter-insurgent success 
following World War I.142 
 However, this brief glance at these historical events reveals that an increase in weak actor 
activity was often followed by a reassertion of strong actor control.  For example, most of the 
revolutions of 1848 quickly burnt themselves out, or fell to reactionary forces.  In the 20th century, 
142  Lyall and Wilson, “Rage against the Machines,” p. 70. 
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some anti-colonial rebellions faltered as departing states helped friendly regimes consolidate power, 
while other countries that gained independence from declining European powers fell under the 
influence of the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War.  The advantages non-state actors 
acquire by reacting more quickly to major international transitions appear to be fleeting. 
 This suggests that networks' relative success in the first decades after the Cold War will not last.  
Though networks adapted more quickly to the geopolitical and technological transitions than powerful 
states, strong actors will create new strategies and develop new technologies designed to counter the 
latest network techniques.  Large bureaucratic states may take some time to adjust to new 
circumstances, but once they do they are able to reassert their resource advantage, until another 
transition creates a new opportunity for the non-state networks able to adapt most quickly.  For 
example, the United States, United Kingdom and others have greatly enhanced their internet 
monitoring capabilities, decreasing terrorists' ability to communicate or research bomb-making 
anonymously.  Additionally, as discussed in Part Two below, developments in military robotics can 
help states overcome some of the advantages networks acquired by rapidly adapting to the global 
transitions of the 1990s and developing strategies that made use of the information technology 
revolution.  However, another transition will swing the pendulum back towards non-state networks, as 
they adapt new strategies that take advantage of future geopolitical and technological changes, to which 









Summary of Data for Each Strong Actor 
 Opponent Type US USSR/Russia UK France China Israel 
Total Conflicts Small State 10 2 7 5 3 6 
Network 7 11 13 10 0 14 
Average Civilian 
Fatalities 
Small State 0 0 0 0 0 26.17 
Network 434.57 205 55.23 289.5 0 105.86 
Average Military 
Fatalities 
Small State 9518 37.5 68.86 8.4 3481.5 672.67 
Network 991.57 2687.27 247.46 1767.1 0 155.29 
Average Duration 
(Months) 
Small State 22.7 1.5 7.29 6 4.33 7.17 
Network 76.86 47.42 84.15 74.5 0 46.36 
Percent Failure Small State 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 
Network 40.00% 30.00% 27.27% 20.00% N/A 15.38% 
Percent Mixed  Small State 10.00% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 
Network 40.00% 10.00% 18.18% 20.00% N/A 84.62% 
Percent Success Small State 70.00% 100.00% 85.71% 100.00% 0.00% 66.67% 
Network 20.00% 60.00% 54.55% 60.00% N/A 0.00% 
 
Summary of Data for Each Strong Actor (Excluding Conflicts in which the Weak Actor Received 
Material Assistance from a Great Power) 
 Opponent Type US USSR/Russia UK France China Israel 
Total Conflicts Small State 8 2 7 5 3 6 
Network 7 10 12 10 0 14 
Average Civilian 
Fatalities 
Small State 0 0 0 0 0 26.17 
Network 434.57 205 59.83 289.5 0 105.86 
Average Military 
Fatalities 
Small State 60.75 37.5 68.86 8.4 3481.5 672.67 
Network 991.57 1482.55 263 1767.1 0 155.29 
Average Duration 
(Months) 
Small State 1.5 1.5 7.29 6 4.33 7.17 
Network 76.86 37.42 87.5 74.5 0 46.36 
Percent Failure Small State 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 
Network 40.00% 22.22% 30.00% 20.00% N/A 15.38% 
Percent Mixed  Small State 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 
Network 40.00% 11.11% 20.00% 20.00% N/A 84.62% 
Percent Success Small State 87.50% 100.00% 85.71% 100.00% 0.00% 66.67% 




Chapter 3: The War on Terror, Al Qaeda the Organization and Al Qaeda 
the Idea  
 
The previous chapter separated asymmetric conflict into three categories: localized insurgency, 
irredentist, and global insurgency.  That final category is a recent phenomenon, and al Qaeda is the 
only case that truly fits the definition.  There have been some cases of transnational non-state networks 
engaging in asymmetric warfare in the past, with the late 19th and early 20th century European 
Anarchists providing a notable example.  However, these earlier cases were confined to a region, while 
al Qaeda and its affiliates span the globe, executing attacks in North America, Europe, Africa, and 
various regions of Asia.  This conflict is a product of globalization, enabled by the information 
technology revolution.  In particular, the internet facilitates transnational communication and creates 
the space in which like-minded individuals from around the world can form a network, while the global 
media provides a worldwide theater for mass-mediated terrorism, providing coverage of attacks and 
broadcasting leaders’ messages.      
The organization founded by Osama bin Laden called al Qaeda (“the base”) pulled off the 
largest terrorist attack in history, but has failed to achieve its larger goal of removing American and 
Western influence from the Muslim world.  Following the September 11th attacks, the United States 
became more involved in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, not less, and significantly 
degraded al Qaeda's capacity, eventually killing bin Laden in May 2011.  This raises the question: is 
the War on Terror over? 
 Seeking to avoid association with rendition, torture of prisoners and other unpopular actions the 
United States took under the rubric of fighting terrorism, the Obama administration has generally 
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refrained from using the phrase “War on Terror.”  Elements of the Bush administration first tried 
rebranding the conflict to avoid these negative connotations, sometimes using “Struggle against Violent 
Extremism” starting in 2005.143  Though the United States has used alternative labels, including the 
euphemistic “Overseas Contingency Operations,”144 counter-terrorism remains a prominent focus of 
American national security policy. 
 Al Qaeda's strategy failed to remove the United States from the Middle East because it 
approached a global conflict as if it were a localized insurgency.  However, as the world's preeminent 
military and economic power, America's interest in maintaining a presence in the Middle East and 
supporting allied or friendly governments in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and now Iraq is greater than those of 
foreign powers that withdrew from distant conflicts in the face of resistance.  Furthermore, when al 
Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, it demonstrated the capacity and desire to directly threaten 
American civilians.  This made the conflict more closely resemble a scaled-up irredentist conflict than 
a localized insurgency, and the United States responded accordingly, resolving to continue the War on 
Terrorism until achieving success, or at least a mixed outcome preferable to the status quo. 
 Bin Laden's group has been severely weakened, and it is unclear if it will survive his death, but 
the international jihadist movement he helped catalyze lives on.  This loosely connected group of 
organizations and individuals resembles a violent version of a transnational activist network.145  The 
various nodes—from fairly large groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to self-starters like the 
Boston Marathon bombers—share an ideology and the general goal of resisting what they perceive to 
be a Western war on Islam.  The ideology behind international jihad predates al Qaeda and overlaps 
somewhat with opposition to Israel, but the September 11th attacks and the subsequent American-led 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq galvanized it.  The internet facilitates communication between 
143 Schmitt and Shanker, “Washington recasts terror war as 'struggle.'” 
144 Wilson and Kamen, “'Global War on Terror' Is Given New Name.” 
145 See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. 
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adherents and sympathizers, and gives them access to both the arguments of radical clerics advocating 
violence and information teaching them techniques to carry it out.  Meanwhile, the global media 
provides coverage of distant conflicts and national actions taken in the name of fighting terrorism, 
creates an international audience that inflates the impact of terrorist attacks, and frequently refers to any 
self-stylized jihadists as “al Qaeda,” increasing their perceived importance and unity.   
 The result is a globalized insurgency of which few members pursue goals beyond the general 
idea of resistance.  Various individuals and organizations that share the jihadist ideology think globally, 
but act locally.  This loose network is less capable of concentrating power than a more tightly 
organized group, but more adaptable and harder to eliminate. 
 
The War on Terrorism  
In response to 9/11 the United States declared a War on Terror, but it has never been entirely 
clear what that means.  The most open-ended interpretation is an ambiguous struggle similar to the War 
on Poverty or War on Drugs: a problem that can be reduced with effort but never solved entirely.  
However, unlike the wars on poverty and drugs, primary responsibility for the War on Terror fell to the 
American military and an expanded and more militarized intelligence community.  Those 
organizations, tasked with the national security of the United States, typically operate against clearly 
defined enemies, but terror is an emotion and terrorism is a tactic, neither of which can be vanquished.   
 The US government's “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” released in February 2003, 
is somewhat more specific, but still quite broad.  “The intent of our national strategy,” it declares, “is to 
stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies 
around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all 
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those who support them.”146  While the document acknowledges that victory will not be clearly marked 
by a formal surrender, it does present a desirable end-state at which point the war will be won, 
envisioning that “through the sustained effort to compress the scope and capability of terrorist 
organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them within state borders, the United States and its 
friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat 
of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.”147  This is grandiose, but it points to clear goals: 
reducing the scope and capacity of known terrorist groups, improving vigilance and homeland security 
to decrease vulnerability to terrorism, and coordinating international efforts to advance these goals 
through intelligence sharing, freezing terrorists' finances and denying them safe haven.  
 However, it became clear in the war's first years that the United States did not intend to target 
every terrorist group that threatens a friend or ally.  At the time of the National Strategy's publication, 
the US State Department listed 36 “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” but the United States 
did not devote military and intelligence efforts towards combating all of them.  Groups focused on 
single countries that had not killed Americans or directly threatened American interests, such Aum 
Shinrikyo in Japan, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path) in Peru fell outside the scope.  Critics accused the United States of waging a war on Islam, noting 
that the groups targeted by the United States all espoused Islamist ideologies.  In a poll of four Muslim 
majority countries (Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia) conducted from December 2006 to February 
2007 by World Public Opinion, 79% said that a goal of US foreign policy is to “weaken and divide the 
Islamic world,” which ranged from 73% of respondents in Indonesia to 92% in Egypt.148 
 Contributing to this perception was the “second phase” of the War on Terror, in which the Bush 
administration pivoted to rogue states.  In a speech on September 12, 2001, President George W. Bush 
146 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” p. 11. 
147 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” p. 12. 
148 “Muslims believe US seeks to Undermine Islam.” 
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linked al Qaeda to the Taliban government providing them sanctuary in Afghanistan, claiming “we will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”149  
When the Taliban did not respond to America's demand to arrest and extradite bin Laden, a US-led 
multinational coalition worked with the Afghan Northern Alliance to depose the Taliban and dislodge 
al Qaeda from its sanctuary. 
 However, US policy soon shifted from retaliation to preemption.  Identifying terrorists armed 
with weapons of mass destruction as potentially the most serious threat facing the United States, Bush 
declared that “we must prevent terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons from threatening the United States and the world.”150  The president labeled North Korea, Iran 
and Iraq an “Axis of Evil” and accused them of “arming to threaten the peace of the world.”151  These 
states, Bush argued “could provide [WMD] to terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred.”152  Because of this possibility, the United States would oppose rogue regimes, using military 
force preemptively if necessary.153   
 This culminated in the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  In a September 12, 
2002 speech to the United Nations, President Bush argued that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons and 
that this was a risk the UN could not afford because “if an emboldened regime were to supply these 
weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September 11th would be a prelude to far greater 
horrors.”154  Bush accused Iraq of sheltering and supporting terrorist organizations, though he never 
explicitly tied Saddam Hussein's government to al Qaeda or the September 11th attacks in any formal 
speech.  Other administration officials, most notably Vice President Dick Cheney, asserted that Saddam 
149 Bush, “Bush addresses nation.” 
150 Bush, “State of the Union Address” January 29, 2002, p. 3. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Bush, “State of the Union Address” January 29, 2002, p. 4. 
153 See, for example, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, p. 6. 
154 Bush, “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002, p. 4. 
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Hussein worked with al Qaeda.155  However, while Iraq had provided some support to non-state 
networks fighting against Turkey, Iran and Israel, there was no evidence linking the Iraqi government 
to al Qaeda or any other terrorist group that had killed Americans.156  Unlike the Taliban, Saddam 
Hussein's regime did not impose a strict interpretation of Sharia law, making Iraq a potential target for 
al Qaeda rather than a likely ally.  Nevertheless, the primary public justification for the invasion of Iraq 
was the possibility that Iraq could provide anti-American terrorists with weapons of mass destruction in 
the future. 
 Pre-war UN weapons inspections found, and post-invasion searches confirmed that Iraq did not 
have an active nuclear or biological weapons program,157 and administration officials revealed that the 
Bush administration saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as a priority before September 11th,158 but 
the interpretation of the War on Terrorism that targets rogue regimes lives on in the concept of the 
Long War.  This term, popularized by General John Abizaid, acts as a general policy guideline for the 
Pentagon in the post-Cold War world.159  Whereas the United States sought containment of the Soviet 
Union and opposition to communism after World War II, now America's general geopolitical goal is to 
prevent disruption of the globalizing international order.160  The main actors interested in or capable of 
disrupting this order are rogue states and terrorist groups, independently or in concert, and opposing 
them provides a general strategic direction for the United States that's an alternative to the framework 
that places China as a “near-peer” competitor akin to the USSR.  Following this policy, the United 
States would act globally to counter terrorist groups (e.g. drone strikes against suspected al Qaeda 
155 “Cheney Reasserts Al Qaeda Links to Saddam Hussein's Iraq.” 
156 “Terrorism Havens: Iraq.” 
157 “CIA's final report: No WMD found in Iraq.” 
158 Suskind, The Price of Loyalty. 
159 Graham and White, “Abizaid Credited With Popularizing the Term 'Long War.'” 
160 See Carafano and Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War and, even though he doesn't use the phrase “Long War,” the 
strategic writings of Thomas P.M. Barnett in The Pentagon's New Map and Blueprint for Action. 
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operatives) and overthrow or contain rogue states pursuing weapons of mass destruction (e.g. sanctions, 
covert activity, and possibly future military action against the Iranian nuclear program). 
 This is the broadest interpretation of the War on Terror, incorporating goals above and beyond 
the prevention of terrorist attacks.  At the other end of the spectrum is the narrowest interpretation: a 
war against al Qaeda, the organization responsible for the September 11th attacks.  This rubric treats the 
response to September 11th as similar to law enforcement, aiming to arrest (if possible) or kill the 
individuals who planned, perpetrated, and assisted with the attacks.         
 That task has been mostly accomplished.  The original 19 hijackers died in the attacks, and 
Mohammed al Qahtani, the alleged “20th hijacker” was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and 
imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.  (Qahtani was unable to participate in the attacks because he arrived at 
Orlando International Airport in Florida on August 3, 2001 having used a one-way ticket, and US 
immigration denied him entry out of suspicion that he intended to become an illegal immigrant).  
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, named the “principal architect of the 9/11 attacks” by the 9/11 Commission 
Report was captured in Pakistan on March 1, 2003 and remains in US custody.161   
 The United States alleged that five senior members of al Qaeda, including Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, were “fully aware of the operation's details,”162 and all five are dead or in custody.  
Mohammed Atef, the military chief of al Qaeda, was one of the “principle decision makers” and 
recruiters for the 9/11 attacks;163 and was killed by a US drone strike near Kabul, Afghanistan in 
November 2001.164  Abu Turab al Urduni, who trained the 9/11 attackers in hijacking, disarming air 
marshals, explosives, and basic English, was also killed in Afghanistan in 2001.165  Ramzi bin al Shibh, 
who facilitated communications between the attackers and al Qaeda's leaders, was captured in Karachi, 
161 “The 9/11 Commission Report.” 
162 “Substitution for Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, p. 24.” 
163 Ibid. 
164 “Taliban confirms death of Osama bin Laden's military chief in U.S. Strike.” 
165 “Substitution for Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, p. 24.” 
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Pakistan in September 2002, and held by the CIA in Morocco before being transferred to Guantanamo 
Bay in 2006.166  And Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, was killed by US forces in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan on May 2, 2011. 
 However, the War on Terror was always about more than bringing the individuals responsible 
for 9/11 to justice.  Regardless of the label used for the conflict, there is a near-consensus among 
American and allied military and political leaders that preventing future al Qaeda attacks is a 
worthwhile national security goal.  But that goal is more expansive than countering bin Laden's 
organization; it also includes combating the international movement he helped catalyze. 
 
Al Qaeda the Organization  
Al Qaeda's war against the United States began shortly after its founding in 1988.  The minutes 
of the original meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan—which was attended by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, and Sayyed Imam al Sharif, better known as Dr. Fadl167—vow to advance the cause of Islam 
and do not mention America, but the United States became al Qaeda's main target within a few years.  
Bin Laden, like many Arabs and Muslims (and others) had long criticized the United States for its 
support of Israel, advocating a boycott of American products in a 1986 speech because “the Americans 
take our money and give it to the Jews so they can kill our children with it in Palestine.”168  However, 
bin Laden's choice to make America the focus of al Qaeda's jihad grew out of his reaction to the Saudi 
decision to accept the United States' protection in the Gulf War. 
 After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Saudi Arabia feared that Saddam Hussein's army 
might next push on to capture northern Saudi oil fields.  Bin Laden, fresh off his participation in the 
successful expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, used his family connections to contact the 
166 “Binalshibh to go to third country for questioning.” 
167 Wander, “A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1998-2008.” 
168 Bergen, The Longest War, p. 18. 
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Saudi royal family and offer to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack.  The Saudis turned 
him down, opting for American help instead.  Accepting assistance from the world's preeminent 
military power over that of a group that helped compel invaders to withdraw after a decade of 
insurgency makes eminent strategic sense, but bin Laden was infuriated by the presence of 500,000 
American troops, some of them women, in the land of Islam's two holiest cities.  To bin Laden, his 
followers, and various Muslim clerics in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, the Saudi government had 
willingly allowed an infidel army to invade Muslim land.  In their interpretation, these foreign forces 
were “crusaders,” and their presence “in the sanctuary of Islam posed a greater calamity than the one 
that Saddam was already inflicting on Kuwait.”169 
 Unwelcome by the Saudis, bin Laden fled to Pakistan and then shifted al Qaeda to Sudan, 
where he first developed a plan to attack Americans.  Still angry over the presence of American forces 
in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden interpreted the American mission in Somalia that began in December 1992 
as evidence that the United States intended to colonize Muslim lands.  Al Qaeda's first attack on an 
American target was against two hotels in Yemen that housed US Soldiers bound for Somalia.  The 
bombs killed two tourists, but no Americans.170 
 This attack was unsuccessful, but the American intervention in Somalia shaped al Qaeda's 
strategy.  The United States pulled out of Somalia in response to losing 18 soldiers in Mogadishu in 
October 1993 while trying to capture a Somali warlord, in what became known as the Black Hawk 
Down incident.  Similarly, in 1983, the United States withdrew forces from Lebanon after a truck bomb 
attack on a marine barracks killed 241 American servicemen.  To bin Laden and other al Qaeda 
strategists, this demonstrated that America is weak, and will quit when faced with resistance.  “The 
youth were surprised at the low morale of the American soldiers and realized more than before that the 
169 Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 182. 
170 Wander, “A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1998-2008.” 
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American soldier was a paper tiger and after a few blows ran in defeat,” bin Laden told an interviewer 
in reference to the withdrawal from Somalia. “And America forgot all the hoopla and media 
propaganda about being the world leader and the leader of the new world order, and after a few blows, 
they forgot about this title and left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.”171  
 Drawing on his experience fighting in the successful localized insurgency against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, bin Laden crafted a strategy based on attacking American targets to compel an 
American withdrawal from the Middle East.  In 1996, bin Laden left Sudan under pressure from the 
government, and established a new base of operations in Afghanistan.  From there, in August 1996, he 
issued a “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” 
referring to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.  It argues that “the people of Islam had suffered from 
aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their 
collaborators” and declares that all Muslims have a religious duty to attack Jews and Americans.172 
 Al Qaeda began carrying out this strategy with attacks on American targets in Africa.  On the 
morning of August 7, 1998, truck bombs exploded at the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  The explosions killed 223 people, including 12 Americans.  In response, the 
United States launched cruise missiles at al Qaeda training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan.  These 
caused some damage, but only further convinced bin Laden that the United States would not be willing 
to put its soldiers at risk and therefore lacked the stomach for a protracted conflict. 
 The next major al Qaeda attack was scheduled for the turn of the millennium, on or around 
January 1, 2000.  The plan consisted of near-simultaneous attacks on four locations in Jordan targeting 
American and Israeli tourists, an attack on Los Angeles International Airport, and an attempt to sink the 
USS Sullivans, a destroyer refueling in Aden harbor off the coast of Yemen.  Jihadists had executed 
171 Zernike and Kaufman, “The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism.” 
172 Bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” 
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terrorist attacks in the United States before—most notably a team led by Ramzi Yousef set off a truck 
bomb below the North Tower of the World Trade Center in 1993 that killed six173—but the LAX plot 
was the first time someone acting at al Qaeda's direction attempted an attack on US soil.  Jordanian 
intelligence thwarted the first plot, US Customs and Border Protection thwarted the second by catching 
a would-be LAX bomber crossing the Canadian border with bomb-making material, and the attack 
against the Sullivans failed when the boat intended for a suicide attack sank under the weight of the 
explosives onboard.174 
 The attack against the Sullivans failed, but a successor attempt against the USS Cole succeeded 
on October 12, 2000.  The suicide boat attack killed 17 sailors and injured another 39.  This success 
proved a significant victory for al Qaeda, as “camps in Afghanistan filled with new recruits, and 
contributors from the Gulf States arrived carrying Samsonite suitcases filled with petrodollars.”175  
Furthermore, the United States did not retaliate, possibly because less than a month remained until the 
Bush-Gore presidential election, because President Clinton was focused on negotiating Israeli-
Palestinian peace, or because the CIA was uncertain as to bin Laden's location.176  Regardless, this 
further convinced al Qaeda’s leaders that they could benefit from attacking American targets. 
 Al Qaeda next struck on September 11, 2001, killing 2,996 in the largest terrorist attack in 
history.  Bin Laden's strategic intent behind 9/11 was likely a combination of three possibilities.  Either 
the United States would be frightened and withdraw support for Saudi Arabia and Israel, much as it had 
withdrawn from Somalia in 1993; the United States would not react, as in the aftermath of the Cole 
bombing, or would respond with a limited strike as it had in response to the embassy attacks, and al 
173 “First Strike: Global Terror in America.” 
174 Loeb, “Planned Jan. 2000 Attacks Failed or Were Thwarted; Plot Targeted U.S., Jordan, American Warship, Official 
Says.” 
175 Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 374. 
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Qaeda would gain recruits and funding;177 or perhaps the attacks would bait the United States into 
invading Afghanistan, where bin Laden believed the mujahideen could win as they had against the 
Soviet Union.178  On October 3, 2001, in anticipation of an American invasion of Afghanistan, bin 
Laden wrote a letter to Taliban leader Mullah Omar explaining his conviction that “a U.S. campaign 
against Afghanistan will cause great long-term economic burdens which will force America to resort to 
the former Soviet Union's only option: withdrawal from Afghanistan, disintegration, and 
contraction.”179  
 9/11 was thus a tactical success for al Qaeda, but a strategic failure.  The attacks demonstrated 
that the United States was vulnerable which likely pleased and motivated jihadists around the world, 
but the aftermath did not go as bin Laden hoped.  It took barely one month for the United States to 
depose the Taliban, which had both provided al Qaeda with sanctuary and represented the closest thing 
to the organization's vision of a true Islamic government.  Almost 12 years after the original invasion, 
the United States and the UN-sanctioned International Security Force has not been able to defeat the 
Afghan insurgency.  However, Hamid Karzai, the appointed leader of the Afghan Transitional 
Administration, won national presidential elections in 2004 and 2009.  Despite expressing a desire to 
negotiate with insurgent groups, he shows no interest in supporting al Qaeda or the international 
jihadist cause and agreed to an “Enduring Strategic Partnership” with America.180  Meanwhile, the 
United States, which plans to withdraw forces from Afghanistan in 2014,181 does not appear on the 
verge of economic or political collapse. 
 American and allied Afghan forces mostly drove al Qaeda from Afghanistan, and the United 
States continued pursuing its core members as they fled to Pakistan and elsewhere.  The central 
177 Bergen, The Longest War, p. 5. 
178 Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 375. 
179 Bergen, The Longest War, p. 10. 
180 “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of 
America.” 
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organization has not been able to execute another attack against an American target, claiming only a 
June 2002 attack on a synagogue in Tunisia that killed 19,182 and some bombings in Pakistan.  Many of 
the senior members are dead or in custody. 
 Bin Laden's death could mean the end of the group he founded.  Accounts from inside al Qaeda 
show that bin Laden “exercised near-total control” of the organization.  Senior members had to swear a 
religious oath to him personally, and he could overrule a consensus position among the rest of the 
leaders by himself.183  This role persisted after the invasion of Afghanistan and throughout al Qaeda's 
subsequent time underground.  Materials captured in the 2011 raid on bin Laden's compound revealed 
that he continued orchestrating his group's operations, contacting operatives through couriers.184   
 Former lieutenant Ayman al Zawahiri has formally taken the leadership role of post-bin Laden 
al Qaeda, but most accounts describe him as uncharismatic, “a poor speaker, argumentative, and a 
know-it-all.”185  Bin Laden's reputation was almost precisely the opposite: charismatic in person, 
admired for forgoing the life of luxury his family's wealth could afford him in favor of a modest, pious 
existence, and especially well-spoken in public, from wedding speeches to formal recorded addresses 
intended for a global audience.186  Given the role personal inspiration and devotion played in al Qaeda 
under bin Laden, Zawahiri may not be able to guide the organization back to a similarly prominent 
position. 
 Bin Laden made multiple strategic errors.  He underrated both the importance of great power 
material assistance to the mujahideen's victory over the USSR as well as the developments in strong 
actor military technology in the years since the Soviet Union withdrew, including laser-guided 
precision missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.  He overrated the importance the Afghan war played 
182 “Al-Qaeda claims Tunisia attack.” 
183 Bergen, The Longest War, pp. 24-25. 
184 Hashim, “The Bin Ladens' life on the run.” 
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in the collapse of the USSR, ignoring the role of internal economic and political problems, and 
therefore believed that the United States would suffer a similar collapse if it tried to occupy 
Afghanistan.  Perhaps most importantly, he built his strategy around theories of localized insurgency, 
when the war he wished to undertake more closely resembled a large-scale irredentist conflict. 
 The key feature of a localized insurgency is the strong actor's ability to withdraw without 
sacrificing a central national interest, and this goal seemed to drive bin Laden's thinking.  He noted 
attacks that killed American soldiers, precipitating withdrawal from Beirut and Mogadishu, and 
miscalculated that a larger attack against American civilians would lead to a larger withdrawal from the 
greater Middle East.  However, the United States' support for Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other friendly 
Middle Eastern governments, and interest in guaranteeing the normal flow of the world's oil supply, is 
considerably larger than America's commitment to peacekeeping missions in Lebanon or Somalia.  
When al Qaeda attacked American military and diplomatic targets abroad, it utilized a transnational 
version of a localized insurgency strategy.  However, by killing many civilians on US soil, al Qaeda 
galvanized American resolve in a manner similar to strong actors fighting irredentist conflicts, leading 
to the War on Terrorism. 
 
Al Qaeda the Idea  
Bin Laden's strategy may have weakened his organization and failed to reduce American 
influence in the Middle East or Central and South Asia, but there is one area where he seems to have 
succeeded: spreading international jihadism and turning the cause into a global movement.  The ideas 
behind fundamentalist Muslims violently resisting Western influence and overthrowing insufficiently 
religious regimes predate al Qaeda, but bin Laden's speeches, the September 11th attacks, and 
America's subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq spread the ideology and increased the number 
112 
 
of adherents.  Numerous organizations have taken up the al Qaeda label, only some of which received 
support from bin Laden's central group.  Additionally, individuals from North America, Europe, North 
and East Africa, the Middle East, the Caucuses, and Central, South, and Southeastern Asia have 
committed violence in the name of jihad. 
 Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian theologian, has been called the Father of Global Jihad.187  In 
reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—the first time since World War II that a non-Muslim 
state had invaded a majority-Muslim country—Azzam issued a fatwa (religious ruling) called “Defense 
of the Muslim Lands” instructing Muslims that their first obligation, after faith, was to fight against 
aggression by non-Muslims.188  Azzam called on Muslims from around the world to help expel 
foreigners from Muslim lands, primarily the Soviets from Afghanistan and the Israelis from Palestine.  
This call to jihad resonated around the world, “inspiring men from Algeria to Brooklyn to travel to 
Pakistan and Afghanistan” to fight the Soviets.189  One of these men was Osama bin Laden. 
 Azzam died from a car bomb explosion on November 24, 1989, but his ideas live on.  His 
assassin remains unknown, though various parties have suspected competing Afghan warlords or 
mujahideen leaders, the CIA, Mossad, or operatives working for Ayman al Zawahiri.190  Azzam’s 
legacy, however, is considerable.  In addition to mentoring bin Laden, Azzam helped found both 
Hamas, the Palestinian group that now controls Gaza, and Lashkar e Taiba, the group based primarily 
in Pakistan-administered Kashmir that executed the 2008 Mumbai attacks.191 
 In line with Azzam's call to fight defensive jihad, these organizations focus on expelling non-
Muslims from what they believe to be Muslim lands, but al Qaeda's goals are more expansive, shaped 
by the ideas of Ayman al Zawahiri.  An Egyptian doctor, Zawahiri led Egyptian Islamic Jihad in its 
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fight against the Egyptian government.  Following the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, a leader of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood imprisoned and later killed by the Egyptian government, Zawahiri 
strongly opposed both the secular rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the peace agreement with Israel 
signed by Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat.  Qutb argued for offensive jihad, writing that those “who 
attempt to defend the concept of Islamic jihad by interpreting it in the narrow sense of the current 
concept of defensive war... lack understanding of the nature of Islam and its primary aim.”192  This led 
Zawahiri to believe that jihad required more than fighting against foreign forces occupying Muslim 
countries.  He argued that jihadists should overthrow governments throughout the Middle East, which 
would both purify Islamic society and strengthen it for a fight against the West.193  Zawahiri officially 
merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al Qaeda in 1998. 
 The intellectual justification for jihadist violence against fellow Muslims and secular or 
insufficiently religious regimes comes from Dr. Fadl.  Fadl wrote “The Essential Guide for 
Preparation,” which al Qaeda used as both a training manual and motivational tool.  The Guide asserts 
that Muslims must always be in conflict with non-believers and that rewards await those who fight, or 
assist the fighters, in the afterlife.  This argument resonated in part due to Fadl's reputation as an 
accomplished religious scholar.  In the Guide, Dr. Fadl denounces many Middle Eastern governments 
as apostate, arguing that “the way to end the rulers' unbelief is armed rebellion.”  Many Arab 
governments banned the book and arrested anyone caught with a copy.194 
 Bin Laden combined Azzam's notion of defensive jihad against foreigners, Qutb and Zawahiri's 
desire for offensive jihad against apostate Muslim governments, and Fadl's justifications for worldwide 
attacks against non-Muslims into a two-stage strategy.  He agreed that jihadists needed to purify the 
Muslim world by overthrowing secular and corrupt governments, but asserted that this “near enemy” 
192 Qutb, Milestones, quoted in Bergen, The Longest War, p. 24. 
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could not be defeated until the United States, the “far enemy,” was forced to withdraw its support.195  
Bin Laden's 1996 fatwa declaring war reflects Azzam's teachings by arguing “clearly after Belief there 
is no more important duty than pushing the Americans out of the holy land.”196  However, he also 
accused the Saudis of collaboration, writing “instead of motivating the army, the guards, and the 
security men to oppose the occupiers, the regime used these men to protect the invaders, further 
deepening the humiliation and the betrayal.”197 
 The focus on the United States, and narrative of persecution at the hands of non-Muslim 
governments, helped unite various adherents of the jihadist ideology and catalyze the larger movement.  
Individual groups could put aside their doctrinaire religious disagreements and specific local political 
aims and unite behind the general goal of resisting the global conspiracy against Islam.  Furthermore, 
explaining the misfortunes of local jihadist organizations as the product of a concerted effort by the 
world's most powerful states absolved those organizations of blame.  The decisions of various regional 
groups to adapt the al Qaeda moniker, as well as Zawahiri's formal incorporation of Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad into al Qaeda, demonstrate the appeal of bin Laden's unifying idea.   
 In public statements, especially post-9/11 addresses intended for a global audience, bin Laden 
calmly laid out his arguments in the manner of a statesman.  For example, in a videotaped message 
delivered to al Jazeera in October 2004, bin Laden explained that al Qaeda targeted the United States 
because of its support for Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and other aggressive actions that resulted 
in the deaths of innocents.  Portraying September 11th as self-defense, bin Laden spoke directly to the 
American people, saying that “your security is in your own hands.  Any nation that does not attack us 
will not be attacked.”  Asserting the political nature of his cause, bin Laden asked “contrary to what 
Bush says and claims – that we hate freedom – let him tell us then, ‘Why did we not attack 
195 Bergen, The Longest War, pp. 23-24. 
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Sweden?’”198  Bin Laden surely knew that multiple audiences would hear this message and aimed his 
arguments at supporters as well as opponents.  The speech both threatens and extends an offer of peace 
to Americans, reassuring supporters that they are not fanatics, nihilists, or crazy conspiracy theorists, 
but rational actors responding to aggression. 
 The jihadist thinker who most clearly articulates the vision of a global resistance movement 
goes by the nom de plume Abu Musab al Suri.  His manifesto, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, 
published online in January 2005, critically evaluates the history of the jihadist movement and proposes 
a strategy based on decentralized cells linked primarily by shared sympathy and ideology.  Al Suri 
argues that “al Qaeda is not an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be.  It is a call, a 
reference, a methodology.”  Bin Laden's organization, therefore, would only be “a stage in the 
development of the worldwide Islamist uprising.”199   
 Al Suri's writings demonstrate a forward looking understanding of the movement's strategic 
situation and the appeal of information technology.  He openly criticized bin Laden for relying on 
geographically fixed training camps that could be hit with guided missiles, as was the case in response 
to the 1998 embassy bombings.  By contrast, al Suri’s doctrine calls for autonomous cells without overt 
bases or traceable organizational ties.200  He sees the internet as essential to cultivating the group 
consciousness necessary for autonomous cells to operate with a shared grand strategy, and his ideas are 
accordingly popular in the online forums that terrorism analyst Thomas Hegghammer calls the “town 
square of” jihadism.201  Al Suri’s writings are featured on the website of the Global Islamic Media 
198 “Bin Laden: 'Your security is in your own hands.'” 
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Front, one of the largest online distributors of jihadist works, and have been downloaded tens of 
thousands of times from the online library known as the Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad.202 
 In addition to advocating a decentralized strategy, al Suri is a vocal proponent of weapons of 
mass destruction.  This comes from an understanding of the disadvantages associated with an 
asymmetry of resources and the ability of WMD to provide a partial equalizer.  In “The Muslims in 
Central Asia and the Coming Battle of Islam,” al Suri writes that “the difference in armament and 
number between Muslims and their enemies, between the oppressed and the strong has never been 
larger... The military logic shows us that it is almost absurd to launch a classical confrontational war to 
restore the balance of power.”  Therefore, he argues that jihadists “must attempt to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction (nuclear, biological, bacteriological) in exactly the same way as the aggressive 
oppressive world represented by the Jews and the West possess these weapons.”203  While radical 
clerics have issued fatwas providing religious justification for WMD use against non-Muslim 
civilians,204 al Suri emphasizes the strategic logic of WMDs as a force equalizer.  Additionally, if those 
responsible for a WMD attack follow al Suri's advice and avoid revealing themselves as much as 
possible while shunning fixed training camps, efforts to deter or retaliate against them would be 
especially difficult.  Both deterrence and retaliation require known targets. 
 Al Suri thus represents the next generation of jihadist thinkers, who see al Qaeda more as an 
idea than an organization.  His strategy is that of global insurgency, mixing in elements of localized 
insurgency and irredentist conflict with an online community of loosely connected autonomous cells to 
create a transnational resistance network.  Eliminating this diffuse movement will be difficult, but the 
decentralization will limit its ability to concentrate power.  Given the resources and expertise necessary 
to construct, acquire, or operate working weapons of mass destruction, al Suri's visions of a loosely 
202 Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 15. 
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connected network of autonomous cells and an al Qaeda armed with WMDs are somewhat 
contradictory. 
 
The Global Jihadist Network  
The various organizations and individuals united by this ideology function similarly to a 
network of issue activists.  In Activists without Borders, political scientists Keck and Sikkink define a 
transnational advocacy network as a collection of “actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and 
services.”205  Similarly, the international jihadist movement does not need to be centrally controlled to 
act as a transnational network.  Like groups of activists, jihadists are committed to a common cause and 
share information to help each other advance the cause with separate actions. 
This can be seen in the pattern of post-September 11th suicide bombings.  The worldwide 
incidence of suicide attacks has skyrocketed since 2001, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.  
There were four times as many suicide bombings from September 11, 2001 through the end of 
December 2005 than in the entire period from 1968 through September 10, 2001.  Individuals 
espousing jihadist ideology are responsible for more than 85% of the suicide attacks in the 21st century, 
but few belonged to the same organization or received direction from the same leaders.  As Scott Atran 
argues, “most suicide terrorists today are inspired by a global jihadism which, despite atavistic cultural 
elements, is a thoroughly modern movement, filling the popular political void in Islamic communities 
left in the wake of discredited Western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments.”206 
 In line with al Suri's vision, numerous jihadist groups now consider themselves branches or 
affiliates of al Qaeda.  A committee established by the UN Security Council to sanction “individuals, 
205 Keck and Sikkink, Activists without Borders, introduction. 
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groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida,” lists 224 individuals and 64 separate 
groups as of July 11, 2013.207  Among the largest groups are the Organization of al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (North Africa), which changed its name from the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat in 2007 and primarily seeks to overthrow the governments of Algeria and Mali; Jemaah 
Islamiyah, a group based in Southeast Asia responsible for the October 12, 2002 bombing of a Bali 
nightclub that killed 202 and injured an additional 204, for which they received funding from bin 
Laden's group; Lashkar e Taiba, the group primarily based in Kashmir that attacked Mumbai in 2008; 
the Islamic International Brigade, which fights Russia in the Caucuses; al Shabaab, which controls part 
of Somalia and officially joined al Qaeda in 2012; al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq); al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula; and others.  Most of these groups focus on a particular country or region, acting as 
localized insurgents or irredentists; but all of them espouse a jihadist ideology, and inspire, advise, and 
occasionally assist each other. 
 However, sharing an ideology does not mean they agree on tactics.  For example, al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia, which was founded as Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad by the Jordanian Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi, gained notoriety for brutal attacks against Iraqi Shiites in an attempt to stoke an Iraqi civil 
war.  Concerned that Zarqawi's videotaped beheadings harmed al Qaeda's reputation, Ayman al 
Zawahiri wrote Zarqawi a letter asking him to change his methods.  After praising the efforts of al 
Qaeda in Mesopotamia and stressing the importance of the Iraqi theater to the global jihadist cause, 
Zawahiri wrote “if we look at the two short-term goals, which are removing the Americans and 
establishing an Islamic amirate in Iraq, or a caliphate if possible, then, we will see that the strongest 
weapon which the mujahideen enjoy – after the help and granting of success by God – is popular 
support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries.”208  Zarqawi did not 
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heed this request, continuing to alienate Iraqis by bombing and beheading Shia Arabs, and directing 
three simultaneous suicide attacks at hotels used by foreign diplomats in Amman, Jordan on November 
9, 2005.  The attacks killed 60 people and injured 115 more, including many attendees of a Palestinian 
wedding, among them the fathers of both the bride and groom.   
 This incident illustrates the difficulty of coordinating actions across various nodes of the 
network and how that can be detrimental to the movement's grand strategy.  While Zawahiri 
emphasized the necessity of popular support, Zarqawi seemed motivated primarily by hatred for Shiites 
and his native Jordan.  Popular revulsion at Zarqawi's tactics likely contributed to many Iraqi 
insurgents’ and their supporters’ decision to turn on al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, including the Sunni 
Arab tribal leaders behind the Sons of Iraq.  Beginning in 2005, these militias began fighting against al 
Qaeda and working to stabilize as part of a movement known as the Sunni Awakening.   
 While most al Qaeda affiliates focus on local conflicts, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) has attempted attacks against the United States in addition to pursuing an irredentist conflict 
against the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  AQAP recruited Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
the son of a prominent Nigerian banker, and sent him to blow up a passenger jet bound for Detroit on 
December 25, 2009 with the plastic explosive PETN sown into his underwear.  The “underwear 
bomber” failed to ignite the explosives properly and was subdued by passengers.209  AQAP attempted a 
larger attack using PETN in October 2010, hiding the explosive in printer cartridges placed in packages 
in the cargo container of two passenger jets bound for the United States.  Officials from the United 
Arab Emirates and United Kingdom discovered the packages when the planes stopped, respectively, at 
Dubai International and East Midlands airports.  The bombs were designed to explode in midair when 
the planes were close to landing, destroying the aircraft and raining debris down on a major US city, 
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possibly Chicago.210  Though unsuccessful, these instances demonstrate that attacks on Western cities 
could come from any ambitious jihadist group, even one focused on an insurgency against a local 
government. 
 AQAP also played a role in inspiring self-starters in the United States.  Anwar al Awlaki, an 
American imam who preached a fundamentalist ideology at mosques in the US and then UK, moved to 
Yemen in 2004 and became a prominent member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  Awlaki 
maintained an active presence online, posting sermons and writing a blog that advocated anti-American 
violence, frequently in English.  The most popular sermons received over 40,000 views on YouTube.211    
 Awlaki offered his email address to his online followers.  Among those who contacted him was 
Nidal Malik Hasan, a US Army medical officer who practiced psychiatry.  Awlaki and Hasan 
exchanged at least 18 emails before Hasan shot and killed 13 while injuring an additional 29 at Fort 
Hood in Texas on November 5, 2009, due to anger over the US military presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  While AQAP recruited and sent the underwear bomber, Awlaki did not instruct Hasan to 
attack; Hasan's questions in the emails were found to be consistent with his psychiatric research.212  
Rather, Awlaki's message inspired Hasan to come up with the attack himself. 
 Other self-starters include Faisal Shahzad, who tried and failed to set off a car bomb in Times 
Square on May 1, 2010, and claimed to be influenced by Awlaki's sermons and writing, though the two 
did not have direct contact.213  Bilal Abdullah, a British-born doctor of Iraqi decent, crashed a Jeep 
loaded with propane canisters into Glasgow International Airport on June 30, 2007 in an “al Qaida 
inspired” attack that only managed to kill his driver.214  More recently, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who, along 
with his brother Dzhokhar, killed three in the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, followed 
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the video postings of Gadzhimurad Dolgatov, a Dagestani jihadist who went by Abu Dujana.215  These 
self-starters were inspired by jihadist ideology, and tried to attack Western targets despite never 
receiving training or instructions from a terrorist organization, demonstrating the reach of the global 
jihadist network.   
 This interpretation runs the risk of conflating disparate threats into a single entity.  The various 
organizations and self-starters who consider themselves part of a global jihadist movement may act like 
a loosely connected activist network, but they do not receive central direction and many of the groups 
and individuals never communicate or come into contact with each other.  Therefore, those who 
compare the fight against jihadism to the Cold War against communism are making both an analytical 
and strategic error.  As John Nagl put it, “we are facing a number of different insurgencies around the 
globe—some have local causes, some of them are transnational. Viewing them all through one lens 
distorts the picture and magnifies the enemy.”216  
 Nevertheless, as al Suri envisioned, a network of autonomous cells is carrying on the jihadist 
mission.  They are not centrally controlled and some of them are just localized insurgencies or 
irredentists that use the al Qaeda moniker.  However, many operate transnationally, and some pose a 
threat to the US, UK, and other Western countries.  Organized groups, like al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and self-starters, like the Boston Marathon bombers, will continue planning attacks in the 
name of the global jihadist movement, threatening local governments and civilians, as well as the 
soldiers, government officials, and civilians of distant powers. 
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Conclusion  
The al Qaeda organization suffered a number of serious, possibly fatal blows.  Many members 
have been killed, and the rest are on the run.  By most accounts, Zawahiri lacks bin Laden's charisma, 
and has been unable to reconstitute the organization.  However, the international jihadist cause al 
Qaeda championed shows no sign of disappearing.  This global activist network of organizations and 
individuals is adaptable and resilient.  Due to the limited size of each node and a lack of coordination 
between them, this network will continue to have difficulty concentrating power.  However, it is likely 



















Chapter 4: Asymmetric Warfare and the Robotics Revolution  
  
This dissertation presents a cyclical theory of international asymmetric warfare, in which non-
state networks adapt more quickly than powerful states to systemic technological or geopolitical 
change.  States are larger, more bureaucratic organizations, with more permanence and inertia; they 
thus experience an institutional drag that can delay adaptation to external change, especially in the 
absence of a pressing need, such as an existential threat from a rival great power.  This creates a 
window in the wake of major shifts in the global system in which non-state networks capable of 
threatening great powers can spring up before the states fully adapt.  However, given time, powerful 
states can marshal their resources and reduce the asymmetric threat by producing technological, 
strategic, and political advancements.   
 In the post-Cold War world, the prevailing international system is a global, near-universal, 
commercial alliance among states, featuring eight nuclear powers.217  As long as they remain at peace 
with each other, communicating, trading, and participating in international institutions, the greatest 
threat to nuclear states individually, and the international system as a whole, is disruption by non-state 
networks.  Many networks fighting irredentist conflicts and localized insurgencies adapted quickly to 
the information age, enhancing their capabilities by utilizing new communications technologies.  
Additionally, the internet and global media created an environment in which globalized insurgency is 
possible; while the political, economic, and cultural changes associated with globalization motivate 
some individuals to violently resist the international order.   
217 US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel.  Does not include states that possess nuclear technology, but 
lack nuclear weapons.  Also does not include North Korea, because its estimated stockpile of nuclear weapons is less 
than 10, and, unlike the other nuclear weapons states, it lacks the missile technology to strike from distance. 
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 States have responded to these challenges by gradually adapting to the information technology-
enhanced strategies and transnational nature of many 21st century non-state networks, especially al 
Qaeda and its affiliates.  National security and intelligence agencies share more information with each 
other, track and freeze financial transfers used to support terrorist and insurgent organizations, and 
monitor their websites.  These efforts demonstrate states' ability to marshal their resources to counter 
threats enabled by technological shifts.  However, while new technologies create new capabilities and 
strategic opportunities, the dynamic often works in reverse, with strategic need driving technological 
change.   
 States, unlike networks, possess the resources necessary to drive technological advancement.  
While networks may adapt more quickly, and design idiosyncratic strategies in response to major shifts 
in the technological environment, they cannot possibly afford long-term research programs or 
production facilities for high-tech inventions.  Therefore, developing new technologies is a significant 
way for states to utilize their resource advantage to counter the threat posed by non-state networks.  
This inherently takes more time than developing new ways to utilize existing, commercially available 
technology, but has the potential to provide longer lasting, more decisive benefit. 
 To counter the asymmetric threat from non-state networks in the 21st century, the world's most 
powerful states should and will direct an increasing amount of security resources to robotics and 
automated systems.  Robots are machines that can perceive their surrounding environment and 
recognize changes in it, process this information and make decisions in response, and act upon the 
external environment without constant human direction.218  By contrast, a computer can processes 
information and choose among options, but not act upon the surrounding physical environment, while a 
non-robotic machine can change its external environment, but does not make decisions.  Robots come 
218 See Finkelstein, “Military Robotics: Malignant Machines or the Path to Peace?” p. 5-6, for a more technical version of 
this definition. 
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in many types, ranging from fairly simple varieties that perform repetitive tasks on factory assembly 
lines, to complex aircraft that can autonomously survey a large area and fire missiles at a target.  All 
technologically advanced militaries now utilize automated systems, which demonstrates the widespread 
belief in their usefulness.219   
 As the robotics revolution continues to advance, it will likely have an increasing impact on 
strategies of asymmetric warfare.  Whereas internet-era communications technology can enhance non-
state networks' capabilities by increasing their ability to exploit the non-material asymmetries in which 
they have an inherent advantage, advancements in robotics and information processing have the 
potential to help states reduce weak actor advantages derived from non-material asymmetries, 
especially information, resolve, and responsibility.  Using robots, advanced militaries can gather and 
process more information, risk fewer lives, and protect more locations than with human soldiers alone. 
 
Robots and the United States Military  
As the most advanced military in the world, with an annual budget greater than all other nuclear 
powers combined,220 the United States has prioritized robotics.  Responding to Congressionally 
mandated austerity and the winding down of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense 
released a document in January 2012 outlining a 22% reduction in total defense expenditures from the 
2010 peak.221  All of this reduction comes from personnel and manned systems; the budget protects or 
increases funding for unmanned platforms.  The new budget projections reduce active army personnel 
from 570,000 to 490,000, and reduce active Marine personnel from 202,000 to 182,000, while retiring 
and divesting planes designed to airlift troops.   
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 This reduction in ground capacity and mobility could be expected following the end of two 
foreign occupations, but the budget reduces manned naval and aerial capacity as well.  It retires seven 
Navy cruisers early, while removing two Littoral Combat Ships and eight Joint High Speed Vessels 
from future acquisition plans.  Additionally, it recommends disestablishing six (out of 60) Air Force 
tactical fighter squadrons.  However, the new budget funds the equipment and personnel necessary for 
65 Predator and Reaper drone patrols, “with a surge capacity of 85,” up from the 2011 total of 61.  It 
also protects or increases the funding for Gray Eagle, the Army's unmanned air system, and “sea-based 
unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such as Fire Scout,” all in the 
name of “counter-terrorism operations.”222  This is consistent with personnel training over the last few 
years; since 2009, the Air Force has trained more pilots to fly unmanned aircraft than manned fighters 
and bombers combined.223  DoD's priorities are clear: over the next decade, the United States military 
will become a more roboticized force. 
 Advances in robotics, along with developments in computing—namely, increased networking, 
information processing, and cyber capabilities—have the potential to grant the US military significant 
strategic advantages.  While robots undoubtedly would be useful in the event of a relatively symmetric 
interstate war, their effect on international asymmetric warfare will be more immediately dramatic.  
Other powerful states are also developing robotic military technology, and no developments appear 
likely to overthrow the nuclear balance in the near future.  Non-state networks, however, lack the 
resources to develop or acquire advanced automated systems, and new innovations in unmanned 
technology have already made significant contributions to America's counterinsurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and in the global conflict against al Qaeda. 
 
222 “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” p. 10. 
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Robots in Combat  
 In the 21st century, robots have taken on more combat-related tasks, including some of the most 
dangerous.  With mobile machines of various shapes and sizes turning corners and entering rooms 
ahead of soldiers, removing wounded troops from combat zones, and searching roads for explosives 
ahead of human-carrying vehicles, powerful militaries can undertake risky missions with less risk to 
soldiers' safety.  Fewer casualties decreases a major source of the strong actor's political costs of war, 
making the asymmetry of resolve less of an advantage for weak actors.  This undermines weak actors' 
primary strategy in localized insurgencies, in which protracted war and steadily mounting costs create 
political disputes within strong actors that eventually lead them to abandon the conflict.  For example, 
the American anti-war movement in response to the protracted conflict in Vietnam would almost 
certainly have been weaker if American casualties were significantly lower, with robots reducing the 
need for a draft. 
 In the United States, as with other countries, public support for a given conflict tends to 
decrease as casualties rise, with the notable exception of wars against perceived existential threats, such 
as World War II.224  Along these lines, it is unsurprising that approval ratings for the war in 
Afghanistan have steadily decreased, from 90% approving at the start in 2001, to slightly over half of 
those polled approving in the mid-2000s, to only 36% approving in 2011.225  Meanwhile, American 
casualties rose from an annual average of 50 from 2002-2004, to 104 from 2005-2007, and then as high 
as 499 in 2010 and 418 in 2011.226 
 By contrast, approval for attacks from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has remained high 
among Americans.  A Washington Post-ABC news poll conducted in February 2012 found that 83% of 
224 Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. 
225 Data an average of polls from Gallup, CNN and Opinion Research Corporation, and Fox News and Opinion Dynamic.  
See: Wayner, “American Approval Rating (Percent) of War in Afghanistan.” 
226 Data from “Operation Enduring Freedom” at iCasualties.org. 
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Americans approve of “the use of unmanned 'drone' aircraft against terrorist suspects overseas.”227  The 
2012 “Global Attitudes Survey,” released by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in June 2012, found 
majorities from most countries disapproving of American drone strikes, with the notable exception of 
the United States, where 62% of respondents approved and only 28% disapproved.228  The gap in the 
two surveys most likely reflects the specific language of each question—the Washington Post-ABC 
News poll specified drones strikes against “terrorist suspects overseas” while the Pew survey did not 
use the word “terrorist”—rather than a significant drop in approval over a few months.  Regardless, 
both of these polls demonstrate that a solid majority of Americans support the use of drone strikes, and 
that millions of Americans who oppose the war in Afghanistan nevertheless support continuing the 
campaign of UAV attacks there and elsewhere. 
 This indicates that the American public supports the use of force against suspected members of 
terrorist and insurgent organizations, except when the effort results in mounting American casualties.    
Therefore, with an increasingly roboticized military, the United States will be increasingly able to use 
force abroad without generating much public disapproval at home.  This will make America, and other 
powerful states that utilize drones and other unmanned military platforms, less vulnerable to the Maoist 
strategy of protracted war, while also raising ethical questions regarding the ease with which 
governments are willing to use force absent potential public disapproval. 
  
Ground-based Robots 
 Aerial drones get the most publicity, but ground-based robots are revolutionizing 21st century 
warfare as well.  Whether rolling around on wheels or treads, or, in a recent development, walking 
around on legs, unmanned ground-based systems can enhance the capabilities of soldiers in the field.  
227 “Washington Post-ABC News Poll,” February 4, 2012. 
228 “Drone Strikes Widely Opposed, Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” Pew Global Attitudes 
Project. 
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As of early 2013, the United States has developed or acquired robots that can remove wounded troops 
from battlefields, carry supplies over difficult terrain, detect and remove explosives, shoot firearms 
with precision, knock mortars and rockets out of the sky, and locate the origin of gunfire.  Many of 
these have already been utilized successfully in active combat theaters. 
 The US government has awarded numerous grants to developers of semi-autonomous robots for 
non-killer tasks.  For example, the Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot, or BEAR, from Vecna 
Robotics, is designed to carry wounded soldiers to safety without risking others' lives.  It can lift up to 
500lbs, navigate uneven terrain, climb stairs, and autonomously determine how best to lift objects of 
various shapes and sizes.229  The BEAR was invented in 2005, and Vecna received a grant in excess of 
$1 million from the US Congress to further its development in 2007.  As of late 2012, it is undergoing 
testing at the US Army Infantry Center Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort Benning, where soldiers are 
growing accustomed to its glove-controller, which recognizes hand gestures, and developing tactics for 
extracting wounded soldiers in simulated battle conditions.230  
 Another large ground robot currently undergoing testing is the Legged Squad Support System 
(LS3) from Boston Dynamics, known as the BigDog, which acts as a robotic pack mule.  Unlike the 
BEAR and most other ground-based robots which move around on wheels or treads, the BigDog walks 
on four legs, allowing it to traverse more difficult terrain.  With a variety of sensors, a gyroscope, and 
an on-board computer constantly making adjustments, the robot maintains its balance much like a 
person or an animal.  In demonstration videos, it slips on ice and regains its balance without dropping 
any of its cargo, all without human assistance.231  By absorbing the shock of the impact of each leg 
229 See Atwood and Klein, “Vecna's Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot BEAR,” or “High Performance Hydraulics for 
Industrial Applications.” 
230 Ruppert, “Battlefield Extraction-Assist Robot to Rescue Wounded on Battlefield.” 
231 “BigDog Overview.” 
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with the ground, it can recycle some energy from one step to the next, extending operating time 
between charges. 
 The LS3 is about 3 feet long, 2.5 feet tall, weighs 240lbs, and looks eerily like a headless four-
legged animal.  In separate tests, the BigDog demonstrated that it can run at 5 mph, climb slopes up to 
35 degrees, walk across rubble, through mud, snow, and water, and carry a maximum load of 340 
lbs.232  It also has the ability to follow a human leader without directional input, and, in 2013, Boston 
Dynamics added a robotic arm which is capable of lifting (and throwing) heavy objects such as cinder 
blocks.233  Funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the BigDog began 
undergoing military tests in 2012, and could be deployed as early as 2014.  In video from tests in the 
summer of 2012, the LS3 prototype demonstrates that, if knocked down, it can automatically right 
itself, stand up, and continue walking.  Early versions were noisy, but the latest prototype is “roughly 
10 times quieter than when the platform first came online, so squad members can carry on a 
conversation right next to it, which was difficult before,” according to DARPA program manager Lt. 
Col. Joe Hitt.234  A robotic pack mule like the BigDog would allow soldiers to bring heavier equipment 
into rougher terrain, and lighten the load carried on their backs, making them simultaneously more 
mobile and better equipped.    
 Currently, the United States and other advanced militaries make extensive use of smaller, 
multipurpose robots, like the PackBot by iRobot, which looks like a camera and robotic arm mounted 
on a series of treads.  Over 2,000 PackBots have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, where they 
enter buildings or peer around street corners ahead of soldiers, reducing the risk to personnel.235  
232 “BigDog – The Most Advanced Rough-Terrain Robot on Earth.” 
233 “Dynamic Robot Manipulation.” 
234 Pfeiffer, “DARPA Unveils Robotic Mule.” 
235 “Ground Robots – 510 PackBot.” 
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Weighing approximately 7 to 18 kilograms—give or take, depending on accessories—the PackBot can 
be carried in a backpack (hence the name).   
 Most importantly, PackBots can detect and dispose of explosives, especially improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs).  Of 2,617 International Security Force fatalities in Afghanistan from October 
2001 through the end of 2012, 1,337 have been due to IEDs, for a total of 51.09%.  However, the 
percentage has steadily declined, from a peak of 60.98% (of 451) in 2009 to 58.41% (of 630) in 2010, 
51.22% (of 492) in 2011, and 42.31% (of 312) in 2012.236  Part of this decline may be due to shifting 
insurgent and counter-insurgent tactics, but a significant portion is likely due to deployment of the 
PackBot 510 EOD model beginning in late 2007.  EOD stands for Explosive Ordinance Disposal, and 
the new model can drag larger objects and lift up to 13.6kg with its arm in a compact position and 
4.5kg with its arm extended, twice the capability of its predecessors, with a grip that is three times as 
strong.237  Additionally, these robots feature “Fido” sensors that can detect explosive vapors on a level 
comparable to highly-trained bomb sniffing dogs.238   
 The decline in the percentage of coalition casualties caused by IEDs coincides with the 
deployment of thousands of EOD robots, beyond the 2,000-plus PackBots deployed to Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  The larger Talon robot, developed by Foster-Miller and produced by QinetiQ, weighs 
approximately 52 to 71 kilograms, depending on accessories, and includes chemical, gas, temperature, 
and radiological sensors.  With its larger size, the Talon is less portable that the PackBot, but features a 
more powerful robotic arm, capable of manipulating heavier objects, dragging up to 113kg, and lifting 
up to 34kg with its arm retracted and 13kg when extended.239  As of the beginning of 2012, Talon's 
236 “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org. 
237 “iRobot PackBot 510 with Engineer Kit.” 
238 “PackBot Tactical Robot.” 
239 “Talon Specifications.” 
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makers boast of “more than 20,000 successful EOD missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”240  The Talon, 
PackBot, and other robots with explosive ordinance disposal capabilities—such as the Wheelbarrow 
bomb disposal robot, made by Northrup Grumman primarily for the United Kingdom, and the tEODor, 
made by Cobham primarily for the Spanish Armed Forces—reduce the ability of weak actors to injure 
or kill strong actors' soldiers, thereby weakening their overall strategy.  Less fear of IEDs allows 
military units to advance further and faster, while decreasing the rate at which strong actors' accrue 
costs in prolonged conflicts.  
 In addition to planted explosive devices, automated systems help protect soldiers against 
explosive projectiles.  After IEDs, some of the most successful insurgent weapons against American 
and allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been rockets and mortars.  Insurgents occasionally fire 
these relatively inaccurate projectiles at US bases from nearby residential neighborhoods, thereby 
discouraging long-range retaliatory fire.  The shooters, therefore, often have time to abandon their 
location before ground forces can respond, making the possibility of retaliation insufficient to deter 
rocket and mortar fire.  To counter this threat, the Army and Marines have employed Counter Rocket, 
Artillery, and Mortar technology (C-RAM).241   
 In response to an operational needs statement from the Multinational Corps in Iraq, Raytheon 
adapted its MK15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System for land use.242  Since the 1980s, the US Navy 
has mounted Phalanxes on ships to protect against anti-ship missiles and aircraft.  The system utilizes 
radar—and, more recently, infrared, and electro-optical sensors—to spot incoming projectiles, and then 
fires up to 4,500 rounds per minute from a swiveling Gatling gun to destroy them before they can reach 
the ship.  Though attached to a fixed position on various vessels, the Phoenix is considered a robot 
because it “autonomously perform[s] its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage and kill 
240 “Armed, Aware and Dangerous.” 
241 Singer, Wired for War, p. 38. 
242 “Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM).” 
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assessment functions.”243  After tests demonstrating a 60-70% success rate in shooting down incoming 
mortars, the land-based version known as Centurion was first deployed to Iraq in 2005, where it was 
installed at bases and government installations, including the Green Zone and Camp Victory.244  Unlike 
the ship-mounted Phalanx, which uses depleted uranium shells, land-based C-RAMs employ 
incendiary rounds to avoid civilian exposure to radioactive material, and explode in mid-air to reduce 
the risk that ammunition that misses the target will harm personnel or civilians.245  Before deployment, 
the military required Centurion to demonstrate an ability to neutralize incoming threats while 
minimizing collateral damage.246 
 While the original Centurion can protect an area of up to 1.2 square kilometers from a fixed 
position, the latest C-RAM technology aims for greater range, improved tracking, and mobility.247  In 
2010, Raytheon successfully demonstrated a Mobile Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (MLPWS).  
This mobile C-RAM system, mounted on the back of a heavy tactical truck, met the 60-70% success 
rate of its stationary antecedent while maneuvering through 28 miles of paved and off-road 
conditions.248  It could provide useful protection against mortars and rockets to mobile convoys, 
reducing the threat of ambushes, and also rapidly provide C-RAM defense to forward positions.        
 An alternative C-RAM system, which boasts a greater success rate against mortars and rockets, 
was recently developed by Rheinmetall for the German military to protect bases in Afghanistan.  The 
Modular Automatic and Network capable Targeting and Interception System, or MANTIS for short, 
was first deployed in 2011, and includes six 35mm automatic guns, two sensor units capable of 
recognizing approaching missiles from 3km, and a ground-based control unit.  Instead of hurling a hail 
of bullets at incoming projectiles, the system fires air-burst shells that separate into 152 tungsten 
243 “MK 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS).” 
244 “Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM).” 
245 Singer, Wired for War, p. 38. 
246 “Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM).” 
247 “A Laser Phalanx?” 
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projectiles, each of which weigh 3.3 grams.  The central control unit analyzes information from the 
sensors to determine the flight path and velocity of incoming targets, and then programs the 
ammunition using an electronic timer.  When the MANTIS' ammunition approaches its target, it bursts 
into a metal cloud obstructing the projectile's flight path, which increases the chances that it will 
destroy the incoming rocket or mortar compared to other land-based C-RAM systems.  The entire 
process—detection, analysis, counter-fire—takes approximately 4.5 seconds.249 
 To improve range and reduce operating costs, Raytheon is developing a variant of the Phalanx 
that would use lasers instead of bullets.  By using a focused fiber-optic beam, a C-RAM system could 
triple the range of earlier models and eliminate the cost of ammunition.  However, despite successful 
tests at shorter distances, in which a laser-based C-RAM destroyed incoming 60mm mortars at 550 
yards, numerous technical problems remain.  Lasers require considerable power to operate, and 
sometimes have difficulty maintaining full strength in unfavorable weather conditions, such as fog or 
rain.  The delicate technology may degrade from exposure to salt spray at sea, or sand in deserts, and 
destroying targets with lasers at a greater distance creates additional risk of collateral damage.  Unlike 
incendiary shells, which detonate after a set distance, lasers could go through the target, creating a risk 
for friendly or civilian aircraft in the area.250   
 Minimizing civilian casualties is essential for C-RAM to provide strategic value in asymmetric 
warfare.  If insurgents fire mortars or rockets from populated areas, and the C-RAM system knocks the 
projectiles out of the air without destroying them, they could harm civilians or destroy civilian 
property.  From the insurgents' prospective, both outcomes are strategically beneficial: either the 
projectile gets through the C-RAM defenses and has the opportunity to strike counterinsurgent soldiers 
or equipment, or the C-RAM knocks down the projectile in a civilian area,  potentially angering the 
249 “NBS MANTIS Air Defense Protection System, Germany.” 
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population against the counterinsurgents.  Both exploit the asymmetry of resolve, as they impose costs 
on the strong actor and motivate the weak actor.  By contrast, a C-RAM system that protects soldiers 
without causing harm to local civilians benefits strong actors by reducing the asymmetry of resolve 
from both directions.   
 Unsurprisingly, in addition to those that to protect soldiers and save lives, some modern military 
robots possess offensive capabilities.  The Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection 
System, or SWORDS, is a weapons system that can be mounted on a Talon robot.  SWORDS replaces 
Talon's gripping arm with a gun mount that can hold any weapon weighing less than 300lbs, including 
an M-16, a .50-caliber machine gun, an antitank rocket launcher, or a 40mm grenade launcher.251  In 
testing, it directly hit bull's-eyes up to 2,000 meters away every time it was fired from a stationary 
position.252   
 The robot achieves greater accuracy than even the best human snipers by eliminating human 
error.  A Talon does not breathe, react to surprises, fear counter-fire, or depend on muscle control, thus 
providing a more stable platform for weapons than any person could.  Furthermore, the SWORDS 
system matches its zoom lens camera to a weapon's optics, allowing soldiers to see exactly what the 
weapon is looking at on a monitor, instead of needing to align their eye with the gun sight.253  
Therefore, by using robots instead of human soldiers on the front lines in uncertain, dangerous 
situations, like urban warfare against an insurgency, strong actors not only reduce the risk to their 
soldiers, but could reduce collateral damage as well.   
 Futuristic developments over the next decade or two will likely produce ground-based robots 
increasingly capable of combat-related tasks traditionally handled by human soldiers.  As of 2012, 
unmanned ground systems can carry supplies, remove wounded soldiers from the battlefield, pick up 
251 Singer, Wired for War, p. 30. 
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smaller items, dispose of explosive ordinance, and fire weapons at a target.  Soon, these functions will 
be joined by hunter-killer robots designed to track down and incapacitate human targets.   
 Adapting the BigDog's ability to walk on legs, Boston Dynamics created an anthropomorphic 
two-legged robot called PETMAN.  It is human-sized and shaped, and can walk, twist, squat, and do 
push-ups.  The company currently sells PETMAN as “an anthropomorphic robot for testing chemical 
protection clothing.”254  By moving like a person and simulating human physiology, “controlling 
temperature, humidity and sweating when necessary,”255 the PETMAN can provide realistic conditions 
for testing protective clothing. 
 Even though the PETMAN looks eerily like a prototype of the hunter-killer robot from the 
movie Terminator, humanoid robot soldiers are likely still a long ways off.256  PETMAN can walk on a 
treadmill and return to its original path when pushed, but it cannot move as smoothly or as quickly as a 
person.  On video, its jumping-jacks and push-ups appear stunted, and it lacks the ability to rapidly 
switch motions, such as from walking to crawling.257  More importantly, no currently designed robot 
possesses anywhere near the adaptability or decision-making capabilities of human beings.  With 
engineering improvements, a humanoid robot could move faster or more smoothly than the current 
incarnation of the PETMAN, but the lack of high-functioning artificial intelligence means that human 
soldiers are in no danger of being replaced by robots in the near future. 
 However, the ideal hunter-killer robot to assist human soldiers in a limited task may not be 
humanoid.  In the Terminator movies, the robot resembles a person because it aims to infiltrate human 
society and track down a specific target.  It looks human to avoid detection, and interacts with people to 
acquire information.  Appearing and acting indistinguishable from a real person is far beyond the 
254 “PETMAN – BigDog Gets a Big Brother.” 
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capabilities of current robotic technology, and human soldiers will remain central to military tasks, 
especially the population-interaction elements of counterinsurgency, for the foreseeable future.  
However, a ground-based hunter-killer robot could help human soldiers catch a fleeing suspect. 
 In pursuit of this goal, DARPA granted a contract to Boston Dynamics to adapt the BigDog into 
a cheetah-like robot that can track down human prey.  Like the BigDog, the Cheetah-bot stands on four 
legs, but the aim is to create a faster, more agile robot capable of making tight turns so that it “can 
zigzag to chase and evade.”258  It could have non-combat uses as well.  For example, DARPA and 
Boston Dynamics foresee this fast, four-legged robot assisting rapid emergency response teams, 
reaching victims of a fire or vehicular accident before human first responders.  In a 2012 
demonstration, the Cheetah-bot reached a maximum speed of 28.3 mph galloping on a treadmill, which 
is faster than Olympic sprinters.259 
 As ground-based robots increasingly protect soldiers from hostile fire and take on some of the 
most dangerous combat-related tasks, including battlefield extraction, explosive ordinance disposal, 
and front-line advancement on enemy positions, the ability of weak actors to kill strong actor soldiers 
will likely decrease.  With fewer soldiers returning home in body bags, strong actors would face less 
domestic political pressure to negotiate unfavorable settlements or abandon protracted conflicts.  
Additionally, the increased precision of robot-fired weaponry could decrease civilian casualties without 
reducing military effectiveness.  By shooting more accurately and never acting out of fear for their own 
safety, robots like the SWORDS system or a futuristic hunter-killer could decrease the harm to civilians 
that fuels both weak actor resolve and political pressure from human rights' groups and antiwar 
advocates.  Therefore, ground-based robots have the potential to increase the likelihood of strong actor 
258 Rawnsley, “Darpa's Cheetah-Bot Designed to Chase Human Prey.” 
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success in asymmetric conflicts by narrowing the asymmetry of resolve, undermining a key element of 
weak actor strategy.      
 
Aerial Robots 
 In addition to ground-based robots, the US military and intelligence community makes 
extensive use of flying robots known alternatively as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned 
aerial systems (UASs), commonly referred to as aerial drones.  Most drone missions involve 
reconnaissance, but some UAVs, like the Predator and Reaper, use missiles to attack targets on the 
ground.  According to GlobalSecurity.org, there are 77 different UAV models in use, discontinued, or 
currently in production.260  
 Unmanned aircraft are almost as old as manned airplanes, with the first attempts at remote-
controlled planes coming in World War I.  The Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane project aimed to 
create a “flying bomb,” and flew the unmanned N-9 model for the first time in 1917.  An explosives 
laden unmanned airplane, the N-9 was more of a precursor to cruise missiles than modern UAVs.  The 
earliest unmanned aircraft using a jet engine, the Firebee by the Ryan Aeronautical Company—which 
became Teledyne Ryan after a merger in 1969, and was purchased by Northrup Grumman in 1999—
first flew in 1955, and was used primarily for training aircraft gunners.  Later versions, including the 
Ryan Lightning Bug, were designed for reconnaissance, and the United States first flew Lightning 
Bugs in August 1964 to gather information over China and Vietnam.261   
 Expanding UAV use in combat, Israel utilized adapted Firebees as decoys to distract Syrian 
aerial defenses in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  In 1982, in advance of a strike on Syrian positions in the 
Bekaa Valley, Israel sent a squadron of UAVs that broadcast signals like regular planes, prompting 
260 “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” 
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Syrian anti-aircraft fire.  The Israelis then followed with a wave of manned aircraft that destroyed the 
air defenses using radar frequencies revealed by the anti-aircraft batteries' attacks on the drones.262    
 However, in the Post-Cold War world, UAV use has expanded dramatically, most notably for 
targeted killings.  The Predator drone, manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, comes 
in two versions: the RQ-1 for surveillance and reconnaissance, and the MQ-1, which includes combat 
capabilities.  Operational since 1994, the Predator first flew missions in Bosnia in 1995, in support of 
forces under the auspices of NATO and the United States.263  It can fly up to 25,000 feet, and remain in 
the air up to 40 hours.  The original version, used in the former Yugoslavia, was flown remotely by a 
pilot and sensor operator, sometimes accompanied by payload specialists, sitting in a van near the 
runway of the drone's operating base.  Direct radio signals controlled takeoff and landing, just like a 
remote-controlled model airplane.  Once airborne, communications between UAV and pilot shifted to 
the military's satellite network, which often caused delays of a few seconds between a pilot's command 
and the drone's response.264   
 By the beginning of the 21st century, improvements in communications technology allowed 
pilots to fly unmanned aircraft from thousands of miles away, without noticeable delay.  The US has 
two main UAV programs operating out of two command centers: CIA pilots fly drones from the 
agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, near Washington D.C., while the US military's UAV pilots 
operate out of Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.265  Both bases are over 6,000 miles away from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen, where the planes fly and execute various missions, 
including missile strikes.     
262 Singer, Wired for War, p. 56. 
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 The Predator was the first UAV to be controlled via satellite data link, the first to support 
manned aircraft with target laser designation, and the first to fire air-to-ground missiles.266  As a result, 
it is also the first flying robot in history to kill a person outside of a war zone.  In February 2001, an 
MQ-1 Predator successfully fired a Hellfire-C laser-guided missile in flight tests at Nellis Air Force 
Base in Nevada.267  In November 2002, a CIA-controlled Predator destroyed a jeep in Yemen with a 
Hellfire missile, killing six men, including Ali Qaed Senyan al Harthi, a member of al Qaeda linked to 
the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000.268  Since then, the MQ-1 
Predator—and the Predator B, a successor aircraft also known as the MQ-9 Reaper—have played an 
increasing role in American counter-terrorism and counterinsurgent efforts. 
 The Reaper is a larger, more powerful version of the Predator, specifically designed to strike 
enemy targets.  According to Air Force General T. Michael Moseley, “the Reaper represents a 
significant evolution in UAV technology and employment.  We've moved from using UAVs primarily 
in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles before Operation Iraqi Freedom, to a true hunter-
killer role with the Reaper.”269  First flown in 2001, the Reaper features a 900-horsepower engine, 
compared to the original Predator's 119hp, and can carry 15 times the ordinance, fly twice as high, and 
achieve a maximum velocity at least twice as fast as the earlier model.270  General Atomics is 
developing an even faster version, the Predator C, or Avenger, which first flew in April 2009, but as of 
2012, remains in an expanded test program.271 
 In the 21st century, the United States has increasingly utilized missiles fired from Predator and 
Reaper drones to strike targets linked to al Qaeda or Afghan insurgent networks.  The US does not 
officially acknowledge these attacks because they are part of a covert program, so there are no publicly 
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available statistics from the American military or intelligence services that oversee the strikes.  
However, compiling news reports of drone attacks can provide reasonable estimates.  From 2004 
through January 2013, American drones launched approximately 337 attacks in Pakistan,272 along with 
approximately 65 strikes in Yemen,273 and 3 to 9 in Somalia.274   
 The totals are approximate because, given the lack of official statistics, reports occasionally 
conflict regarding whether the strike came from a UAV or a manned aircraft, or whether American or 
local government forces were responsible.  For example, according to diplomatic cables revealed by 
WikiLeaks, Yemeni officials claimed responsibility for American airstrikes to avoid a public outcry 
over the government granting foreign forces permission to launch attacks against Yemeni citizens on 
their territory, with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh telling American General David Petraeus, 
then commander of US forces in the Middle East, that “we'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not 
yours.”275  The figures thus represent confirmed American drone strikes, which could be considered a 
low-end estimate.  Alternative sources, especially those critical of American UAV campaigns, like the 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism's “Covert War on Terror” project, compile data on any possible 
drone strike, estimating 362 attacks in Pakistan, and up to 93 in Yemen, which effectively provide 
high-end estimates.276        
 Of the three locations, Pakistan features the best international press coverage and has received 
the most scholarly attention.  The Year of the Drone project, led by Peter Bergen at the New America 
Foundation, provides a comprehensive study of UAV attacks in Pakistan.  The project “draws only on 
accounts from reliable media organizations with deep reporting capabilities in Pakistan, including the 
New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, accounts by major news services and 
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networks—the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN, and the BBC—and reports in 
the leading English-language newspapers in Pakistan—the Daily Times, Dawn, the Express Tribune, 
and the News—as well as those from Geo TV, the largest independent Pakistani television network.”277  













Low High Low High Low High 
2004-2007 9 89 112 81 103 8.98% 8.04% 3 
2008 33 274 314 134 165 51.09% 47.45% 11 
2009 53 369 725 266 502 27.91% 30.76% 7 
2010 118 607 993 581 939 4.28% 5.44% 12 
2011 70 378 536 362 500 4.23% 6.71% 6 
2012 48 222 349 194 317 12.61% 9.17% 6 
2013 (Jan) 6 37 44 37 44 0.00% 0.00% 4 
Total 337 1976 3073 1655 2570 16.24% 16.37% 55 
 
 The United States first employed UAVs in Pakistan in 2004, but the drone campaign began in 
earnest in 2008.  The number of strikes escalated from 33 in 2008, to 53 in 2009, and peaked at 118 in 
2010, followed by 70 in 2011 and 48 in 2012.  The initial rise indicates an increasing reliance on UAV 
strikes to target various insurgent networks operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, along 
with remaining members of al Qaeda.  The increasing number of attacks is coupled with a decreasing 
percentage of civilian deaths, which suggests better intelligence and improving skill regarding drone 
277 “Year of the Drone.” 
278 Low percentage of civilian deaths calculated using the low estimated total deaths and low estimated militant death 
figures.  High percentage of civilian deaths calculated using the high estimated total and high militant death figures.  As 
a result, in some years, the percentage of civilian deaths calculated by using the low estimates is greater than that 
calculated by using the high estimates. 
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usage.   
 The declining number of UAV strikes and associated deaths after 2010 demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the campaign, as fewer targets become available.  While this could be due to successful 
elimination of a significant percentage of fighters, the decline could also indicate that insurgents have 
adjusted their behavior to reduce their vulnerability to aerial attacks.  The estimated number of militant 
leader deaths in 2011 (6) and 2012 (6) are fewer than any since 2007, and insurgent leaders have said 
that the drone strikes have driven them underground.279  This therefore suggests that the drone 
campaign in Pakistan has disrupted insurgent operations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater by killing 
fighters and leaders, and denying the remaining members the ability to operate openly. 
 Meanwhile, the drone campaign in Yemen has escalated, with more UAV attacks in 2011 and 
2012 than in all previous years combined.  While Yemen was the site of the first extrajudicial targeted 
killing by UAV—the Predator-launched strike against Ali Qaed Senyan al Harthi in 2002—the 
American drone campaign began focusing on Yemen after al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
claimed responsibility for the attempted “underwear bombing” on December 25, 2009, in which Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a plastic explosive called PETN that was sown into his 
underpants while on board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.  Beginning with an 
attack on a suspected AQAP training camp in December 2009, the United States launched 
approximately 27 drone strikes through June 2012,280 and at least 27 more in the following seven 
months, with 6 attacks in January 2013 alone.281 
 As of January 2013, the strikes have killed an estimated 765-1080 people in Yemen, 743-1006 
of whom the New America Foundation identified as militants.  This presents an estimated civilian 
279 Khan, “Pakistani Taliban: US Drone Strikes Forcing Militants Underground.” 
280 Bergen and Rowland, “Obama Ramps Up Covert War in Yemen.”  
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casualty rate of 2.87% to 6.85%, which is similar to the rate in Pakistan from 2010 through early 2013 
(5.63% to 6.35%), providing further evidence of the UAV teams' ability to target selectively.  The 
strikes have killed at least 41 senior members of AQAP, including the American-born cleric Anwar al 
Awlaki on September 30, 2011, and the organization's head of media, Ibrahim al Bana on October 14, 
2011.282  In addition to assisting in the planning of operations, al Awlaki was considered the public face 
of AQAP, broadcasting the group's message in sermons on the internet, and directly communicating 
with and motivating Abdulmutallab, Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hasan, and others.283  
While the United States can point to individual successes, like killing al Awlaki, it is unclear if 
the drone campaign is succeeding strategically.  Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen reports that al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula has grown from 200-300 militants in 2008 to more than 1,000 fighters as of 
2012, with expanded control in southern Yemen.  “In parts of Abyan and Shabwa provinces,” he stated, 
“the organization controls towns in which it has established its own police departments and court 
systems. It is providing water, electricity and services to these towns. In short, AQAP now sees itself as 
the de facto government in the areas under its control.”284  This demonstrates UAVs' ability to kill 
wanted individuals, but casts doubt on the strategy of targeted killings as a method of successfully 
neutralizing militant groups.  It is possible that anger in response to attacks increases popular support 
for militant movements and improves their recruiting, though this blowback effect is almost certainly 
due to violations of sovereignty and the damage and casualties the attacks cause, not the fact that the 
strikes come from unmanned systems rather than manned aircraft. 
 Much like ground-based robots, aerial drones allow militaries to execute missions at reduced 
risk to personnel.  This leads to fewer strong actor deaths, and, correspondingly, less political cost.  
282 Ibid. 
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States, of course, do not want unmanned aerial systems to crash, get shot down, or destroyed, because 
of the cost of the equipment and the risk that enemies will learn more about proprietary technologies; 
but there is no danger that a human pilot will be killed or captured and exploited by enemy forces.  
Drones are expensive, but cost considerably less than manned aircraft, primarily because they do not 
include equipment necessary to accommodate a person, such as a cockpit, ejection seat and parachute, 
or air pressure control.  For example, according to the Pentagon's requested budget for fiscal 2012, each 
F/A-18E/F Fighter costs $93.4 million, while the next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and F-22 
respectively cost $133.6 million and $345.9 million per plane.  However, each Reaper costs a relatively 
cheap $30.3 million, which includes the ground control equipment, satellite uplink, and the drone itself.  
Each RQ-1 Predator costs only $4.03 million.285   
 These manned aircraft are not yet obsolete, because they offer far superior air-to-air combat 
capabilities.  Unlike fighter jets such as the F-18 or F-22, Predators and Reapers lack the ability to 
engage in aerial dogfights against enemy airplanes.  The drones are capable of carrying air-to-air 
missiles, which they could fire at opposing aircraft, but they lack the speed, maneuverability, and 
situational awareness to challenge fighter jets.286  In December 2002, before the start of the Iraq war, an 
MQ-1 Predator gathering information over Iraq was fired upon by an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat.  As the 
MiG's missile approached the Predator, the drone's pilot launched an air-to-air Stinger missile in 
response, but did not connect.  The Predator was destroyed.287 
 Since 2002, there have been no reported incidents of UAVs firing upon enemy aircraft.  Due to 
the absence of air threats in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and Predators' limited carrying capacity, the 
285 “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012 Pentagon Spending Request.” 
286 Pardesi, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: Likely Missions and Challenges for the 
Policy- Relevant Future.” 
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United States outfitted its unmanned combat aerial systems exclusively with ground attack weapons;288 
but in the future, the United States and other advanced nations will likely develop UAVs capable of 
aerial combat.  A 2009 Air Force study mapping out the future of unmanned aircraft envisions a class 
of UAVs called “MQ-Mc,” which would be capable of any Air Force mission, including dogfighting 
and nuclear strikes, by 2030.289  Meanwhile, the Navy is already designing experiments, which may 
take place as early as 2015, in which two teams, each made up of as many as 50 small “aerial battle 
bots,” will engage each other to develop tactics for unmanned air-to-air combat.290  Besides costing less 
than manned aircraft, and eliminating the risk to human pilots, unmanned planes have the potential to 
be more maneuverable, because human pilots can lose consciousness from the g-force of rapid turns at 
supersonic speeds.   
 However, air-to-air combat capabilities are not especially important to state-network warfare.  
Due to their resource advantage, powerful states can easily maintain air superiority over non-state 
opponents.  The primary threat to strong actor aircraft comes from surface-to-air attacks from anti-
aircraft weaponry, such as shoulder-launched missiles, rather than enemy fighter jets.  Every fixed-
wing or rotary aircraft lost by the United States and allies in Iraq or Afghanistan was due to accident or 
ground-based fire.  Therefore, while unmanned aerial vehicles with the ability to engage other aircraft 
in dogfights would provide strategic advantages in a symmetric conflict between powerful states, 
UAVs with information gathering and ground attack capabilities are sufficient for conflict against non-
state networks. 
 In asymmetric warfare, the lack of human pilots brings advantages beyond decreased risk to 
personnel and lower monetary cost.  Robotic airplanes do not need to eat, sleep, or use the bathroom.  
Ground-based drone operators have the opportunity to attend to bodily needs, or change shifts due to 
288 Axe, “Predator Drones Once Shot Back at Jets... But Sucked At It.” 
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fatigue.  As a result, UAVs can remain in the air for far longer than any manned aircraft, with pilots 
constantly operating at peak capacity.  This allows them to be more selective about the timing of 
attacks.  Due to limited flight time and concern for personal safety, the pilot of a manned plane is more 
likely to fire on a target when the opportunity arises.  Unmanned planes, by contrast, can remain in the 
air for 36 hours or more, allowing them to wait for greater certainty about a target's identity, and for 
targeted individuals to be isolated from non-combatants.   
 The result is fewer civilian deaths relative to attacks from manned aircraft.  As the following 
table shows, an increasing reliance on drone strikes coincided with a significant decrease in civilian 
casualties in Afghanistan.  According to statistics from United States Air Force Central Command, 
weapons fired from unmanned aircraft increased by 42% from 2011 to 2012, going from 5.45% of total 
airstrikes to 12.37%.  Meanwhile, civilian casualties (including both deaths and injuries) declined by 
42%, while civilian deaths from airstrikes declined by 46%.  Though 2012 featured fewer total 
weapons released by aircraft, this cannot explain the decline in civilian casualties, as the rate of both 
total civilian casualties and civilian deaths per airstrike decreased. 
 











from Air Attacks293 
Civilian Casualties 
Per Weapon Release 
    Casualties Deaths Casualties Deaths 
2010 5102 279 5.47% 306 171 6.00% 3.35% 
2011 5411 294 5.43% 353 235 6.52% 4.34% 
2012 4092 506 12.37% 204 126 4.99% 3.08% 
 
291 See: Dobrydney, David, “Combined Forces Air Component Command Airpower Statistics.”  
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 In addition to large drones, like the Reaper, the US employs smaller unmanned aerial vehicles 
that help ground forces attack with greater precision, potentially reducing the risk to strong actor 
soldiers and nearby civilians.  For example, the Switchblade, from AeroVironment, is “a Non Line of 
Sight (NLOS) weapon” that measures only two feet long and weighs a little over two pounds.294  It 
launches out of mortar-like tube, whereupon its wings unfold and its camera switches on.295  
Alternatively, it can launch from the 70mm rocket tubes used on army helicopters.296  Together, the 
launch tube and drone weigh 5.5lbs, and can be easily carried by one soldier.297  Using a hand-held 
controller that receives video and GPS coordinates, an operator can guide the Switchblade and then 
crash it into a target in a kamikaze attack. 
 This provides soldiers in the field with a valuable method of attacking distant targets without 
having to call in airstrikes.  The Switchblade utilizes a quiet electric motor, which allows it to sneak up 
on targets,298 can remain in the air for 20 to 40 minutes,299 has an effective range of 10 kilometers, and 
is capable of suspending its attack sequence and loitering.300  While Predators and Reapers fire 100-
pound Hellfire missiles, or drop 500-pound GPS guided bombs,301 the Switchblade carries an explosive 
similar to a hand grenade.302  It therefore causes far less collateral damage to bystanders or property.  
After successful tests in 2011, the US Army ordered over 100 Switchblades,303 awarding 
AeroVironment with a series of contracts that total $10 million for the drones and associated services, 
such as training.304 
294 “Switchblade – Miniature Loitering Weapon.” 
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 In many ways, the Switchblade represents a culmination of the century-old effort to create a 
flying bomb.  While missiles are capable of quickly traveling great distances, and the modern varieties 
can shift direction mid-air and be guided towards a target, they cannot hover or return to base.  The 
Switchblade, however, can loiter and land, giving operators the ability to pause an attack to reconsider, 
or call it off and reuse the equipment later.  Additionally, the cameras allow soldiers to pursue fleeing 
suspects and confirm a target's identity at close range before initiating the attack sequence.   
 The Switchblade is ideally suited for urban warfare, as it greatly improves attacks against 
covered positions, and grants soldiers the ability to strike enemies firing from rooftops or windows 
without destroying entire buildings.  Firing mortars, lobbing grenades, or calling in airstrikes risk 
collateral damage, while advancing on the enemy's position places soldiers at risk.  Additionally, as 
soldiers advance, they often utilize covering fire, which could accidentally hit bystanders.  The 
Switchblade, however, can maneuver around objects and strike directly around corners, over walls, at 
fortified positions or enemies hiding from a soldier's line of sight.  This decreases the ability of weak 
actors to exploit the asymmetries of resolve and expectations by operating in populated areas, because 
small kamikaze drones like the Switchblade improve the ability of strong actors to respond to enemies 
firing from covered or hidden positions without risking extensive civilian casualties. 
 In addition to unmanned attack aircraft, the United States military has begun using pilotless 
helicopters to deliver supplies in combat theaters.  Beginning in December 2011, two modified K-
MAX helicopters, built by Kaman and modified for autonomous flight by Lockheed Martin, have been 
delivering goods to American marine outposts in Afghanistan.  These experimental missions have been 
such a success that the program has been extended twice and remains running.305    
 The K-MAX can carry up to 6,000 pounds at sea level, which is more than its empty weight, 
and more than 4,000 pounds at an altitude of 10,000 feet, attached to a steel cable.  With its “four-hook 
305 “Robocopter arrives.” 
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carousel,” the helicopter can drop off supplies in multiple locations on one mission.306  In the first two 
months, the K-MAXs delivered over 100,000lbs of cargo on over 50 unmanned resupply missions.307  
Within six months, the helicopters delivered over one million pounds of food, fuel, and equipment.308 
 Unlike the Predator and other fixed wing UAVs, which are usually piloted by remote control, 
the unmanned K-MAX often flies autonomously.  The helicopter typically flies along a pre-
programmed course to a forward operating base using GPS coordinates, where a human on the ground 
directs the drop with a remote control.  Using a variety of sensors, it is able to drop its cargo or land in 
total darkness.309  However, with a new development the K-MAX can deliver cargo without human 
intervention.  Using a beacon approximately the size of a hockey puck developed by Lockheed Martin 
to mark the drop point, an unmanned K-MAX autonomously deposited cargo within three meters of its 
target on ten out of ten demonstrations in April 2012.310  The beacons are scheduled for further tests in 
April 2013. 
 Whether partially or completely autonomous, robotic helicopters provide two main advantages 
to strong actors fighting an insurgency: bypassing land-based supply routes and reducing the risk to 
helicopter pilots.  Ground forces, especially those stationed in remote locations, require a steady supply 
of food, fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts for equipment.  Traditionally, armies convoy 
materials to forward troops with long, ground-based supply lines, along which vehicles and, in rougher 
terrain, pack animals, could be attacked.  Supply line disruption is a common insurgent technique, 
because convoys are rarely as well armed as combat troops, and regular routes allow those with 
knowledge of the territory to set up ambushes.  Helicopter-based supply lifts reduce the need for 
ground-based supply lines, which reduces insurgents' ability to ambush convoys, kill personnel, deny 
306 McLeary, “Marines extend Afghan deployment of cargo UAV.” 
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materials to troops in the field, and, perhaps most importantly, capture supplies.  Switching from 
ground-based to aerial supply missions would make Che Guevara's favored technique of supplying his 
forces with captured material much more difficult. 
 Automated helicopters increase the feasibility of an aerial alternative to ground-based supply 
lines.  Like fixed-wing UAVs, the automated K-MAX does not get fatigued or hungry, and can thus 
remain in flight longer than manned aircraft.  As with other drones, robotic helicopters eliminate any 
physical risk to human pilots.  However, this is arguably more important for helicopters than airplanes, 
because helos fly lower and slower than planes, making them more vulnerable to ground-based anti-
aircraft fire.     
 Therefore, as with ground-based robots, both fixed-wing and rotary UAVs reduce strong actors' 
disadvantage regarding the asymmetry of resolve from both directions.  Using unmanned airplanes and 
helicopters reduces strong actor casualties, thereby slowing the rise of war-weariness and the associated 
political pressure to abandon protracted conflicts.  Additionally, drones' ability to wait longer than 
manned aircraft before striking reduces the risk of collateral damage, generating less anger among both 
strong and weak actor constituencies.  As a result, the strong actor faces fewer political costs, and the 
weak actor experiences less of a boost to resolve.   
 In a study of drone strikes in Pakistan from March 2004 through June 2010, Patrick Johnston 
and Anoop Sarbahi find that drone strikes correlate with a decrease in both the frequency and lethality 
of militant attacks.311  This suggests that the drone campaign in Pakistan has reduced militants' 
capacity, and that the negative reaction among Pakistanis is insufficient to replenish the capabilities of 
insurgent networks.  If the drone strikes increased the resolve of people in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, if anger over the attacks effectively created more 
311 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan.” 
153 
                                                 
 
insurgents than the strikes eliminated, then we would expect to see the opposite result from a study like 
Johnston and Sarbahi's. 
 
Robots and Information  
While drone strikes garner more publicity, considerably more UAV flight time is devoted to 
gathering information.  For example, in Afghanistan from 2009-2011, the United States conducted 
more than four times as many spy sorties as strike missions.312  Robots do not attack in fundamentally 
different ways from humans; UAVs fire the same types of missiles that are attached to manned aircraft, 
and ground-based bots fire the same types of weapons that human soldiers carry or mount on manned 
vehicles.  However, a robot can gather far more and more detailed information than a person by 
employing daylight cameras, infrared, radar, and other sensors.  Furthermore, machines can process 
more information, more quickly, and from more sources at once.  The rapid advancement of robotics 
and information technology show no signs of slowing, which has, and will continue to have, a dramatic 
impact on asymmetric warfare by helping relatively strong actors overcome asymmetries of 
information.   
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Systems 
 While the earliest unmanned aircraft were attempts to create flying bombs, the United States 
began developing the forerunners of modern UAVs to replace spy planes.  In 1960, the Soviet Union 
shot down an American U-2 over Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) that was using high-resolution 
cameras to photograph military installations and other strategically important sites on Soviet territory.  
The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, managed to eject and parachute down safely, but was captured by 
312 Shachtman, “Flying Spy Surge: Surveillance Missions Over Afghanistan Quadruple.” 
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Soviet forces, along with the remains of the mostly intact U-2.  The incident caused considerable 
embarrassment for the United States, and led to the release of KGB colonel Vilyam Fisher in a prisoner 
exchange for Powers.  Within days of Powers' capture, the United States launched Red Wagon, a 
classified UAV program.313 
 American UAVs began flying reconnaissance missions in the 1960s over Vietnam and China, 
using primarily Ryan Lightning Bugs.  The US Air Force's 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew 
3,435 UAV missions during the Vietnam War, losing 554 unmanned planes.  In Congressional 
testimony, USAF General George S. Brown explained the logic simply: “The only reason we need 
[UAVs] is that we don't want to needlessly expend the man in the cockpit.”314   
 The modern UAV successor to large, high-endurance spy planes like the U-2 is the RQ-4 
Global Hawk made by Northrup Grumman.  The RQ designation identifies the Global Hawk as an 
intelligence gathering platform, in contrast to the MQ designation that identifies the Predator and 
Reaper as combat systems.  First tested in June 1999, the Global Hawk can fly extremely high, up to 
65,000 feet, and remain in the air for as long as 35 hours.  With a maximum speed approaching 400 
mph, the Global Hawk can fly 1,200 miles to a target area, observe the area for 24 hours, and then 
return to base.  The drone is almost entirely autonomous.  Once it is programmed where to fly and what 
area to observe, the Global Hawk can autonomously taxi, take off, fly, gather information about the 
target area, return, and land.  Ground-based operators, primarily at Beale Air Force Base in California, 
monitor the UAV remotely and can redirect the plane or its sensors as they wish.315      
 21st century intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems like the Global Hawk 
utilize a variety of methods of gathering information.  In addition to high resolution cameras that 
provide photographs and video, ISR drones carry infrared sensors, which observe heat, rather than 
313 Wagner, p. xi, xii. 
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visible light, allowing them to identify hot objects like people, vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, 
electricity generators, and computer servers.  Synthetic-aperture radar, which has also been used by 
spacecraft to observe the surface of planets and other celestial objects, utilizes the motion of the aircraft 
and a varied series of sound waves to provide a detailed map of terrain, including land formations, 
buildings, and other objects.316  Complimenting these are electro-optical sensors, which gather 
information about a given object by analyzing the spectrum of electromagnetic energy—infrared, 
visible light, and ultraviolet—it reflects and absorbs.  Much as space telescopes can determine the 
chemical make-up of distant stars by the electromagnetic energy they emit, electro-optical sensors on 
ISR drones can determine the type and strength of fuel coming out of the back of a missile, as well as 
distinguish between objects that appear similar in photographs, such as natural terrain and artificial 
camouflage.317  Beginning in 2007, some UAV models feature the Airborne Signals Intelligence 
Payload system (ASIP), which tracks and identifies radar and other types of electronic and 
communication signals.318  The infrared, radar, electro-optical, and electronic signals sensors can 
gather information day or night, regardless of cloud cover. 
 Utilizing these sensors in combination, the Global Hawk can conduct a wide-area search 
observing an entire region, or focus on a single target using its “high-resolution spot mode.”319  In 24 
hours, it can image a 40,000 square-mile area, approximately the size of Illinois, and relay this 
information in near-real time using satellite and ground-based communication systems.320  Northrup 
Grumman boasts that Global Hawks logged over 350 hours of flight time in the Iraq War, collecting 
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over 4,800 images, and locating surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries, SAM transporters, and Iraqi 
tanks.321 
 Unlike the Global Hawk, the RQ-170 Sentinel from Lockheed Martin is outfitted with stealth 
technology, making it better suited for gathering information against targets that possess air defense 
capabilities.  Introduced in 2007, the Sentinel is operated primarily by the Air Force and the CIA, and 
much of its specifications remain classified.  In contrast to other drones, the Sentinel is a flat “flying 
wing,” and looks like a smaller version of the B-2 stealth bomber.  Because it utilizes jet propulsion, 
the Sentinel can probably fly considerably faster than propeller powered UAVs like the Predator, and 
reach heights of 50,000 feet.322  The Sentinel was photographed over Afghanistan in 2007, earning it 
the nickname “the Beast of Kandahar,”323 and played a role in the operation that killed al Qaeda leader 
Osama bin Laden.  It is widely assumed that the Sentinel possesses an array of sensors similar to that of 
other ISR drones like the Global Hawk, with the possible addition of nuclear material “sniffing” 
sensors that can detect radioactive isotopes at a distance.324  With its role in providing ground forces 
with real-time battlefield intelligence, along with suspected spying missions over Iran and North Korea, 
this stealth UAV demonstrates both the rapid advancement of drone technology, and the increasing 
usefulness of unmanned systems. 
 In 2010, the United States began outfitting reconnaissance drones with the next generation of 
ISR cameras, the Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System from the Sierra Nevada Corporation.  
Nicknamed Gorgon Stare, after the unblinking monsters from Greek mythology, the system uses nine 
electro-optical and infrared cameras to observe up to 100 square kilometers at once.325  The images are 
sufficiently detailed that the system can send up to 65 different views to different users on tablets or 
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laptops, allowing some users to zoom in on a small section while another user simultaneously looks at a 
wider area.  According to Maj. Gen. James O. Poss, the Air Force's assistant deputy chief of staff for 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, “Gorgon Stare will be looking at a whole city, so there 
will be no way for the adversary to know what we're looking at, and we can see everything.”326  
Gorgon Stare thus provides a significant advancement from one-camera systems that could capture 
video images of a single target, like a building or an intersection.     
 The Air Force plans to mount Gorgon Stare on Reaper UAVs, and reportedly began using it in a 
limited capacity in Afghanistan beginning in December 2010.327  At least eight have been ordered, at a 
cost of $17.5 million each.  The system weighs 1,100 pounds, and, because of its weight and 
configuration, would be mounted on Reapers that are not also carrying weapons.328 
 However, Gorgon Stare disappointed in tests in late 2010 by the 53rd Wing of the Air Combat 
Command at Eglin Air Force Base, which deemed the system “not operationally effective” and “not 
operationally suitable.”329  It successfully tracked vehicles, but could not reliably follow smaller 
objects, most notably people.  Gorgon Stare sometimes failed to seamlessly join the images from 
multiple cameras, creating blind spots and leading the system to lose track of objects as they left an 
individual camera's frame.  Limited bandwidth combined with huge amounts of data caused delays in 
relaying information to the ground.  Most egregiously, even when it successfully tracked objects, a 
software error occasionally generated “a faulty coordinate grid,” sending an inaccurate location to 
operators.  This could lead forces acting on the information to lose an object of interest by arriving at 
an incorrect location, or, disastrously, attacking a civilian or friendly target.330  These problems led one 
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tester to deem Gorgon Stare only “55 to 65 percent reliable,”331 which is insufficient for regular use in 
the field, especially regarding information that is acted upon in real-time.   
 These difficulties are technical, rather than conceptual, and will almost certainly improve as 
imaging and data transfer technology continue to progress.  A promising alternative is a system based 
on a single, extremely powerful camera rather than a series of integrated sensors like Gorgon Stare.  
The Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System (ARGUS-IS), 
developed by BAE systems, utilizes the world's highest resolution video camera.332  At 1.8 gigapixels, 
it can spot a 6-inch object from 17,000 feet in the air.333  The picture is so detailed that the ARGUS-IS 
can provide over 60 independent “electronically steerable” windows that zoom in on a component of 
the larger image.  Instead of directing a camera to change its focus, a computer system focuses on an 
aspect of the recorded image, either providing continuous footage of a fixed area, or automatically 
keeping a specific target in the window.334  Therefore, unlike Gorgon Stare, the ARGUS-IS does not 
lose track of an object as it moves from one sensor area to another.   
 However, like other Wide Area Airborne Surveillance Systems, the ARGUS-IS collects a huge 
amount of information, potentially creating data transfer delays.  The ARGUS-IS can store up to one 
million terabytes of data per day, recording the equivalent of 5,000 hours of high-definition video.335  
Such a large amount of data requires considerable bandwidth to transfer from the aircraft to a ground 
base where analysts can view the videos. 
 One potential method to smooth this process is through an aerial command center, known as 
Integrated Sensor Is Structure (ISIS).336  Directed by DARPA and the United States Air Force Research 
Laboratory, the ISIS project aims to develop a high-altitude airship that would carry sensors, including 
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a radar with a range of 600 kilometers, and could link to ISR drones.  While the ARGUS-IS films from 
a maximum height of 20,000 feet,337 the ISIS blimp will fly over 60,000 feet, out of the range of most 
anti-aircraft weapons.  Additionally, from that height, it could track aerial objects along with those on 
the ground.  Held aloft by helium, and powered, at least in part, by solar energy, the airship could 
remain aloft for long stretches of time, perhaps multiple years.  In April 2009, DARPA awarded a $400 
million contract to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to produce a prototype ISIS system, which is 
expected in 2014.338 
 A functional ISIS system could address some of the technical problems of Gorgon Stare.  Like 
the ARGUS-IS, the ISIS system uses a single radar and sensor array covering a wide area, so it would 
not lose track of an object as it moved from one sensor area to another; though its high-altitude position 
would reduce the ability to provide detailed visual imagery to observers.  As a blimp flying at high-
altitude, ISIS could communicate more easily with a satellite, improving upon ARGUS-IS or Gorgon 
Stare's difficulties with data transmission.  Additionally, the airship could function as an informational 
mothership, gathering data from other ISR platforms in the area, and relaying that information to 
analysts on the ground.  By combining data from the sensors of Gorgon Stare, the high definition video 
of ARGUS-IS, and the powerful radar of the ISIS in one ISR command center, battlefield commanders 
and intelligence analysts could gather a detailed portrait of a designated area. 
 This would help address the technical problem of delayed data transmission, but not the 
conceptual problem of the bottleneck created by data analysis.  A fully operational Gorgon Stare, 
ARGUS-IS, or alternative Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System, could produce visual, infrared, 
and electro-optical information about a 100 square kilometer area, covering an entire town or a 
significant portion of a large city.  (For reference, Baghdad covers 734 square kilometers).  These 
337 Hoffman, “PBS Features DARPA'S ARGUS-IS.” 
338 Trimble, “Lockheed Martin to Build the Mother of All Airborne Radars.” 
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systems produce an immense amount of data, requiring dozens of human observers to monitor a 
sparsely populated area, and hundreds to watch and analyze an urban center bustling with activity.  Air 
Force officials working on the ARGUS-IS project have reached out to sports broadcasters and reality 
show producers seeking advice on how to monitor many simultaneous video feeds.339 
 The United States already has difficulty keeping up with the demand for airborne surveillance, 
especially in active theaters like Afghanistan.  ISR sorties undertaken by manned and unmanned 
aircraft quintupled over Afghanistan, from approximately 500 per month in the first quarter of 2009, to 
over 1,500 per month in mid-2010,340 to over 2,500 per month in the first nine months of 2011.341  
Analyzing the data from each of these sorties requires considerable manpower, even though the 
information is relatively focused because an officer explicitly selected a target for surveillance.  A 
Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System could reduce the number of flights necessary to gather the 
same amount of information, but the true advantage of Gorgon Stare or ARGUS-IS is the ability to 
observe many targets at once, including areas that users do not know are important in advance.  
However, to accomplish this would require observers to actively monitor every piece of information 
the system acquires, whether or not they possess a corroborating reason to pay attention.  Highlighting 
this problem at a conference in November 2010, General James E. Cartwright, the vice chairman of the 
Joints Chiefs of Staff, lamented that “an analyst sits there and stares at Death TV for hours on end, 
trying to find the single target or see something move.  It's just a waste of manpower.”342 
 This demonstrates that current technologies cannot yet overcome the asymmetries of 
information and responsibility inherent in asymmetric warfare.  Relatively weak actors, such as 
insurgents in Afghanistan, have a plethora of targets to choose from; attacking civilians or local 
339 Hoffman, “PBS Features DARPA'S ARGUS-IS.” 
340 Nakashima and Whitlock, “With Air Force's Gorgon Drone 'we can see everything.'” 
341 Shachtman, “Flying Spy Surge: Surveillance Missions Over Afghanistan Quadruple.” 
342 Nakashima and Whitlock, “With Air Force's Gorgon Drone 'we can see everything.'” 
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government officials in any populated area disrupts normalcy, while attacking strong actor forces or 
anyone working with them in any location imposes a cost on the counterinsurgents.  Relatively strong 
actors have to protect all of these targets at once, without knowing where insurgents will attack, or, in 
many cases, who is an insurgent and who is a civilian.  Human intelligence can close the information 
gap by providing strong actors with the identities and plans of some insurgents.  However, without 
good humint to direct analysts' focus, ISR systems just gather a flood of information that may or may 
not be important.  Given the limited ability of operators to monitor all of this data at once, they might 
not learn that a particular piece of information is relevant until after an attack. 
 Therefore, it would be extremely valuable if advancements in information gathering were 
accompanied by advancements in information processing.  Instead of numerous human analysts staring 
at live video feeds, just in case something might happen, computer software could monitor many feeds 
simultaneously, and alert human analysts if something happens that requires their attention.  This 
would allow a few people to monitor a large area, since no human attention would be wasted on 
locations where nothing is moving. 
 As of yet, comprehensive software capable of autonomously monitoring a large area does not 
exist, though there have been considerable advancements in the field of computer vision, which 
indicates that such a software package is possible.  Computer vision seeks to teach machines to 
replicate the human ability to distinguish and understand components of visual imagery.  While 
humans have little difficulty picking out the components of pictures or videos, computers require 
complex algorithms to identify various objects as distinct from the background.  It is especially 
challenging to teach a computer to recognize the same object from multiple angles, at multiple scales, 
or when partially obscured.343   
343 See Sonka et. al., Image Processing, Analysis, and Machine Vision. 
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 Computer vision already plays a significant role in ISR systems.  Object recognition and motion 
tracking allow systems like the ARGUS-IS to keep a visual window focused on a person or vehicle as it 
moves through the larger image.  This requires distinguishing the object from a constantly changing 
background and from similarly shaped objects that enter the frame.  However, while the system can 
autonomously follow a designated item, a human operator must first select a target for the system to 
track.   
 Before long, software will be able to identify and track objects with less human direction.  In 
2012, Google received a patent for software that autonomously identifies objects in videos on 
YouTube, its video sharing site. Instead of asking users to label objects in their videos, the software 
utilizes a database of “feature vectors,” such as color, shape, texture, and movement, to compare 
various objects across videos and label them automatically.344  Such software presages a program that 
could watch “Death TV for hours on end” in support of, or in place of human analysts. 
 Developing software capable of monitoring the input from a Wide Area Airborne Surveillance 
System would free up considerable manpower and could significantly reduce the disadvantage strong 
actors face from the asymmetries of responsibility and information.  To prevent disruption, 
counterinsurgents need to protect many potential targets at once.  In larger areas, this becomes cost 
prohibitive for strong actors, since it is almost impossible to know when and where weak actors will 
attack.  Oil pipelines, power lines, railroads, and other infrastructure are thus attractive targets for 
insurgents, because it is difficult to defend all of them at once, and a breach anywhere along the route 
can significantly disrupt the flow of resources, electricity, or goods.  However, a computer, monitoring 
video and infrared sensors, could effectively watch an entire length of pipeline or railroad, alerting 
human operators to suspicious activity, such as people approaching a remote area at night. If soldiers 
are unable to arrive in time to prevent the attack, the computer could track any people leaving the area 
344 Fingas, “Google lands patent for automatic object recognition in videos.” 
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following an explosion, allowing soldiers to intercept them before they can blend back in to the civilian 
population. 
 Due to the asymmetry of information, attacking strong actor soldiers as they move along roads 
is among the most successful insurgent tactics.  Given their size, convoys of strong actor troops or 
supplies are fairly conspicuous.  It is therefore far easier for insurgents to know the route of a convoy 
than for counterinsurgents to know the location of ambushes or explosives hidden next to or buried 
under a road.  A Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System could monitor roads in front of convoys, 
spotting people that may not be visible to soldiers traveling along the road, and use object recognition 
to autonomously search for weapons.  Additionally, if computer vision software can learn to recognize 
basic actions in addition to objects, cameras could monitor every stretch of road in a given area, 
alerting human operators when it spots someone potentially planting explosives.  The action in question 
may be innocuous, and the system might not be able to recognize every type of explosive device, but it 
could alert a human analyst to the suspicious activity, who could then zoom in closely and review the 
video. 
 Meanwhile, the data gathered by airborne ISR systems, including Gorgon Stare and ARGUS-
IS, could be utilized for after-the-fact analysis.  With Wide Area Airborne Surveillance systems and 
ISIS blimps capturing images of everything within an area of interest, there would be a record of every 
IED explosion, every attempted ambush, and every outdoor movement of people and vehicles.  This 
would enable analysts to review a visual record of any event of interest.  They could closely analyze a 
single event to identify mistakes and develop countermeasures, or analyze multiple events of the same 
type, looking for patterns. 
 For example, after an IED explodes under a patrolling vehicle, or is successfully dismantled by 
an Explosive Ordinance Disposal team—perhaps with the assistance of a ground-based EOD robot— 
analysts could review video from the bomb's location.  They could run the video back to the point when 
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an insurgent placed the IED, and then both follow him to his next location or reverse the video further 
to discover his previous location, thereby potentially finding where the bomb was made.  Real-time 
analysis would be more valuable, by enabling ground forces to arrive quickly when an insurgent plants 
a bomb, arrest the bomber, and dispose of the ordinance before it can harm anyone.  Nevertheless, the 
opportunity to discover insurgent hideouts, bomb-making factories, and weapons caches demonstrate 
the vast potential of Wide Area Airborne Surveillance systems, even while real-time data analysis 
remains a bottleneck.   
 
Smaller Information-Gathering Robots 
 In addition to ISR sensor systems mounted on Global Hawks, Sentinels, Predators, and other 
large UAVs, the military utilizes smaller robots to gather information.  On the ground and in the air, 
these robots operate on the tactical level, improving soldiers' battlefield awareness.  This can reduce 
strong actors' informational disadvantage in asymmetric war, especially in urban environments, as 
soldiers move along roads, through alleyways, and into buildings. 
 The RQ-11 Raven, made by AeroVironment, is a small unmanned aerial system that carries 
video, electro-optical, and infrared cameras, enabling it to gather information day and night.  Weighing 
between 4.2 and 4.8 pounds with a wingspan of 4.5 feet,345 it uses an electric motor to fly up to a 
maximum of 15,000 feet above sea level, though it more frequently operates and achieves maximum 
performance around 500 feet above the ground, and can remain aloft for up to 90 minutes.  With a 
flying speed between 28 and 60 mph, the Raven's range is effectively 10 kilometers.  The three cameras 
transmit information to a ground control station, which can display the images in real-time or store 
them for future analysis.  Together, a Raven and its ground control station cost approximately 
$250,000.  The United States granted AeroVironment a contract to produce 2,358 Raven systems, and 
345 “UAS Advanced Development: Raven RQ-11A” and “UAS: Raven RQ-11B.” 
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additional units have been purchased by American allies, including Australia, Italy, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the UK, and Spain.346 
 Unlike larger UAVs, such as the Predator or Global Hawk, the Raven is carried by and operated 
by soldiers in the field.  The Raven launches when a soldier throws it in to the air, using an over-the-
shoulder motion similar to throwing a javelin.347  Once in the air, it can be directed manually via the 
ground control station, or fly autonomously according to pre-programmed specifications using its GPS 
system.  The Raven also lands autonomously and does not require a prepared landing strip, making it 
well-suited for forward-deployed units, especially in harsh terrain.348  However, some soldiers have 
complained that the Raven is difficult to launch and crashes often, requiring frequent repairs or 
replacement.349 
 AeroVironment also makes a smaller “micro air vehicle” known as the Wasp.  Less than a foot 
long, with a wingspan of 28.5 inches, the Wasp weighs only one pound, making it highly portable and 
easy to throw.  It carries two cameras, each approximately the size of a peanut,350 that can gather 
information day and night, and, like the Raven, transmits the information it gathers to a ground-based 
control station.  Using an electric motor with rechargeable lithium ion batteries, it can travel at speeds 
ranging from 20 to 40 mph, reach heights of 1,000 feet above ground level, and fly by remote control 
or autonomously using GPS and an internal navigation system.351  Unlike the Raven, the Wasp comes 
in an “all environment” version capable of full functionality at sea, as well as on land.352  Each 
system—plane and control station—costs approximately $50,000.353 
346 “RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” 
347 Singer, “Wired for War,” p. 37. 
348 “RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” 
349 “Why Soldiers Hate the Raven UAV.” 
350 Singer, “Wired for War,” p. 37. 
351 “Wasp III.” 
352 “UAS: Wasp AE.” 
353 “Wasp III.” 
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 Small UAVS, like the Raven and the Wasp, provide soldiers with the ability to gather 
information about their surroundings at their discretion.  Instead of requesting assistance from a nearby 
ISR drone, and having to wait for a response, they can direct a small UAV to quickly acquire relevant 
information.  With a Raven or Wasp, soldiers can look over hills or onto rooftops, scout ahead to the 
next city block, around a curve on a mountain path, or a few miles down a road, and observe their 
immediate vicinity from a better vantage point.  This gives them lead time to prepare for approaching 
circumstances, such as a potential encounter with civilians or enemy fighters, and a layout of the terrain 
in which it could take place.  Perhaps most importantly, aerial observation could give soldier advance 
notice of an ambush, or at least help them locate the source of incoming fire and determine the easiest 
way to counter it. 
 Recently deployed tiny helicopters provide a smaller and more maneuverable alternative to 
these small planes.  Beginning in 2012, British forces in Afghanistan began utilizing a “nano 
helicopter” drone known as the Black Hornet produced by the Norwegian company Prox Dynamics.354  
Officially called the PD-100 PRS (for “Personal Reconnaissance System”), the Black Hornet is four 
inches long and weighs only 16 grams (about half an ounce), easily fitting in the palm of an adult's 
hand.  Despite its small size, it is capable of operating in windy conditions, can fly up to 22mph, and 
remain in the air for a maximum of 25 minutes at a time before its batteries require recharging.355  It 
launches from a small base station, which, together with the drone, weighs less than a kilogram and can 
fit inside a pants pocket.  Like the Raven and Wasp, the Black Hornet can be piloted remotely using a 
hand-held controller, follow a pre-programmed course, or utilize GPS to autonomously survey a 
designated area.356   
354 Hill, “Toy-Size Helicopter Drones Now on Surveillance Duty in Afghanistan.” 
355 “PD-100 PRS – Your Personal Reconnaissance System.” 
356 Hill, “Toy-Size Helicopter Drones Now on Surveillance Duty in Afghanistan.” 
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 Essentially a flying camera that can provide real time video or still photos with a maximum 
visual range of 1,000 meters, the Black Hornet provides ISR capability to individual soldiers.  While 
large UAVs, like the Global Hawk or Predator, typically serve theaters and are operated from remote 
command centers, and smaller UAVS, such as the Raven, typically serve a platoon, the Black Hornet 
can serve soldiers as they operate within a squad.  Each nano helicopter launches itself, requires 
minimal training and no pilot experience to fly, and transmits information back to a small display 
unit.357  It is thus possible for multiple soldiers in a small, 8-12 man unit to each operate a Black 
Hornet, looking in multiple directions at the same time, or maintaining ISR capabilities even if they 
split into smaller sub-units. 
 Nano UAVs can therefore help small groups of soldiers overcome asymmetries of information 
as they advance over open ground, patrol streets, or raid buildings.  These actions are among the most 
dangerous counterinsurgents can undertake, as they expose soldiers operating in the open to fire from 
hidden locations.  However, by flying ahead of soldiers, nano helicopters can help determine the 
location of enemy positions, and give advance notice whether people are armed fighters or civilians.  
According to British Sergeant Christopher Petherbridge of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force in 
Afghanistan, the “Black Hornet is definitely adding value, especially considering the lightweight nature 
of it.  We use it to look for insurgent firing points and check out exposed areas of the ground before 
crossing, which is a real asset.”358  Additionally, because they are so small, they can operate inside 
buildings as well as outside, and are sufficiently quiet as to attract minimal attention.359  In 
Afghanistan, British soldiers have used them to see around corners and into rooms.360  The British 
Ministry of Defense granted a contract to Prox Dynamics for 20 million pounds (approximately $31 
357 “PD-100 PRS – Your Personal Reconnaissance System.” 
358 Quoted in “Miniature surveillance helicopters help protect front line troops.” 
359 “PD-100 PRS – Your Personal Reconnaissance System.” 
360 Hoffman, “British soldiers flying nano helicopters in Afghanistan.” 
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million) to provide 160 Black Hornet systems,361 and, based on the positive early reviews, other 
countries will likely follow suit.  
 Besides aiding soldiers by looking beyond their line of sight, small UAVs can be used for 
electronic surveillance.  In 2011, at the Black Hat and DEFCON security conferences, which feature 
hackers and computer security professionals, two security consultants and engineers, Mike Tassey and 
Richard Perkins, presented a homemade drone known as a Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform (or 
WASP—no relation to the small ISR drone by AeroVironment known as a Wasp) that can spy on both 
wireless computer networks and cell phones.362  This UAV is 76 inches long, with a wingspan of 67 
inches, and can remain in the air for 30-45 minutes with a maximum altitude of 22,000 feet.363  The 
WASP can hack password encrypted Wi-Fi computer networks, and also act as a GSM antenna (Global 
System for Mobile), which allows it to intercept cell phone calls and text messages.364  Any cell phone 
that is closer to the WASP than a cell tower will connect with the drone first, allowing it to gather any 
information sent to or from nearby mobile devices.  
 Tassey and Perkins, who have experience working for the US intelligence and defense 
communities, built the drone to prompt new developments in electronic security by demonstrating the 
potential risks to electronic communications, but it offers apparent intelligence-gathering capabilities as 
well.  A WASP could intercept insurgent communications and gather information off of militants' 
computers without their knowledge.  This would allow intelligence analysts to monitor 
communications insurgents believe to be secret, in which they might discuss strategy, identify 
members, or plan attacks.  Even if a terrorist network discovered the WASP's capabilities, the result 
361 “Miniature surveillance helicopters help protect front line troops.” 
362 Greenberg, “Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones.” 
363 “About Us,” the Rabbit-Hole. 
364 Humphries, “WASP: The Linux-powered flying spy drone that cracks Wi-Fi & GSM networks.” 
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would be avoidance of wireless networking or cell-phones, which would greatly hinder their ability to 
communicate. 
 Not all small information-gathering robots are airborne.  The Scout XT, from Recon Robotics, 
is a “throwbot,” a small ground-based robot that soldiers can throw over walls or into buildings.  It 
looks like a rolling dumbbell with antennae: a cylindrical tube with a wheel on each end in place of the 
weights.  The Recon Scout weighs 1.2lbs and can be thrown up to 120 feet.  Upon landing, its camera 
and microphone switch on and transmit data back to a hand-held control unit, which a soldier uses to 
direct the robot.  The Scout includes infrared, as well as ambient light cameras, enabling operation in 
both dark and light conditions.365  In demonstration videos, the Scout proved its durability by falling 30 
feet onto a concrete surface, bouncing, and then rolling along as normal.366  Together, the robot and its 
control unit weigh three pounds, making it easily transportable by individual soldiers.  In early 2012, 
the US Army awarded a $13.9 million contract to Recon Robotics for 1,100 Scouts, the largest order in 
the company's history.367 
 The tactical advantages of the Scout are similar to those of the Black Hornet, with a few 
noticeable differences.  The Recon Scout is quiet, operating at just 22 decibels.368  To put that in 
perspective, a typical refrigerator hums at 40 decibels, and a human whisper is around 30 decibels.369  
Therefore, like a nano helicopter, the Scout can stealthily look around corners and enter rooms ahead of 
soldiers, sending back information that can alert them to potential dangers.  Comparatively, the main 
disadvantage of a Scout is that it rolls rather than flies, which means it cannot climb stairs or view a 
scene from above.  However, it is far more cost effective.  Based on recent orders, each Scout costs less 
than $13,000, while each Black Hornet costs just under $200,000. 
365 “The Throwbot XT with Audio Capabilities.” 
366 “The Military's New Weapon: Mini Spy Robots You Throw Like Grenades.” 
367 “Army Orders 1,100 Recon Scout XT Robots from ReconRobotics.” 
368 “The Throwbot XT with Audio Capabilities.” 
369 “Decibel Levels of Everyday Sounds.” 
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 To illustrate how new technologies can overcome asymmetries of information, consider the 
microcosm of combat between a squad and a sniper.  With more people and more guns—plus, perhaps, 
mortars, RPGs, and the ability to request assistance from tanks and aircraft—the squad of soldiers 
enjoys a considerable resource advantage over an individual sniper, or two-man sniper team.  However, 
the sniper can threaten the squad because of his advantage regarding an asymmetry of information.  
The sniper is hidden, his location unknown to the squad.  By contrast, the soldiers are on patrol or 
advancing in the open.  As such, the sniper can capitalize on surprise, shoot at the squad, and continue 
shooting with relative security until the soldiers discover his location.  In settings with considerable 
cover, such as cities or jungles, the sniper can shoot and quickly move to a new spot.  A squad of 
soldiers from a powerful military could easily defeat a sniper team, if they knew its location.  However, 
as long as the snipers remain hidden, their informational advantage neutralizes the squad's resource 
advantage. 
 To overcome this informational disadvantage, the squad could use recently developed gunfire 
detection systems.  These anti-sniper systems utilize sound detection to determine the location of a 
gunshot.  For example, the Boomerang Mobile Acoustic Shooter Detection System (MASDS) from 
BBN Technologies, a subsidiary of Raytheon, identifies the location of a shooter to plus-or-minus 15 
degrees accuracy within one second of the shot.  According to BBN, the MASDS can detect fire from 
AK-47s and other small arms at ranges of 50 to 150 meters, and can operate on a vehicle moving up to 
60 miles per hour.370    
 An alternative that does not require a separate system is the Robot Enhanced Detection Outpost 
with Lasers (REDOWL) addition to the commonly used PackBot from iRobot.371  In conjunction with 
the Photonics Center at Boston University, iRobot has developed a system that combines optic and 
370 Crane, “Anti-Sniper/Sniper Detection/Gunfire Detection Systems at a Glance.” 
371 Sofge, “5 Robots We Should Deploy Right Now,” p. 4. 
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acoustic sensors to pinpoint the origin of gunfire.  It utilizes an algorithm based on human hearing to 
process acoustic information, as well as daylight and low-light cameras, thermal imaging, a laser range 
finder, and GPS positioning to locate the shooter day or night and shine a laser pointer at the shot's 
point of origin.  In firing range field tests for the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, the REDOWL system 
demonstrated a 94% success rate locating the origin of shots from M-16 and AK-47 rifles at more than 
100 meters.372 
 While these and other gunfire detection systems have proven their capabilities in controlled 
demonstrations, they have yet to be deployed to combat zones.  The systems are not able to distinguish 
friendly weapons and calibers from hostile fire, and the robot becomes useless, or potentially a little 
dangerous, in a firefight.  As shots ring out from all sides, the robot's head goes “into a laser-aiming 
seizure,”373 swinging around wildly.  This negates its capability and creates the risk that it will hit, or 
shine its laser pointer into the eyes of, a friendly soldier.   
 Despite these technical issues, development of gunfire detection systems will continue, because 
the potential advantages are considerable.  The ability to locate the origin of gunfire would neutralize 
the informational advantage that allows a sniper to threaten a squad of soldiers, and would allow 
soldiers to respond more effectively to ambushes.  If the REDOWL or similar systems can remain 
focused on the first shot, or can learn to distinguish nearby fire by friendlies from more distant fire by 
enemies, they will enhance strong actor capabilities by allowing soldiers to assert their resource 






                                                 
 
Conclusion  
Relatively weak actors engaged in asymmetric warfare exploit non-material asymmetries to 
combat strong foes, especially regarding information.  However, advancements in robotics and 
computing technology can help strong actors overcome these asymmetries and reassert their resource 
advantage.  This is already apparent from the American-led asymmetric conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where unmanned systems on the ground and in the air have decreased strong actor 
casualties, improved the efficiency of targeting and reduced collateral damage, and revolutionized 
information acquisition.  As robotics technology continues to advance, unmanned systems will play an 




Chapter 5: Robotics and Non-State Networks  
 
 
 As with any new technological development, it is tempting to overstate the potential advantages 
robots can provide to the states that produce them and downplay the risks.  As the robotics revolution 
progresses and the technology spreads, actors with fewer resources will find it easier to acquire 
unmanned weapons and information-gathering systems.  These robotic systems appeal to networks for 
the same reasons they appeal to states: as a method of acquiring information or striking targets without 
risking personnel.  Given the overwhelming resource advantage enjoyed by states relative to non-state 
networks, terrorist or insurgent groups will almost certainly not develop their own squadrons of aerial 
or ground-based robots.  However, with more and more countries producing and selling military 
robotics technology, it becomes increasingly likely that networks could purchase some through the 
black market or receive some from state sponsors, much as they acquire firearms or explosives. 
 While many of the most notable developments in the field of robotics have been military in 
nature, the robotics revolution will increasingly feature commercially available automated systems.  In 
the early 21st century, numerous non-military versions of ground-based and aerial robots have become 
available for use by individuals and businesses, and, as with earlier inventions like personal computers 
or cell phones, this trend will likely accelerate.  From driverless cars to small UAVs that shoot movies 
or deliver food, a large variety of privately controlled robots will become increasingly commonplace in 
developed countries.  Inadvertently, this will provide relatively weak actors, from individual self-






Acquiring Military Robots  
Attacks from large unmanned aircraft operated by networks in localized insurgencies or 
irredentist conflicts are unlikely to pose a strategic risk to powerful militaries.  Given their resource 
advantage, states have little difficulty maintaining air superiority in state-network conflicts.  With the 
airspace above any active theater monitored by radar, and the location of friendly aircraft known, any 
drone large enough to carry missiles is unlikely to escape notice.  If states detect an unfriendly or 
unidentified Predator or similar UAV flying in airspace they control, they could target it with ground-
based air defense systems.  Alternatively, interceptor aircraft could engage and destroy the enemy 
drone, much as an Iraqi MiG shot down an American-operated Predator in 2002.  States will likely feel 
few qualms firing on unidentified or potentially hostile unmanned aircraft, as there is no chance that a 
pilot will be killed, and thus less risk of accidentally harming an innocent or creating an international 
incident. 
 However, if insurgents acquire smaller drones that fly low to the ground and could escape radar 
detection, such as a Switchblade, they could pose a threat to ground forces with kamikaze attacks.  
Such robotic non-line-of-sight weapons are far more maneuverable and accurate than the alternative 
measures of striking targets at a distance employed by weaker actors fighting powerful militaries, such 
as mortars or crude rockets.  Small UAVs fly considerably slower than rockets, which means they 
would present easy targets for the automated C-RAM systems that protect bases, ships, and convoys; 
but counter-rocket-and-mortar systems would not protect soldiers that venture outside of bases, in 
groups smaller than a defended convoy.  Smaller units operating in urban environments would be 
especially vulnerable to kamikaze drones, since insurgents could direct them from covered positions, 
using the UAV's camera to locate their target.  With its flight time of 20-40 minutes and effective range 
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of 10km, a Switchblade could provide urban guerrillas with an effective method of attacking exposed 
soldiers or unarmored vehicles without revealing their location. 
 While fortified military areas may be able to counter the UAV capabilities that non-state 
networks could acquire, small drones in the hands of terrorist or insurgent groups could prove 
especially threatening to non-combatants, including in developed countries.  An individual operative 
could crash a Switchblade or a similar UAV into populated areas, such as a market, causing damage on 
the scale of a small bomb planted on the ground.  Once an attack is in progress it would be difficult to 
stop, since aircraft tracking and anti-air defense systems are designed to monitor and potentially shoot 
down larger aircraft flying higher above the ground, and C-RAM systems would be impractical in 
densely populated areas due to the possibility of falling debris and the massive cost of protecting 
everywhere at once. 
 As with other military technology, governments can restrict the sale of small and large UAVs to 
friendly states.  For example, the United States only permits General Atomics and other defense 
contractors to sell unmanned aircraft to allied governments, primarily members of NATO.  European 
companies such as AeroVironment, the maker of small UAVs including the Raven and the 
Switchblade, face similar restrictions, as do drone makers in Israel and other non-European US allies.  
It is unlikely, however, that other countries with emerging UAV manufacturers, such as China, Russia, 
and Iran, will only allow sales to governments friendly with the United States, or that any purchasers or 
manufacturers will refrain from reselling or granting drones to non-state actors. 
 In February 2013, General Atomics reached an agreement to sell an undisclosed number of 
unarmed Predators to the United Arab Emirates for $197 million, which, pending authorization from 
Congress, would be the first time an American company sold large drones to a non-NATO ally.374  
Even though this potential sale only includes RQ models designed for reconnaissance, rather than the 
374 Hennigan, W.J., “United Arab Emirates set to buy U.S. Predator drones.” 
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MQ models outfitted with weapons, it has drawn some scrutiny because of the possibility that the UAE 
will use the Predators for domestic spying and repression of political dissidents.  Additionally, some 
critics have raised the possibility that terrorist groups could steal or purchase a Predator from the UAE, 
though they have not presented any evidence in support of this speculation. 
 While this potential sale provides further evidence that the number of countries acquiring UAVs 
continues to expand, it also demonstrates the political barriers and prohibitive monetary cost that make 
it unlikely that non-state networks will acquire Predators or other large UAVs, whether legally or 
illegally.  Governments have strong incentives to prevent theft of any weapons they control, and there 
is no known instance of a terrorist group stealing manned military aircraft, which indicates that 
Predator theft is probably not a serious risk.  Sales to foreign entities by UAV-manufacturing defense 
contractors that do their primary business with the United States and American allies require 
governmental authorization, and any country suspected of transferring the technology to others would 
likely forfeit the ability to acquire more drones or the parts necessary for maintenance.  While UAV 
manufacturers based in unallied or adversarial countries may sell to different clients, they are also 
likely to punish unauthorized transfers by cutting off future sales of aircraft and parts.  The incentives 
for states to control military-grade drone technology reduce the risk that large UAVs will be stolen or 
sold illegally. 
 Even if a state decides to sell large drones it has manufactured or purchased to a non-state 
network, or rogue members of a military try to sell some on the black market, the cost is likely too high 
to be practical for non-state actors.  At its high point in the late 1990s/early 2000s, al Qaeda's annual 
operating budget was approximately $30 million according to the CIA.375  Since September 11, 2001, 
efforts to track and freeze the funds of al Qaeda's financiers and various charitable or business fronts by 
the United States Treasury Department, other governments including the UK and Saudi Arabia, and 
375 Vardi, Nathan, “Is al Qaeda Bankrupt?” 
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international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force,376 have reduced this considerably.  With 
each RQ-1 Predator costing approximately $4 million and each MQ-1 Reaper costing $30 million when 
legally purchased in bulk by the United States, large UAVs are too expensive for non-state networks, 
even before accounting for black market premiums. 
 Spending that much on a large drone would go against the cost-effectiveness at the core of weak 
actor strategy.  For comparison, the largest attacks by al Qaeda or its affiliates cost considerably less 
than a single unarmed Predator drone.  CIA estimates place the cost of the September 11th operation at 
approximately $500,000, while the 2004 Madrid train bombings cost $70,000, and the 2005 attacks on 
London's transit system cost only $10,000.  According to Stuart A. Levey, the Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the US Treasury from 2004 to 2011, the majority of al Qaeda's 
funds go towards training, operatives' salaries, travel and the purchase of travel documents, payments 
to families of suicide bombers, and bribes for public officials.377  Therefore, it would make little 
strategic sense for al Qaeda or any other non-state network to spend so much money to acquire a 
Predator drone, especially given that one could be easily spotted by strong actors' radar and shot down.  
 Small UAVs, however, are considerably less expensive, and may prove attractive to terrorist or 
insurgent groups.  Under contracts signed in 2011, each Switchblade cost approximately $100,000—
which includes training and other services—while each observational Wasp drone cost $50,000.  
Though still expensive, these or similar drones would not break the bank for a well-funded network.  
More likely, since small UAVs are easier to produce than the large alternatives, cost less, and can be 
operated by individuals with little training, states may be willing to give them to networks that they 
sponsor.      
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 On October 6, 2012, Israel shot down a small drone in the northern Negev, near its border with 
the West Bank, for which Hezbollah claimed responsibility.  According to Hassan Nasrallah, the 
Lebanon-based group's leader, the drone was manufactured in Iran, assembled in Lebanon, and used for 
“reconnaissance flights inside occupied Palestine.”378  This was not the first time that Hezbollah flew 
Iran-provided UAVs over Israeli territory.   
 The first flight occurred in late 2004.  The unidentified drone model flew around 1,000 feet 
above the ground, escaping detection by Israeli radar due to its small size and low altitude.  It was 
spotted by an Israeli officer on the ground near the Lebanese border.  The UAV spent approximately 
five minutes in Israeli airspace, before turning west towards the Mediterranean Sea, where it crashed.  
Israel's military interpreted the incursion as a demonstration of capabilities, and initiated a review to 
determine how the flight originally escaped notice.379 
 In April 2005, Hezbollah flew an Iranian-made Mersad UAV over northern Israel.  The Mersad, 
also known as a Mohajer (which means “migrant” in Persian), was first developed in the 1980s by 
Ghods Aviation, an Iranian company, for reconnaissance in the Iran-Iraq war.  In the years since, 
Ghods built four versions of the Mohajer, the most recent of which is approximately three and half 
meters long and capable of flying as fast as 135 miles per hour for a short while, with an operational 
range of approximately 100 miles.  The Mohajer-4 underwent a successful flight test in February 2002, 
and, unlike the original version, includes autopilot, superior cameras, and the ability to paint targets 
with a laser for guided munitions.380  According to a diplomatic cable from the American embassy in 
Beirut released by WikiLeaks, Iran provided Hezbollah with three Mersads in 2004 or 2005, one of 
which was operational at the time of the flight into Israeli airspace.  Sources in Syria and southern 
378 Barnett, “Hezbollah takes responsibility for last week's drone over Israel.” 
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Lebanon indicated that Syrian intelligence assisted with the Mersad's launch, which flew over Israel to 
gather information and demonstrate Hezbollah's growing unmanned capabilities.381  
 In the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, there were at least three incidents in which the 
Israeli Defense Forces shot down Hezbollah-controlled Ababil UAVs over Israel.382  Also built by 
Ghods, the Ababil (which means “swallow” in Persian), is slightly under three meters long, but more 
aerodynamic than the Mohajer, giving it a top speed of approximately 185 mph, and an operational 
range of 150 miles.  Its ISR capabilities operate similarly to a Raven, with images transferred to a 
ground-based control station.  Though decently larger than the Switchblade, the Ababil launches out of 
a similar pneumatic tube mounted on a truck or via a rocket launch system.383  It therefore does not 
require a runway to takeoff.   
 While the Ababil was primarily designed for ISR missions, it is capable of carrying a single 
warhead with up to 50 kg of explosives.384  Of the three Ababils shot down by Israel in the 2006 war, at 
least one held 30 kg of explosive material.385  Israeli forces recovered the explosives from an Ababil 
intercepted by an Israeli F-16, and suspected that one additional drone of the three they shot down was 
carrying a similar payload, while the remaining Ababil was probably outfitted exclusively for 
surveillance.386  In the years since its 2006 conflict with Israel, Hezbollah has reportedly acquired 
additional Ababils from Iran, some of which carry 45 kg warheads.  
 These flights demonstrate that advancements in robotics can enhance the capabilities of 
relatively weak actors in asymmetric conflicts, as well as those of their stronger opponents.  With 
kamikaze drones providing a more accurate method of attacking strong actor soldiers than mortars or 
rockets, networks could create more casualties and deny their enemies an easy victory, weakening the 
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strong actor's resolve.  Similarly, in irredentist conflicts such as that between Israel and Hezbollah, 
where the fighting takes place in close proximity to the strong actor's territory, UAVs equipped with 
explosives could threaten nearby civilian populations, enhancing strategies built around the 
asymmetries of responsibility and expectations.  While Hezbollah expects to face significant casualties 
when resisting militarily superior Israel, and is therefore not considered responsible for protecting all 
areas of Lebanon at once by its supporters, Israelis expect decisive victory and minimal casualties, 
especially among civilians inside Israel proper, when facing a weaker opponent.  By improving 
networks' ability to kill strong actor soldiers and civilians, kamikaze drones can help them impose 
additional costs that convince their stronger opponents to halt offenses, negotiate ceasefires, or 
withdraw forces. 
 In addition to the destructive capacity of smaller drones that carry an explosive charge, the 
information gathering capabilities of small UAVs can enhance weak actor strategies as well.  In 2006, 
Israeli ground forces advancing on Hezbollah-controlled positions in the mountains of southern 
Lebanon faced fierce resistance.  Despite a significant resource advantage, with 30,000 soldiers backed 
by armored vehicles and aircraft against an estimated 10,000 fighters, Israel was unable to secure 
southern Lebanon or advance more than a few miles to the Litani River.  Before withdrawing, the 
Israeli Defense Forces lost 116 soldiers,387 with an additional 628 wounded, while Hezbollah lost an 
estimated 600 fighters with as many as 1,500 wounded.388     
 Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah's success was in part attributable to a cell phone network, 
which enabled his forces to share the location of Israeli troops that they spotted.389  By sharing this 
information, Hezbollah forces could move through the tunnel system they prepared in southern 
387 “Middle East Crisis: Facts and Figures.” 
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Lebanon to mass at the point of the Israeli attack or raid weaker sections of the Israeli columns.390  
Following guerrilla strategy, Hezbollah used the element of surprise to ambush Israeli forces, and 
retreated when overwhelmed, combining the techniques of hit-and-run and defense-in-depth.  If 
Hezbollah could have used small ISR drones to gather information about the advancing Israeli forces, 
they would have been in an even better position to anticipate Israeli troop movements, and prepare their 
defenses accordingly. 
 Small ISR drones would thus increase Hezbollah's advantage regarding the asymmetry of 
information.  As an invading force entering mountainous territory with which their opponent was 
intimately familiar, Israeli troops were at an informational disadvantage.  Hezbollah scouts could 
observe the movements of Israeli columns climbing the foothills or moving through passes, while most 
of their forces remained hidden in tunnels.  When Hezbollah fighters launched rockets into Israel from 
fixed batteries or the backs of trucks, they would reveal their location to Israeli radar and aerial 
surveillance, after which Israel would attempt to destroy the rocket batteries with targeted missiles.  
However, Israel's cameras mounted on satellites, manned, and unmanned aircraft could not see the 
underground movement of Hezbollah guerrillas or differentiate between civilian vehicles and trucks 
carrying covered rockets.  Hezbollah utilized this informational asymmetry to shoot almost 4,000 
rockets into Israel over the five weeks of conflict,391 killing 43 civilians and causing “serious” or 
“moderate” wounds to an additional 76.392 
 If Israeli forces had been able to secure southern Lebanon, they would have greatly reduced 
Hezbollah's ability to fire rockets into populated areas of Israel.  The maximum range of a Katyusha 
rocket, which made up the vast majority of Hezbollah's arsenal in 2006, is approximately 25km.  When 
fired from across the Lebanese border, this limited range makes Katyushas only capable of threatening 
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northern Israel.393  Major population centers are farther from the Israel-Lebanon border, with Tel Aviv 
about 100km away.  Israeli airstrikes and ground incursions were able to destroy numerous rocket 
launchers, but unable to prevent daily rocket fire throughout the conflict.  This inability to prevent an 
ongoing threat to its civilians likely contributed to Israel's willingness to accept the UN-brokered 
ceasefire. 
 In the years since the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah has reportedly rearmed, acquiring missiles with 
greater range.  This has allowed them to set up defended missile batteries further from the Israel-
Lebanon border in anticipation of another Israeli ground invasion.394  In November 2012, at an event 
marking the Day of Ashura, Hezbollah displayed a Fajr-5 missile it acquired from Iran.395  The Fajr-5 
has a maximum range of 75km, which, if fired from the Lebanese border, could easily hit Haifa and 
potentially reach the suburbs of Tel Aviv.  It is larger and flies faster than Katyusha rockets, making it 
more difficult for C-RAM systems, such as Israel's Iron Dome, to shoot down.  Even with a robust Iron 
Dome presence on the Lebanese border, some missiles would likely get through.  This increases the 
importance for Israel of securing territory further into Lebanon to push Hezbollah out of range of its 
largest population centers and disable the batteries stationed farther from the border. 
 However, with unmanned aircraft observing Israeli movements while Hezbollah's forces remain 
hidden until firing, Hezbollah would enjoy a larger informational advantage if Israel attempted to 
invade southern Lebanon again in the future.  Mersad or Ababil drones could spot Israeli ground forces 
at a distance, granting Hezbollah greater lead time to mass forces or move rocket launchers.  With 
Hezbollah forces moving through tunnels or other prepared cover, they would be difficult for Israeli 
UAVs to spot from the air.  Therefore, in the event of another Israel-Hezbollah war, unmanned aircraft 
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have the potential to increase Hezbollah's advantage regarding the asymmetry of information, 
improving their ability to deny Israel victory.  
 In addition to guerrillas resisting military advances into rough terrain, urban insurgents could 
enhance their informational capabilities utilizing small unmanned aircraft.  A fixed or rotary wing 
UAV with a camera that transmits video to a ground station would allow insurgents to monitor the 
movements of strong actor soldiers.  This could help them determine the patterns of patrols, which 
would improve their ability to set up roadside bombs and plan ambushes.  By watching the streets near 
any meeting locations, safe houses, bomb-making factories, or weapons caches they could anticipate 
raids from strong actor soldiers.  This would provide insurgents with some advance notice, granting 
them a window of opportunity to disperse, and for them to hide or destroy incriminating material.  
Small ISR drones could therefore enhance the informational capabilities of localized insurgencies, such 
as those fought in Iraq or Afghanistan against American and allied forces.  
 
Adapting Commercially Available Robots  
Unlike Hezbollah, many networks do not enjoy significant state sponsorship, and therefore may 
not be able to acquire military UAVs like the Mohajer or Ababil.  However, that might not be 
necessary, since unmanned technology is becoming increasingly available for commercial use.  Even if 
they are unable to acquire small UAVs on the black market or from state sponsors, networks or 
individuals could adapt aerial and ground-based non-military drones into weapons or information-
gathering systems.  Any remotely-controlled vehicle with a camera that can transmit real-time video 
could function as a basic ISR platform.  Add some explosive material and any small robot could act as 




Commercially Available Aerial Robots 
 The commercial drone industry in the United States is in its infancy, and expected to grow 
dramatically in the coming years.  Beginning the process of opening the skies to legal use, a new 
federal law passed in February 2012 (H.R. 658, the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety 
Improvement Act) instructed the Federal Aviation Administration to allow various types of privately-
controlled unmanned aircraft by 2015.  As of 2013, hobbyists can legally fly small “recreational” 
UAVs short distances at low heights (under 400 feet, always within the operator's line-of-sight), just as 
they have long been allowed to fly model airplanes, but commercial interests cannot.  At the time of the 
bill's passage, the overall UAV market was valued at $5.9 billion, and expected to at least double over 
the next ten years.396  By 2020, according to FAA estimates, as many as 30,000 private and 
government drones could be legally flying over the United States.397   
 Small UAVs, ranging in cost from less than one hundred to almost one million dollars, have 
proliferated in the early 21st century.  Like the comparatively complex and expensive military UAVs, 
many of these commercial drones gather information.  Some are as simple as a camera attached to a 
model airplane, or a video camera held aloft by multiple rotaries, or “multicopter,” gathering aerial 
photographs of properties for real estate agents, taking pictures or videos of celebrities for paparazzi, or 
monitoring the location of livestock while feeding live images to farmers through a wireless 
connection.  Larger and more expensive commercial drones combine video cameras with infrared 
sensors, and are used by a variety of organizations, from law enforcement agencies gathering 
surveillance for SWAT teams or searching wooded areas for missing persons, to oil companies tracking 
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spills.  Additional, non-informational uses include crop dusting, managing road traffic after accidents, 
and dropping water on wildfires.398   
 Perhaps the biggest proponent of legalizing commercial drone use is the film industry.  The 
industry's primary lobbying group, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), first disclosed 
in October 2012 that it has been pushing the FAA to authorize filmmakers' use of unmanned aircraft in 
US airspace.399  The industry plans to make use of small fixed-wing and rotary UAVs to shoot film 
from the air, in place of current methods that are more expensive, more restrictive, and potentially more 
dangerous.  According to MPAA spokesman Howard Gantman, cameras on small unmanned aircraft 
would enable directors to utilize innovative camera angels, and “could be used much more safely than 
going up a tree and much more cheaply than renting a helicopter.”400  For comparison, studios looking 
to capture footage from the air typically rent helicopters for $1,700 per hour, plus an additional $1,900 
per day for a pilot, while a drone that could accomplish the same task could retail for less than 
$1,000.401  This economic incentive and the associated lobbying efforts from one of America's largest 
industries will likely lead the FAA to adapt rules allowing considerable private drone use. 
 Other countries have already allowed movie studios to utilize unmanned aircraft.  The Belgian 
company Flying-Cam leases an unmanned aerial system called the Special Aerial Response Automatic 
Helicopter, or SARAH.  The SARAH is an automated helicopter weighing 55lbs that can take off and 
land vertically, and remain in the air for 30 minutes.  Designed for commercial filming, it includes a 
stabilized “Gyro Head” that carries a high resolution digital camera, and is capable of both recording 
and broadcasting live.402  Eon Productions, a UK-based film production company, utilized a SARAH to 
shoot some footage in Istanbul in 2012 for the James Bond film Skyfall.  The drone followed alongside 
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007 as he chased after a train on a motorcycle, all while maintaining a steady horizon and adjusting 
speed when necessary.403   
 There is little effective difference between unmanned systems designed to help movie directors 
capture an aerial shot and information-gathering UAVs built for military purposes.  Besides size, and a 
higher resolution camera, the SARAH is functionally equivalent to the Black Hornet miniature 
unmanned helicopters used by soldiers in Afghanistan.  That means a non-state network could acquire a 
drone designed for commercial filming and use it to film strong actor soldiers or scout locations for 
attacks.  The broadcast feature would enable real-time monitoring of a given area in a manner similar to 
military ISR drones, while the recording feature would allow a network to film a potential target and 
study its security to discover ways to increase the chances an attack will succeed.   
 While aerial shots for movies may be an apparent use for unmanned aircraft, there are other, 
less obvious potential commercial uses, such as food delivery.  In late 2012, researchers at Darwin 
Aerospace in San Francisco designed the Burrito Bomber, a small unmanned plane capable of dropping 
an item—in this case, Mexican food—via parachute to a pre-programmed target.404  The engineers at 
Darwin Aerospace got the idea from the conceptual Taco Copter, a Mexican-food delivery multicopter 
that attracted attention on the internet in early 2012, but was never actually built.  John Boiles, one of 
the designers, explained that they focused on burrito delivery because “Mexican food is really popular” 
and “burritos are kind of bomb-shaped.”405 
 The Burrito Bomber may sound ridiculous, but it provides further evidence that robotics 
technology will continue to spread and become increasingly available for civilian use.  In the course of  
a few decades, unmanned aircraft will have transitioned from the military, to other government 
agencies and large corporations like movie studios, to individuals and smaller businesses, such as 
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restaurants that deliver.  Like other technologies, as robots become more ubiquitous, they will become 
cheaper and easier to acquire.  That means that, much like information technology, smaller, 
commercially available aerial drones will end up enhancing the capabilities of non-state networks.       
 Networks could acquire any of these commercially available UAVs, through legal or illegal 
means, and put them to use against relatively stronger actors.  Insurgent organizations could use 
information-gathering drones to monitor counterinsurgent troop movements, helping them set up 
ambushes or avoid raids.  Terrorists and saboteurs could scout the security of potential targets to 
determine the ideal time and location to strike.  Or they could simply load a drone with explosives and 
fly it into a target.  This would fulfill a similar function as a car or truck bomb, but would be able to fly 
over barriers, and would not require sacrificing a driver.  Unfortunately, it would not be surprising if, in 
the next decade or two, a terrorist loaded a commercial drone with explosive material and tried to crash 
it into a building, bridge, or crowded area in the United States or another economically developed 
country. 
 The FBI has already thwarted one such attack in the planning stage.  In July 2012, Rezwan 
Ferdaus, an American citizen who was born in Massachusetts and received a degree in physics from 
Northeastern University, pleaded guilty to charges of attempting to destroy or damage a federal 
building and providing material support to terrorists.406  Ferdaus was arrested in September 2011 after 
outlining his plan to FBI agents posing as al Qaeda operatives—in which he intended to crash drones 
loaded with explosives into US landmarks including the Pentagon and the Capital building—and 
accepting delivery of hand grenades, AK-47s, and C-4 plastic explosives.  Ferdaus had already 
designed and built cell phone-triggered detonators, obtained a remote-controlled replica of an F-86 
Sabre using a false name, and scouted locations in Washington DC from which to launch the planes.407  
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Modeled after the 1950s-era fighter jet, the F-86 replica is almost three feet long, requires extensive 
assembly, and retails for under $200.408  Though authorities stopped this planned attack before it 
advanced to the execution stage, it presages the possibility of similar attempts in the future. 
 The type of remote-control model airplanes Ferdaus planned to use have been available for 
decades, though there is no publicly known case of someone else attempting to employ one in a 
terrorist attack.  This suggests that he got the idea from the prevalence of military drone attacks in news 
reports of American activity in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.  According to the federal affidavit, 
Ferdaus was obsessed with using unmanned planes for an attack inside the United States, and saw 
himself as a devoted member of the global jihadist movement.409  He had been under FBI surveillance 
since at least 2010, when he attempted to supply Iraqi insurgents with homemade cell-phone detonators 
for IED attacks against American soldiers.410  Like many other self-starters, Ferdaus frequented jihadist 
websites, and claimed that discussions on those forums helped him realize that America is “evil” and 
that violent attacks against Federal targets in Washington DC could be his contribution to the 
“solution.”411  He may have seen a kamikaze drone attack as quid pro quo for the American UAV 
campaign, or perhaps just thought that it would be the most effective method of delivering explosives.         
 After it became public, Ferdaus' plan was mocked on the DIY Drones internet forum, which 
calls itself “the leading community for personal UAVs.”  One member pointed out that the model F-86 
that Ferdaus planned to use requires “a substantial dedicated runway, and plenty of flying practice,” 
which means there was a decent chance that he would have crashed while trying to take off.412  Others 
expressed relief that Ferdaus selected older model airplanes, rather than more modern personal-use 
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drones that can carry larger payloads and be easily adapted to autonomous flight, for fear that the 
government would crack down on their hobby.413 
 The existence of this do-it-yourself drone community indicates the extensive information on 
UAV construction and modification available online.  The DIY Drones website offers instructions on 
how to build an “amateur UAV” from parts that retail for a few hundred dollars.  Whether plane, 
helicopter, or multicopter, DIY Drones defines a UAV as “an aircraft capable of autonomous flight, 
without a pilot in control.”414   
 To expand access to this capability, the DIY Drones community created ArduPilot, a small, 
dedicated computer chip that enables autonomous flight for UAVs.  Billed as “the world's first 
universal autopilot,”415 ArduPilot is based on the Arduino open source electronics platform, a single-
board microcontroller that was first released in 2005 and retails for under $25.416  As an open source 
platform, the Arduino software can be downloaded for free, and runs on Windows, Mac OS X, and 
Linux.417  DIY Drones directs members to the website of 3D Robotics, which sells the latest version of 
the Arduino chip pre-programmed with the autopilot software, ArduPilot Mega 2.5, for $179.  It is 
outfitted with gyros for controlling balance, pressure sensors, and a GPS system to assist with 
navigation.  The mission planner software is free, and allows common desktops or laptops to program 
predetermined flight paths and analyze mission logs afterward.418 
 This means that anyone with a modicum of technical savvy and the ability to perform a simple 
internet search can find their way to the DIY Drones website and learn how to construct a small UAV 
capable of autonomous flight.  The parts and software are fairly inexpensive and available for purchase 
on a variety of websites, “recreational” flights by individuals are legal, and the DIY Drones social 
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network is open to all.  While the website operators and active participants all appear to be well-
intentioned techno-hobbyists and students, there is nothing that would prevent a terrorist from utilizing 
the information.  Official DIY Drones policy bans any discussion of “military or weaponized 
applications” or “illegal or harmful use of UAVs;” and the community has “encouraged all relevant 
regulators, defense agencies and law enforcement agencies to become members” to help them 
“understand what's possible with amateur UAVs, so they can make better-informed policies and 
laws.”419  However, it would be easy for someone to use DIY Drones to assist with UAV construction 
and operation without informing the community of illegal or harmful intentions.  Acknowledging the 
possibility that some participants may fail to follow the community's policies, the DIY Drones mission 
statement declares that “we follow the current interpretation of the FAA guidelines” on recreational 
UAV use, but, if anyone does not, “we're going to assume you've got the proper FAA clearance or we 
don't want to know about it.”420 
 A popular type of UAV on DIY Drones that is more commonly used by individuals than by 
militaries is the multicopter.  These small, light aerial drones feature multiple small rotors (usually 3, 4, 
or 6) attached to a central base.  Like helicopters, they can take off vertically, hover, and smoothly 
move along both vertical and horizontal axes.  Multicopters maneuver by changing the pitch or rotation 
rate of one or more blade, and are cheaper and easier to construct than single or dual rotor helicopters.  
This makes them popular with drone hobbyists and photographers.  In addition to a large section on the 
DIY Drones website, there are numerous online resources devoted to multicopters, such as 
MulticopterWorld.com, which focuses on their use in aerial photography.  Many currently available 
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models use a remote control, but multicopters can be adapted for autonomous flight using the 
ArduCopter autopilot from DIY Drones.421 
 Multicopters with four rotaries, known as quadcopters, are the most popular type, and range in 
price from small plastic toys under $100 to more advanced models for about $700.  A well-reviewed 
high-end commercially available model is the Phantom, from DJI Innovations.  This sleek quadcopter 
weighs less than one kilogram, with a length and width of 35cm and a height of 19cm.  It can fly 
horizontally up to 22 miles per hour with a maximum accent/decent speed of approximately 13 mph, 
and remain in the air for 10-15 minutes depending on activity level.  Though it is primarily controlled 
by a remote, the Phantom includes a GPS sensor and a basic autopilot capable of returning the drone to 
its base and automatically landing if it loses contact with the controller.  Notably, the Phantom features 
a mount designed to carry a camera, and DJI advertises it as well suited for video photography, though 
not on the professional level of a SARAH.422  Many cheaper, alternative quadcopters can carry cameras 
as well. 
 Given the size and payload capacity, the Phantom and similar multicopters would not be able to 
carry enough explosive material to pose much threat as a weapon.  However, they could prove useful as 
information gathering platforms.  A quadcopter with a camera could help a terrorist case a target, 
recording information about the structure or the presence of security.  For example, New York City 
bans photography near the entrances of tunnels and on or close to bridges to prevent anyone from 
taking pictures they could use to search for structural flaws or any other information that could be 
exploited in an attack.423  Many cities in the US, UK, and other developed countries have similar 
restrictions for infrastructure and government buildings.  If someone takes a photo or records video in 
421 “ArduCopter User Group.” 
422 “Phantom.” 
423 “Camera Restrictions in New York.”  
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these restricted areas, the police may confiscate their equipment.424  However, a multicopter recording 
video or still images of potential targets would be more difficult to notice or confiscate.  Even if a 
police officer observes one in a restricted area, and it is not out of reach or able to fly away, the 
operator could remain unknown, because the officer would not have a face-to-face encounter with the 
photographer.  This would be even more likely in the case of multicopters adapted for autonomous 
flight. 
 In addition to photographing potential terrorist targets inside nuclear states, multicopters 
equipped with cameras could help localized insurgents in less powerful countries gather information on 
locations they plan to attack.  By photographing or recording video of police stations, government 
offices, and military installations, insurgents could determine the ideal time to strike with a raid or a car 
bomb, using the information they acquire to discover when security patterns offer windows of 
opportunity.  This would provide them with an alternative to scouting targets in person, reducing the 
risk of getting noticed by police, guards, or security cameras. 
 Stopping insurgents from using relatively inexpensive multicopters to gather information would 
be more difficult than preventing similar efforts by people on the ground.  Visible signs forbidding 
photography, along with the presence of police or soldiers authorized to confiscate cameras, represent a 
deterrent for network operatives.  However, while these humans may fear getting caught and then 
possibly interrogated, the same could not be said of UAVs.  In urban environments, it would be 
difficult for officers to follow aerial drones that can fly over buildings and move horizontally at over 20 
miles per hour.  Unless the UAVs could be tracked with radar or other sensors, security officers would 
need to shoot them down, which would be not be easy given their size and speed, and could be 
dangerous in populated areas.  In the event security services were able to shoot down a small, 
makeshift surveillance drone, they still would have difficulty determining who was operating it. 
424 Geoghegan, Tom, “Innocent photographer or terrorist?” 
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 However, to remotely control an average recreational UAV, like a quadcopter or the replica 
planes Rezwan Ferdaus planned to use in his attack, the operator must send a signal which can be 
traced using the sort of electronic sensors included on the latest Global Hawks and other advanced 
military surveillance drones.  While advanced militaries usually control UAVs from considerable 
distance by relaying a signal via satellites, or program the aircraft to autonomously carry out a 
predetermined mission, less sophisticated drone operators typically send radio waves from a nearby 
remote control.  Using the same technology that identifies the location of radar stations, states could 
determine the location of anyone flying a drone by remote control.  This would enable a response, from 
a police car to a missile strike.  However, such a technique is rendered moot by the various versions of 
ArduPilot and other commercially available autopilots that enable pre-programmed flights. 
 To stop terrorists or insurgents from using a UAV as a kamikaze weapon, or from gathering 
information that could be used to aid an attack, a state would first need to identify a drone as 
suspicious.  This would be comparatively less difficult against a localized insurgency in an active 
theater of war, in which all authorized aircraft are operated by the counter-insurgents and allied forces.  
It becomes much more problematic in an environment with legal commercial drone flights, in which 
every UAV is potentially a smart bomb. 
 For organizations that utilize suicide bombers, smaller ground-based or flying robots present an 
alternative method of guiding explosives to a target that would not expend human operatives.  A robot 
in a populated area would stand out more than a person, limiting its ability to surprise or to move to a 
location where an explosion would cause the greatest damage.  However, this limitation will decrease 
as drones become increasingly normal sights, especially in cities.  If food delivery drones and others 
undertaking daily tasks become widespread, then the presence of small unmanned aircraft will be fairly 
commonplace and won't raise any alarms.  Furthermore, delivery UAVs, or any drone modified with an 
ArduPilot, would follow automated flight plans, like the K-MAX helicopters used for supply delivery 
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in Afghanistan, which eliminates the possibility that police or military could locate the drone operator 
by tracing the radio signal used for remote-control aircraft.  These, in turn, increase the probability that 
a terrorist will acquire a commercially available drone, or construct one from parts by following online 
directions, and transform it into a weapon. 
 
Commercially Available Ground-based Robots 
 In addition to unmanned aerial systems, ground-based robots will likely proliferate for non-
military and private use.  Ground robots utilized by the military already come in versions designed for 
non-military tasks.  For example, iRobot advertises the PackBot to HazMat technicians and first 
responders, who could use its ability to enter dangerous areas and manipulate objects with its arm to 
scout ahead of humans, remove hazardous material without risking human contact, and enter disaster 
zones that would be difficult for people, such as the rubble of a collapsed structure.425  After an 
earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 damaged the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, two PackBots 
entered the plant equipped with sensors that measure radioactivity, oxygen levels, temperature, and 
hazardous chemicals.  Once they had surveyed the affected area, operators used the PackBots to move 
30 pounds of debris determined to be unsafe for human contact.426 
 Terrorists are more typically associated with spreading hazardous material than cleaning it up, 
but, as the PackBot demonstrates, ground-based robots could provide a method of guiding explosives, 
or a radiological, biological, or chemical weapon to a target.  A PackBot may be too expensive and 
difficult to acquire to be practical for a terrorist group, but smaller, commercially available robots are 
cheap and widely available.  Simple, do-it-yourself methods of upgrading a toy remote-control car to 
425 “Ground Robots – 510 PackBot.” 
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drive autonomously are widely available on the internet.427  For less than $200 worth of items available 
at RadioShack, anyone can convert a remote-control car into a basic robot capable of turning corners, 
sensing surrounding objects, and avoiding obstacles on its own.428  With a GPS device, the cheapest of 
which cost less than $100, the car could travel to a pre-programmed location.  While it lacks the 
sophistication of a PackBot and would be incapable of climbing up steps or over curbs, this simple 
robot could allow a terrorist group or self-starter to move a bomb to crowded area at less risk to 
themselves. 
 Similar to iRobot and the PackBot, Recon Robotics markets the Scout Throwbot to police 
forces and first responders in addition to the armed forces.  A small, rolling robot that can transmit 
video and audio is useful to SWAT teams for the same reason it is useful to soldiers: as a stealthy 
method of scouting potentially dangerous areas ahead of humans.  Recon specifically recommends the 
Scout to police forces for “barricaded subjects, hostage situations, and room-clearing operations.”429  
Additionally, given its small size, the Scout can move through areas too narrow or dangerous for 
human first responders to locate disaster victims in need of rescue. 
 Because it is cheaper and sold in greater number than the PackBot, there is a greater chance that 
non-state networks would be able to acquire a Scout on the black market.  While terrorists, insurgents, 
and guerrillas do not often find themselves staging hostage rescues against strong actor forces, the 
information gathering capabilities of these small robots could grant them some additional lead time to 
react to the actions of strong actor soldiers.  Alternatively, the Scout could observe locations ahead of 
an attack or during a raid, whether on a police station, government building, or weapons depot.        
 In addition to potentially acquiring ground-based robots intended for security services and first 
responders, weak actors could adapt some of the robots designed for civilian use that are likely to 
427 Bowman, “Learn how to turn an R/C car in to an autonomous robot.” 
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proliferate in the coming years.  Perhaps the most notable forthcoming ground-based robot that will be 
available for private use is the driverless automobile.  In September 2012, California became the third 
state, after Nevada and Florida, to legalize driverless cars.  There was no law written on autonomous 
automobiles, and therefore their presence on roads was not illegal, but proponents at Google lobbied 
California to officially legalize them to pave the way for their spread in the near future.430   
 These robots autonomously navigate roads populated by traditional cars with human drivers, 
using a variety of cameras and sensors to maintain a safe distance from surrounding vehicles.  The 
cameras read road signs and an internal computer processes the information to ensure that the vehicle 
adheres to speed limits, stop lights, and other rules of the road.  Using GPS and online map programs, 
the cars' navigation system can take passengers to their preselected destination without additional input.  
They can autonomously select a space and parallel park, and perform any other task undertaken by 
human drivers.431 
 In March 2004, DARPA held its first Grand Challenge competition for robotic cars.  The 
research agency offered a $1 million prize to the first autonomous car to complete a 150-mile off-road 
course in the Mojave Desert.  None of the entrants were able to finish, and DARPA raised the prize to 
$2 million for the next year's contest, designing a new course to ensure that the cars were navigating an 
unknown environment.  In October 2005, five vehicles successfully completed the course, with the 
winner, a modified Volkswagen Touareg built by a team from Stanford University led by Sebastian 
Thrun, finishing in under seven hours. 
 For the 2007 challenge, the robotic automobiles had to complete an urban course, in which the 
cars had to recognize street signs and lights, obey various regulations, and merge into traffic.  This 
time, the Tartan Racing team from Carnegie Mellon University, led by Chris Urmson, claimed the $2 
430 Miller, “With a Push from Google, California Legalizes Driverless Cars.” 
431 Lassa, “The Beginning of the End of Driving.” 
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million prize, with an automated version of a Chevy Tahoe.  Tartan, which placed second in the 2005 
Grand Challenge, defeated that contest's victor, the Stanford Racing team, who placed second in the 
Urban Challenge with a modified Volkswagen Passat, receiving $1 million.432  Urmson and Thrun both 
now work for Google[x], Google's ambitious research lab focused on futuristic technologies, 
developing a commercial version of the driverless car.433   
 Driverless cars are likely to become widespread due to their ability to enhance safety.  Using 
cameras, radar, and an emergency breaking system, autonomous cars can react more quickly than 
human drivers, and stop before colliding with other cars or pedestrians.434  Unlike humans, the program 
controlling the driving will never exceed the speed limit, run a red light, get road rage, or aggressively 
cut off other cars.  Insurance companies already offer discounts to drivers with cars equipped with an 
automated emergency brake system because of its strong record of reducing the risk of and damage 
from accidents.  Some Google employees already use the company's autonomous cars to commute to 
work, and the company's co-founder, Sergey Brin, expects Google's driverless system to be ready for 
the mass market before 2020.435  In August 2012, Chris Urmson announced that prototype self-driving     
cars had driven over 300,000 miles under a “wide range of traffic conditions, and there hasn't been a 
single accident under computer control.”436 
 While they could greatly improve road safety, autonomous automobiles also create the 
possibility of car or truck bombs without drivers inside.  For organizations with limited budgets and 
considerable manpower, a driverless car bomb would be less cost effective than using a suicide bomber 
to drive a cheap used car.  But individuals, or any organization for which operatives are more valuable 
than the cost of a driverless automobile, could fill an autonomous car with explosive material—such as 
432 Belfiore, “Carnegie Takes First in DARPA's Urban Challenge.” 
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the ammonium nitrate fertilizer, nitromethane, and diesel fuel mix that Timothy McVeigh used in the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 to kill 168—and instruct it to drive to a target.  McVeigh left an 
explosive-laden Ryder truck in a drop off zone, lit a timed fuse, and fled the scene.  Using a driverless 
car with a cell phone-triggered bomb would allow a terrorist to direct a car bomb to a target without 
visiting the scene shortly before the explosion, and potentially being caught on camera or witnessed by 
a bystander.  If a network can steal a driverless automobile, or buy one using a false identity, it would 
be more difficult for authorities to track down the perpetrator. 
 Much like commercial UAVs, as driverless cars become more common, they will seem less out 
of place, and therefore it will become more difficult to prevent one from being used in an attack.  In 
every country with cars and roads there are many locations with legal parking spaces nearby from 
which a car bomb could cause considerable damage.  Even if someone notices an autonomous car 
approaching or parked near a government building or another potential target, there is no driver for the 
police to instruct to move.  As the technology becomes more widespread, governments will have to 
create laws that address the differences between human-operated and driverless cars, and the associated 
security concerns.         
 
Hacking Unmanned Systems  
In addition to controlling their own UAVs, an adversarial state or network could hack into 
opponents' drones.  In December 2009, the United States admitted that Iraqi insurgents had intercepted 
the video feeds of Predator drones operating in the area.  Insurgents used software such as 
SkyGrabber—an “offline satellite internet downloader” designed to gather free-to-air movies, music, 
and pictures from satellite internet providers437—to view the footage as it was transmitting from a 
437  “SkyGrabber.” 
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satellite back to the plane's base.  The software can be purchased legally for as little as $26, or less than 
$100 when accompanied by a tuner card that receives satellite transmissions.  American forces 
confirmed that they found “days and days and hours and hours” of video taken by Predators on 
captured insurgent laptops, and that the insurgents had distributed the footage to multiple 
organizations.438   
 Intercepting a Predator's video feed falls far short of electronically taking control of an MQ 
drone and firing Hellfire missiles.  The insurgent hackers were not able to direct the UAVs flight path 
or the position of its cameras.  However, accessing the video transmission provided insurgents with 
valuable information.  Not only were they able to see everything captured by the cameras, they also 
learned which targets the United States was keeping under surveillance.  With this knowledge, they 
would be able to move activity that they wanted to keep secret to a different location, act more 
carefully at places they knew were on camera, or deliberately feed the United States false information. 
 The Predator video feed was unencrypted, which left it vulnerable to simple software like 
SkyGrabber.  Therefore, this particular problem can be addressed with a fairly simple fix.  However, it 
reveals a vulnerability in remotely operated UAVs.  To navigate and communicate with operators, they 
rely on signals that travel thousands of miles and bounce off satellites.  Encryption can protect against 
most efforts at corruption or interception, but rendering these signals completely secure one hundred 
percent of the time is difficult, if not impossible. 
 In 2012, a research team from the Radionavigation Lab at the University of Texas used a 
technique called “spoofing” to misdirect an unmanned aircraft.  Demonstrating the technique for the 
Department of Homeland Security on a university-owned drone, the researchers sent a false GPS 
signal, which caused the drone to fly to a different location than its operators ordered.439  UAVs, both 
438  Gorman et. al., “Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones.” 
439 “Researchers use spoofing to 'hack' a drone.” 
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commercial and military, rely on the Global Positioning System network of satellites to determine their 
current location and the location of their targets.  By sending a “spoofed” GPS signal, the University of 
Texas team convinced the drone that it was in a different location than it actually was.  As a result, it 
altered its flight path to travel from the fake current location to the originally programmed destination.  
This caused the drone to veer off course and fly to a different destination, even while its navigating 
computer believed it was arriving at the pre-programmed target. 
 Iran may have used a similar spoofing technique to bring down an American RQ-170 Sentinel 
that was on a covert reconnaissance mission over its territory in late 2011.  Iran claimed that it jammed 
the signal between the drone and its operators, which caused the plane to switch to autopilot.  Then, 
using fake GPS signals, the Iranians were able to land the drone undamaged.440  The United States has 
not confirmed this account, but did admit that American operators lost control of the drone while it was 
flying a mission over western Afghanistan near the Iranian border.441  Shortly thereafter, the Iranians 
proudly displayed what appeared to be an undamaged RQ-170 Sentinel, which is more consistent with 
a controlled landing than a crash.       
 The University of Texas researchers redirected their drone using signals produced by 
commercially available equipment that cost approximately $1,000,442 thereby demonstrating that non-
state actors, as well as states, could acquire the means to launch electronic attacks on UAVs.  Spoofing 
circumvented the more difficult—and yet to be demonstrated—technique of hacking into the signal 
issuing directions to the drone, which would enable the hackers to issue new orders, from new 
destinations to missile attacks.  This highlights two potential risks, as military and commercial drone 
use expands.  The possibility exists that resourceful hackers could create a new technique that 
completely takes over a drone and uses it to launch attacks.  Or, even if signal encryption continues to 
440 Mackenzie and Duell, “We hacked U.S. drone.” 
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protect against an adversary gaining control of a military drone, computer-savvy individuals could use 
spoofing or a similar technique to trick a military or commercial UAV to veer off course.  This would 
allow a network to disrupt drone missions, capture UAVs for sale or study, or, potentially, crash one 
into a target.      
  
Conclusion: Robots and the Precedent of Computers  
 These examples of drone hacking highlight the back-and-forth nature characteristic of most 
technological developments.  As with radar and stealth technology, computer viruses and anti-virus 
software, or improvised explosive devises and explosive ordinance disposal robots, one side gains an 
advantage from an innovation, leading the other side to seek ways to counter the advantage by 
exploiting loopholes or developing a corresponding innovation.  Given strong actors' resource 
advantages, the robotics revolution has the potential to aid states in their efforts to counter the threats 
posed by non-state networks.  However, as with widespread technological advancements like 
information technology, the spread of robots, and militaries' increasing reliance on unmanned systems, 
will create exploitable opportunities for networks in both predictable and unforeseen ways. 
 Information technology was, at first, monopolized by governments.  Before personal computers 
became available commercially, computing and networking technology helped state militaries store, 
process, and share information.  The United States Department of Defense created the world's first 
computer network that employed packet-switching443 and TCP/IP communications protocol,444 the data 
transmission techniques now utilized by the internet.  Known as ARPANET—after the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, the precursor to DARPA—the network launched in 1969, connecting two 
443 “Packet Switching.” 
444 “TCP/IP.” 
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University of California campuses with the University of Utah and the Stanford Research Institute.  By 
1983, it included more than 300 nodes and split off the military-specific MILNET.445   
 However, information technology spread and became increasingly available for civilian use.      
In the 1970s, private universities and corporate research facilities utilized computers and built their 
own internal networks utilizing TCP/IP.  In 1977, Apple, RadioShack, and Commodore began selling 
computers to individuals for home use, and in 1981 IBM introduced the personal computer (PC) with 
floppy disks and the DOS operating system from Microsoft.446  Throughout the 1980s and early 90s, 
ARPANET expanded rapidly, connecting various public and private networks into an integrated 
network of networks, or “internet.”  Meanwhile, in 1991, CERN, the European Organization for 
Nuclear Research, launched the World Wide Web, enabling various research institutions to create easy-
to-read pages that could be accessed with browser software over the internet.447  In 1995, commercial 
service providers took control of the network's major backbones, bringing the internet into private 
homes.448  Accompanying this network expansion, the World Wide Web grew exponentially, from 
10,000 pages in 1995 to over 30 million by 2000, and more than 1 trillion unique web addresses as of 
2010.449   
 Now, in the second decade of the 21st century, almost everyone in economically developed 
countries, and many in the developing world, have access to computers, the internet, and cell phones.  
With smart phones, average citizens carry portable computers that are more powerful and have access 
to far more information than military computers from the 1970s or commercially available desktops 
from the 1980s.  It is reasonable to assume that robotics technology will follow a similar pattern, with 
access progressively spreading from governments to large corporations to individuals. 
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 Whereas information technology originally enhanced the capabilities of state militaries and 
research facilities, as increasingly powerful computers became commercially available and gained 
access to the internet, terrorist and insurgent groups found ways to utilize the technology to their 
advantage.  By 2005, every organization on the U.S. State Department's list of identified terrorist 
groups had a presence on the web, with at least 4,300 separate sites dedicated to the groups or their 
supporters.450  This dramatically enhances their ability to recruit, fund raise, spread propaganda, 
strategize, and share information, from expressions of solidarity to bomb making techniques.  
Computers and cell phones played a significant role in various post-Cold War asymmetric conflicts and 
terrorist attacks, including Hezbollah sharing intelligence about enemy troop movements in their 2006 
war with Israel.  Smart phones were essential to Lashkar e Taiba's attack on Mumbai in 2008, as the 
attackers used their phones' GPS to reach Mumbai by boat, studied online maps to plan their 
coordinated attacks, and actively monitored news websites during the attack to gather intelligence on 
each other’s activities and the response of Indian security services.   
 Perhaps most notably, the internet magnifies the self-starter problem, enabling disaffected 
individuals from many countries to see themselves as part of a global movement.  Al Qaeda 
sympathizers—from the British-born doctor of Iraqi decent who attacked the Glasgow airport, to the 
Nigerian son of a prominent banker who attempted to destroy an aircraft with explosives hidden in his 
underwear, to the Chechen-born brothers who set off a bomb at the Boston Marathon, one of whom 
was a US citizen—all saw themselves as activists fighting for the same cause; thinking globally but 
acting locally.  It is difficult to imagine this loosely connected transnational network of individuals with 
shared sympathies existing without the internet.  And, since most self-starters either learned how to 
build explosives from information acquired on the web, or made contact with terrorist groups online 
450 Weimann, “Terror on the Internet,” p. 15. 
204 
                                                 
 
who later supplied them with explosive material, the ubiquity of information technology enhanced their 
ability to cause damage. 
 The spread of robotics technology will probably repeat this pattern, at least along the basic 
outlines: first enhancing the military capabilities of the wealthiest governments, then assisting with 
military and non-military tasks of smaller and sub-national governments along with the commercial 
efforts of larger corporations, eventually achieving widespread use by individuals.  Much as 
governments and corporations control the world's most powerful supercomputers, these large 
organizations will likely control the world's largest and most advanced robots.  However, the spread of 
robotics technology will enable networks and individuals to acquire the cheaper, commercially 
available versions, and put them to use. 
 It is therefore likely that, within a few decades, robotics will occupy a similar position as 
information technology regarding asymmetric warfare.  Aerial and ground-based unmanned systems 
will enhance the capabilities of strong actors, but their monopoly on the technology will continue to 
fade as weak actors make use of robots as well.  Small unmanned aerial vehicles designed for military 
use have already proven useful as information gathering platforms for state sponsored networks, and 
adapted commercially available versions are likely to follow suit.  Additionally, as privately controlled 
robots, from driverless cars to UAV photographers and even food delivery drones, become increasingly 
commonplace, the chances increase that one will be utilized in a terrorist attack. 
 While it is difficult to predict who will attempt this sort of attack, it is easier to identify risks 
and create countermeasures in advance.  In anticipation, states should develop a method of taking 
control of any robot within a given area in an emergency.  Much as the FAA can order commercial 
aircraft to remain on the ground or human pilots to change course, governments should be able to order 
unmanned aircraft to land or alter their flight plan as needed.  Additionally, as commercial drones 
proliferate, infrastructure, government buildings, and other potential targets could be outfitted with 
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measures that force any UAV that gets too close to turn around, perhaps by triggering the return-to-
base feature common to drones that use ArduPilot.  These defenses would serve a similar function as 
physical barriers designed to defend against car bombs by preventing vehicles from getting too close to 
potential targets.  By anticipating the ways terrorists could utilize commercial robotics technology and 
developing countermeasures in advance, states can mitigate the risk of an attack.  However, it is 
impossible to predict every way that networks will adapt to the robotics revolution.
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Chapter 6: Robots and Strong Actor Strategy against Localized 
Insurgencies: Pursuing Information Dominance 
 
In Wired for War, Brookings scholar P.W. Singer argues that the United States lacks a robotic 
warfare doctrine, an overarching strategy designed to achieve military goals utilizing the new 
capabilities robots provide.451  Analogously, tanks and airplanes appeared in World War I, but only in 
support of existing attrition and trench-warfare strategies, scouting ahead or supporting infantry and 
artillery.  It wasn't until World War II that Germany built a strategy around these new technologies, 
utilizing their strength and speed to target the political and industrial support base of national war 
efforts.  Even though France had more tanks than Germany in WWII—3,245 to 2,574—the French 
doctrine dispersed a few to each infantry unit, while the German blitzkrieg coordinated tanks with air 
and artillery “to create a concentrated force that could punch through enemy lines and spread shock and 
chaos.”452  German forces went around, over, or through French defenses, rapidly taking Paris and 
conquering all of France in less than two months.  Citing soldiers, generals, and roboticists, Singer 
warns that “developing the right doctrine for using unmanned systems is thus essential to the future” of 
American security, so that the US does not develop “the Maginot Line of the 21st century.”453 
 Currently, the US military utilizes robots to enhance pre-robot strategies.  Existing units get 
small unmanned aerial vehicles or links to larger robotic airplanes for scouting; ground-based bots to 
carry equipment or scout ahead with cameras; and specialized robots designed to meet current needs, 
such as searching for and disposing of IEDs ahead of advancing convoys.  Meanwhile, aerial drones 
451 Singer, Wired for War, pp. 208-212. 
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have taken over many of the missions previously conducted by piloted aircraft, from long-range 
reconnaissance to airstrikes.  The military thus uses robots to enhance previously developed capabilities 
and reduce the risk to personnel, but “doesn't yet have an overall doctrine on how to use them or how 
they fit together.”454   
 In part, that is because they are thinking about how humans would use robots to fight, not how 
computers would fight a war.  The main advantages granted by robotics are reduced risk to human 
personnel, and increased information gathering and processing.  Unmanned systems do not 
significantly improve destructive capability.  Any weapon attached to a land, sea, or air-based robot 
could be carried by a human soldier or manned vehicle.  Bullets, bombs, and missiles, along with 
potential futuristic weapons like lasers, could be used by humans and robots alike to kill and destroy 
when necessary.  There are no countermeasures that can sufficiently protect against these destructive 
capabilities—many targets are unarmored, and larger or more directed explosives, such as bunker-
busters or shaped charges, can destroy those with physical protection—which means that destructive 
capacity would not distinguish computerized warfare from the pre-robot doctrine of the early 21st 
century.  Since the invention of precision-guided munitions (AKA “smart bombs”), advanced militaries 
have been able to quickly destroy a known target at will.  The problem is knowing what to target.        
 Therefore, the gathering and processing of information should be the basis of a comprehensive 
doctrine of robotic warfare.  Like human commanders, a computer fighting a war would want as much 
information as possible, avoiding action without sufficient information when it can, and filling in 
information gaps with assumptions and educated guesses when it must.  However, unlike humans, a 
computer can simultaneously utilize as many streams of information as software and processing power 
454 Singer, p. 210. 
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allow.  Taking this idea to its theoretical limit, a network of robots integrated with a powerful computer 
system could fight with perfect information. 
 The ideal of fighting with complete information is not new—arguably it has been a goal of 
militaries since the first organized fighting forces sent out scouts—but technology is finally 
approaching the point at which something close becomes plausible.  Of course, perfect information is 
impossible.  To take an extreme example, mind reading would greatly enhance military tactics by 
revealing an opponents' intentions, but acquiring this information is far beyond the scope of any 
existing or forthcoming technology.  However, with Wide Area Airborne Surveillance Systems high in 
the air and hundreds or even thousands of information-gathering robots on or near the ground, each 
carrying a variety cameras and sensors, all linked to a powerful information processing computer, a 
fully roboticized military could achieve real-time awareness of people and objects within a given area.  
This would allow more informed decision-making, on a larger scale, than any military in the history of 
the world. 
  
Network-Centric Warfare  
 
The United States has made information sharing and widespread battlefield awareness a priority 
since the 1990s under the rubric of “Network-Centric Warfare” (NCW), which was coined by Arthur 
Cebrowski and John Garstka, and developed by the Office of Force Transformation under Cebrowski's 
direction.455  Drawing upon internet-era theories of business, economics, and sociology, NCW 
emphasizes using modern information technology to share information and coordinate actions among 
various units and platforms in real time, so that the whole of a military force is greater than the sum of 
455 Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future.” 
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its parts.  Ideally, transforming the military to a seamlessly networked force would eliminate the fog of 
war (Clausewitz' term for the uncertainties inherent in combat) by removing the friction between 
separate military units and their commanders.  According to Cebrowski, NCW represents no less than 
“transforming from the Industrial Age to the Information Age,” in which “power is increasingly 
derived from information sharing, information access, and speed, all of which are facilitated by 
networked forces.”456  By linking and coordinating the military's various parts, Cebrowski and Garstka 
theorized that a smaller and more mobile fighting force could command the destructive power of larger 
armies, but with greater speed and precision, granting the United States armed forces a qualitative 
military advantage. 
 The core strategic goal of NCW is “information dominance” or “information superiority.”  
According to the US military's “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations” (also known as Joint Pub 3-
13), this refers to “the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information 
while exploiting and/or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.”457  Essentially, the more that 
soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and their commanders know about a given battlespace, the more 
efficiently they can pursue their objectives.  Increasing knowledge reduces the risk of mistakes, such as 
friendly-fire, by informing engaged units of their allies' locations, and allows forces to act with greater 
speed and precision by reducing ambiguity.  Perfect information is a limit, a goal that can be 
approached but never reached, and information dominance works to serve and enhance traditional war-
fighting concepts, rather than replace them.  As NCW advocates David Alberts, John Garstka, and 
Frederick Stein point out, “even in the case where information is far less than perfect, it could 
456 “The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,” p. 1-2. 
457 “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.” 
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reasonably be argued that being able to have a shared understanding of what is known and what is not 
known would be preferable to a situation in which units operated in isolated ignorance.”458 
 Network-Centric Warfare received its first major tests in Iraq, garnering numerous critics.  For 
example, P.W. Singer declares networking-based strategies a “failure” and dismisses the “networks of 
email and Internet fiber optics that now bind military units together” as merely quicker versions of 
“radios, phones, or faxes.”459  The “network crowd,” he argues, “was wrong that the fog of war would 
be lifted,”460 citing instances in which American forces lost track of Iraqi tanks in the early 
conventional phase of the invasion, and then had difficulty identifying and tracking insurgents after the 
defeat of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army.  Defense analyst Loren Thompson goes further, arguing 
that NCW was conceived before 9/11 and designed for conventional warfare, and thus should not have 
surprised anyone when it performed poorly against asymmetric adversaries like the Iraqi insurgency.461  
 Part of the problem was the Bush administration’s, especially Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld's, overzealous conviction that NCW was ready in time for the invasion of Iraq.  In Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, the equipment for network-centric strategies ran into problems both technical and 
logistical.  “Rather than a seamless flow of information, soldiers wrestled with everything from Web 
browsers constantly crashing due to desert sand to heat fouling up equipment designed for use in 
offices, not battlefields.”462  Additionally, the newly networked fighting forces faced unexpected 
bottlenecks, from a shortage of batteries to power mobile devices, to an overwhelmed bandwidth 
spectrum for wireless communications.  These problems stem from the fact that NCW had not been 
458 Alberts et al, p. 8. 
459 Singer, Wired for War, p. 193-194. 
460 Singer, p. 193. 
461 Thompson, “The Twilight of Network-Centric Warfare.” 
462 Singer, p. 190. 
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tested in actual fighting conditions; and the war in Iraq revealed ways in which the military fell short of 
Cebrowski's vision.  Though this is a legitimate criticism of the confidence with which some officials 
in and outside of the Defense Department championed military transformation in the early 2000s, it 
presents technical problems to be overcome rather than a reason to discredit the larger theory. 
 More problematic were difficulties in identifying and tracking adversaries, especially in the 
post-invasion insurgency phase of the Iraq War.  In Armed Forces Journal, Milan Vego argued that 
NCW “appears not to provide much of an advantage in fighting an insurgency in the post-hostilities 
phase of a campaign, as the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate. In fact, the ongoing 
insurgency in Iraq is a powerful proof, if any is needed, of how little practical value networking one’s 
forces has in obtaining accurate, timely and relevant information on the enemy.”463  Casualty data 
support this, as the United States defeated the Iraqi army and deposed Saddam Hussein in two months, 
losing 187 soldiers, but suffered 4,299 military deaths while fighting the subsequent insurgency for 8½ 
years.   
 
Red Force Tracking 
 
The Iraq War clearly demonstrates that network-centric operations did not overcome the 
advantages insurgents enjoy from the asymmetry of information, but that is because the information fed 
into the network was gathered primarily by humans.  As Loren Thompson put it, “all those networks 
the Pentagon was planning are just conduits” and “what matters more for victory is the accuracy and 
completeness of the information moving through the networks.”464  Information gathered by human 
soldiers, and by humans watching video feeds from cameras mounted on soldiers' helmets, satellites, or 
463 Vego, “The NCW Illusion.” 
464 Thompson, “The Twilight of Network-Centric Warfare.” 
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spy planes, is inherently incomplete and of limited accuracy.  When directing combat, senior officers 
can follow the real-time location of friendly forces on interactive maps (not unlike those of Google 
Earth) using “blue force trackers,” which employ GPS to transmit the location of personnel and 
equipment.  Blue force tracking allows greater coordination of friendly “blue” forces, but the utility is 
limited by the absence of data on the location of enemy “red” forces.  The lack of “red force tracking” 
creates problems even when the identity of the enemy is known; it is especially problematic in counter-
insurgent warfare when there is difficulty distinguishing enemy fighters from civilians.  As long as the 
identity and location of enemy forces is unknown, perfect networking does not get the US military 
remotely close to the ideal of information dominance. 
 Therefore, a system capable of red force tracking should be a primary goal of the robotics 
revolution.  Imagine a swarm of flying sensors: hundreds or thousands of micro UAVs equipped with 
sensors, cameras and microphones, feeding information into a supercomputer.  These intelligent 
Systematic Warfighter-Assisting Reconnaissance Measures, or “Smart SWARM,” could fly in front of 
advancing forces and provide detailed, real-time information about what lies ahead.  Taking advantage 
of computers' ability to simultaneously process exponentially more streams of information than 
humans, portions of the swarm could fly off in all directions, gathering information from all sides.  The 
computer could then account for any people and objects within range and create a fluid three-
dimensional display that changes as circumstances evolve.  It could present the full 3D image or a two-
dimensional bird's-eye view on screens in a command center, and display a simplified version to 
soldiers in the field in a manner that would not obstruct their vision, such as a hand-held device or a 
headset display similar to “wearable computers” like Google Glass.  Depending on the needs of various 




commanders when something requires their attention.  For example, with information-gathering robots 
surrounding soldiers at periodic intervals, this system could alert units to approaching enemies, track 
fleeing suspects, and discover awaiting ambushes. 
 Combining a Smart SWARM with a Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System like the 
ARGUS-IS would provide considerable advantages in the kinetic aspects of counter-insurgent warfare.  
While the ARGUS can cover a wide area, and a computer system could process its feed to track 
vehicles or search for threatening behavior such as someone burying an object beside a road, it is only 
capable of looking down, and therefore cannot see through cover.  However, in urban settings, the 
SWARM could peer around corners, fly over rooftops, search under awnings and look in windows, 
providing information on the location of snipers or hidden enemies. 
 Additionally, the Smart SWARM could enter buildings before soldiers, informing them of the 
locations of any people or weaponry.  With many small, mobile robots, the SWARM could provide a 
real-time map of the inside of any building, and individual micro UAVs could follow people as they 
move around inside.  Using object recognition, the system could determine which individuals are 
carrying weapons, and locate any guns or other relevant objects stored on the premises.  With infrared 
sensors, it could find anyone waiting to ambush soldiers or hiding to escape capture.  Add Fido sniffers 
and the swarm could identify booby traps and discover stored explosives.  This would provide 
commanders with detailed information about the contents of any house or compound before sending in 
soldiers, greatly reducing the ability of enemies to surprise or flee and increasing the thoroughness of 
the search. 
 Beyond kinetic operations, the SWARM would be hugely beneficial to intelligence gathering.  




targets, observing meetings or hiding in suspected safe-houses.  They could sneak through pipes or 
between walls, resembling small insects to reduce suspicion.  This would provide a method of bugging 
targets without the risk that a human operative could be caught planting or recovering the recording 
device.  Furthermore, the bug wouldn't be fixed to a single location, and a human operator or computer 
program could direct it to move as the target moves, or if the audio or video feeds become obstructed.  
The system could thus monitor terrorist or insurgent leaders targeted for drone strikes, or snatch-and-
grab missions, confirming the identity of the target and informing decision-makers of anyone in 
proximity, thereby reducing mistakes and limiting collateral damage. 
 It would be naïve to assume that the Smart SWARM can eliminate the fog of war, but it can 
reduce it considerably and provide relative information superiority.  With robots, rather than humans, 
gathering information, and computers, rather than humans, processing the numerous streams, the 
United States military could achieve a considerably higher level of battlefield awareness than it 
achieved in the Iraq War, in both the first phase against the Iraqi military and the second phase against 
the insurgency.  Wide Area Airborne Surveillance Systems, Ravens or other small UAVs, ground-
based robots like Throwbot Scouts and PackBots, and a Smart SWARM of micro UAVs carrying 
various sensors could together gather enough information to provide a detailed portrait of a given area. 
 Nevertheless, pre-robot intelligence techniques would remain essential to strong actor strategies 
against insurgent and terrorist organizations.  A widespread network of information-gathering robots 
could monitor the location of people and objects, and a sufficiently intelligent computer program could 
identify actions such as carrying weapons or planting IEDs.  However, robots could not determine 
intentions or allegiances.  Therefore, human intelligence techniques, from infiltrating hostile 




strategy.  Information gathered in traditional ways would direct and be informed by information 
gathered and processed by robotic systems.  In this way, the Smart SWARM would both enhance and 
depend upon existing informational strategies, much as NCW seeks to compliment rather than replace 
classical war-fighting strategies. 
 
Building the Smart SWARM 
 
Hundreds of miniature flying robots working in conjunction to create a 3D map of all people 
and objects in a given area that updates in real-time may sound like science fiction, but most of the 
elements already exist.  Micro UAVs designed to gather information are already used in active military 
theaters, such as the Black Hornet miniature helicopters British soldiers operate in Afghanistan.  
Prototypes of UAVs that look like and mimic the abilities of various insects have been built, and more 
are expected soon.  Groups of small robots independently working together to accomplish a single task 
already exist, though they have not been mass produced or put to widespread use.  Finally, though it 
appears that no software capable of constructing a constantly updating 3D map from all of these inputs 
currently exists, various existing programs suggest that such a thing is possible. 
 A team from Georgia Tech's Robotics and Intelligent Machines Department has developed a 
miniature UAV that mimics the flying capabilities of a dragonfly.  Developed with a $1 million grant 
from the US Air Force's Office of Scientific Research, the Dragonfly drone can fly and hover in a 
manner similar to its namesake.465  It employs a combination of quadcopter, helicopter, and fixed-wing 
technology to achieve considerable maneuverability, and, with a length of six inches and a weight of 25 
465 Danigelis, “Tiny Dragonfly UAV Flies and Hovers to Spy.” 
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grams, is small enough to fit on a human palm.466  TechJet, a company spun off from the Robotics and 
Intelligent Machines Department to market the Dragonfly, envisions various versions tailored to 
different uses, including gaming, photography, home security, and military surveillance.467  With its 
small size, ability to both fly and hover, and flexibility regarding components, the Dragonfly, or an 
alternative UAV with similar capabilities, could form the basis of the Smart SWARM.  
 TechJet expects the Dragonfly to retail between $250 and $1,500, depending on the level of 
computing and flying capabilities included.468  That is more expensive than the $700 quadcopters 
advertised on DIY Drones, but far less costly than the Black Hornet, which the UK bought for 
approximately $200,000 per unit.  Unlike the Dragonfly, each Black Hornet includes a camera that can 
capture video or still images one kilometer away, and a hand-held display that can show these images 
to an operator.  Although the Dragonfly does not come with these accessories, its drastically lower 
price demonstrates that forthcoming UAVs based on insects could provide a cost-effective basis for 
building the Smart SWARM.  Furthermore, since the distance between each drone in the SWARM 
would be considerably less than one kilometer, they would not require the Black Hornet's powerful 
camera. 
 An even smaller alternative is a tiny flying drone that vaguely resembles a crane fly developed 
by the Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering at Harvard.  This micro UAV is only 3 
centimeters from wingtip to wingtip and weighs only 80 milligrams.  Whereas the Dragonfly is a little 
smaller than a palm, the crane fly drone is barely larger than a penny.  Unlike miniature helicopters and 
other micro UAVs that use rotaries, it is an ornithopter, with flapping wings modeled after the Eristalis 
466 Green, “Dragonfly Robotic Insect UAV is Freaking Cool.” 
467 Danigelis, “Tiny Dragonfly UAV Flies and Hovers to Spy.” 
468 Green, “Dragonfly Robotic Insect UAV is Freaking Cool.” 
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genus of flies.469  This miniature drone can hover and execute simple flight maneuvers, demonstrating 
the feasibility of flying robots tiny enough to escape casual notice.  Though the Dragonfly or crane fly 
drones would not be confused with actual insects by anyone paying attention, as UAVs get smaller and 
closer in appearance to real insects, they will become increasingly capable of stealthy spy missions. 
 To fulfill the Smart SWARM's goal of information superiority, many of these small robots 
would need to independently coordinate actions.  This is simpler than it might seem at first.  To act as a 
swarm, robots do not require constant instructions from a centralized decision-maker.  In a manner 
similar to the way that bees or ants work together, each robot follows some simple rules in relation to 
the other units in the swarm, which, when taken together, produce collective action.470  For example, 
ants carrying food back to the main colony just follow the ant in front of them along a chemical trail 
that was left by the ants that originally discovered the food source and reinforced by every ant that 
walks along the path.  Similarly, each robot in a swarm of information-gathering micro UAVs could be 
programed with the simple rule never to get too close or too far from another member of the SWARM.  
This would keep them close enough to cover a selected area with no blind spots, but spaced out enough 
to avoid crashes or unnecessary redundancy.   
 There has been considerable research into robot swarms, much of it published in robotics 
journals, some of which are specifically devoted to swarming technology.  In particular, the Future and 
Emerging Technologies program of the European Commission sponsored a venture called “Swarm-
bots,” and a successor called “Swarmanoid,” to advance coordinated robot behavior.  The Swarm-bots 
project focused on homogenous groups of robots that autonomously assembled themselves into a single 
469 “Robodiptera.” 
470 Sahin and Franks, “Measurement of Space: From Ants to Robots.” 
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structure.471  Swarmanoid built upon this by creating a heterogeneous swarm consisting of 
approximately 60 robots of three different types that moved as a group through human environments 
while working together to negotiate obstacles.472  The Swarmanoid system won an award from the 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence in 2011, and its success indicates the feasibility of an autonomous 
swarm that features different types of information-gathering micro UAVs working together with 
ground-based and aerial ISR robots. 
 Drawing lessons from the behavior of insect societies, programmers have developed groups of 
robots that can make decisions from a collective process of individual actions.  For example, 
researchers working on the Swarm-bots project noted how group decisions emerge from the 
interactions of individual ants seeking the most efficient path to a food source.  No single ant knows the 
best way to reach the food, but, through trial-and-error and the ability of individuals to chemically 
communicate success or failure, the group of ants finds and then adheres to an effective route.  With 
this in mind, researchers programmed a group of ground-based robots with simple rules that enabled 
the group to avoid falling into holes.  As each robot moved in a general direction across terrain 
featuring holes from which they could not escape, some inevitably would fall in.  However, any that 
fell into a hole would send a simple signal to the other robots to keep their distance, which resulted in 
most of the group avoiding the holes and reaching their destination.  The group’s decision to steer clear 
of holes emerged from simplistic actions of, and signals from, individual members.473  In another 
example of emergent group decision-making, a heterogeneous swarm improved group efficiency by 
471 “Swarm-bots.” 
472 “Swarmanoid.” 
473 Trianni and Dorigo, “Emergent Collective Decisions in a Swarm of Robots.” 
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increasing the role of machines that proved the best at performing various tasks, autonomously creating 
a division of labor.474   
 The ability to learn from circumstances and reassign roles based on performance would make a 
robotic SWARM capable of reacting to combat conditions.  Some early ideas for swarms depended on 
aerial drones that would fly above the other robots to provide information about the surrounding 
environment and issue directions.  However, in the event of accident or malfunction to these central 
robots, the functionality of the entire swarm would suffer.  More recent robot swarms based on 
emergent group decision-making are more robust, which makes them better suited for military 
operations.  The entire swarm is valuable, but each individual unit is incidental.  If a few became 
damaged, whether through accident or hostile action, the group could adjust and continue with its 
mission. 
 Moving a swarm through an outdoor area is relatively easy compared to navigating indoor 
environments.  However, a paper presented at the 2012 International Conference on Robotics and 
Automation detailed an “entirely decentralized approach” of moving around inside that “relies solely 
on local sensing without requiring absolute positioning, environment maps, powerful computation or 
long range communication.”475  The authors reported successfully testing this method using 
quadcopters.  In the experiment, the robots in the swarm did not possess any prior knowledge of the 
halls they moved through, but were able to navigate the indoor space based on basic information each 
robot gathered about its environment and simple rules governing relations between the units of the 
swarm.  Using an advanced version of this application, a Smart SWARM would be able to enter a 
474 Labella et. al., “Division of Labor in a Group of Robots Inspired by Ants' Foraging Behavior.” 
475 Stirling et. al., “Indoor Navigation with a Swarm of Flying Robots.” 
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building and move throughout it, searching for people and objects while providing a layout to human 
operators. 
 With robotic swarms capable of independently navigating both outdoor and indoor 
environments, the next step towards a militarily useful Smart SWARM is software that could 
synthesize the various streams of information to create a user-friendly display.  Many of the 
components for this exist as well.  Three dimensional mapping software is commonly used by 
architects, land developers, city planners, miners, and other professions that make use of geographic 
and spatial data.  The maps created by this software are static models of topographical features, city 
blocks, or buildings, rather than the constantly updating displays necessary for the Smart SWARM to 
monitor the locations of moving objects.476  However, existing software can build detailed 3D maps 
that users can navigate virtually, and a more advanced version could use this template while adding the 
ability to account for real-time tracking of moving objects. 
 Commercially available 3D mapping software is primarily a tool for human users to build 
virtual models, but computers have demonstrated the ability to autonomously create 3D displays of 
indoor spaces using limited information.  In a May 2013 paper published by the National Academy of 
Sciences, a team presented an algorithm that “reconstructs the full 3D geometry” of a room “from a 
single sound emission.”  By using acoustic echoes in a manner similar to the way that bats “see,” the 
software records sounds bouncing back off of walls and uses the information to build a three 
dimensional map of a room.477  With all the noise present in a combat environment, this technique 
might not be the best fit for war-fighting.  However, the software shows how a computer system can 
quickly create a model of a room from information acquired by automated processes, and the Smart 
476 See, for example, “AutoCAD Map 3D.” 
477 Dokmanic et. al., “Acoustic echoes reveal room shape.” 
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SWARM would be able to use information from various sensors and cameras, instead of just a few 
microphones monitoring the echoes from a single sound. 
 To create software that builds three dimensional images based on the information collected by 
each robot in the Smart SWARM, programmers should consider the example set by a method of 
studying hurricanes.  In 2013, a team from the University of Florida announced that it is working on a 
project to predict the strength and path of powerful storms using a swarm of robots.  Combining micro 
UAVs about 6 inches long that fly into the storm with small submersible robots that swim in the ocean 
below, the hurricane-hunting swarm uses sensors carried by each robot to collect data on air pressure, 
temperature, humidity, wind speed, and wind direction.  As with other robotic swarms, each unit is 
relatively cheap: only $250 per miniature plane.  If any are lost—which is to be expected when flying 
in extreme weather, even though the UAVs are designed to fly with, rather than fight, the powerful 
winds—the group adjusts autonomously.  The swarm sends the data it collects in real-time to 
computers out of the storm's range, which then create sophisticated weather models that predict the 
hurricane's trajectory and intensity.478   
 This system has not been completed yet, but the existing method of studying hurricanes 
demonstrates how a computer can build a model of complex phenomena using data collected by many 
small units.  To gather data on powerful storms, a large manned airplane flies into the eye and ejects 
hundreds of lightweight cylinders known as “dropsondes.”  The dropsondes fall through the storm 
attached to parachutes, going wherever the winds blow them, and gather data that they send back to 
478 “Tiny airplanes and subs from University of Florida laboratory could be next hurricane hunters.” 
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base via radio signals.479  This offers a potential model for how the Smart SWARM's central computer 
could utilize real-time data coming in from multiple sources to create a detailed model of a given area. 
 These developments in computing and robotic systems demonstrate that the Smart SWARM is 
technologically plausible.  Many types of small UAVs that gather information, swarms of robots that 
coordinate the actions of different types of autonomous machines without central direction, computer 
software that creates three dimensional maps of indoor and outdoor spaces, and algorithms that create 
models from information gathered from numerous sources all exist.  These components could therefore 
be combined and further developed to produce a robotic swarm and dedicated computer system 
designed to provide soldiers and commanders with a detailed picture of a selected area.  Combined 
with object recognition and facial identification software, such a system could help the United States 
military achieve information dominance in both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. 
Countering Weak Actor Robots 
 
A swarm of flying sensors, cameras and microphones monitored by supercomputers would 
greatly enhance information gathering and processing capabilities, but the core strategy of network-
centric operations focuses on “information superiority,” which also includes denying information to 
enemies.  In asymmetric warfare, this entails minimizing or eliminating weak actors' advantage in the 
asymmetry of information, or even creating informational asymmetries that favor the stronger actor.  
To realize these goals, strong actors not only need to maximize their information acquisition and 
processing capabilities, but also minimize the ability of weak actors to do the same. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, information-gathering robots, especially small UAVs, will 
likely prove increasingly useful to non-state networks in their fights against states.  Whether acquiring 
479 Bittel, “Studying Hurricanes with Swarms of Smart Drones.” 
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unmanned technology designed for military use from state sponsors or on the black market, or adapting 
commercially available robots, insurgents and guerrillas could use small UAVs with cameras and other 
information-gathering unmanned systems to anticipate enemy movements, plan ambushes, and avoid 
raids.  Therefore, a strong actor strategy based on information superiority would need to counter the 
information-gathering abilities of small drones and other robots that relatively weak actors may 
acquire. 
 One possible technique is signal jamming.  By overwhelming radio transmissions with static, or 
“noise,” jammers could prevent communication between drones and their operators.  This technique 
would be especially useful against remote control aircraft and less so against drones that fly 
autonomously, although it would prevent both types of unmanned aircraft from transmitting images 
back to ground stations.  By preventing operators from receiving video feeds in real-time, jammers 
would eliminate the ability of robots to provide networks with actionable battlefield intelligence. 
 Both the American and Israeli militaries have utilized jamming to prevent remote detonation of 
improvised explosive devices, which provides a precedent for using similar technology against robots.  
The United States credits the tens of thousands of jammers it deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan with 
saving numerous lives.480  However, to ensure successful interference with cell phones and other 
devices used to remotely trigger IEDs, jammers saturate an area with electromagnetic energy, 
broadcasting over many frequencies at once.481  IED jammers are typically mounted on vehicles, which 
protects the vehicles from remotely detonated explosives in their vicinity, but to disrupt the 
communications of an enemy UAV high in the air, a jammer would need to be considerably more 
480 Shachtman, “The Secret History of Iraq's Invisible War.” 
481 “IED Jammer.” 
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powerful than one protecting a vehicle from IEDs.  Therefore, any jammer powerful enough to disrupt 
enemy robotics would also interfere with friendly unmanned systems in the area. 
 A similar problem applies to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).  This burst of electromagnetic 
energy damages or disrupts the function of electronic devices, and would therefore be a useful weapon 
against robots.  An EMP is produced by a nuclear explosion, but a non-nuclear EMP can be created by 
an explosively pumped flux compression generator, which is a device designed for this purpose, as well 
as some microwave generators.482  However, while an EMP would disable enemy robots, it would have 
the same effect on friendly robots or electronic equipment within the blast range, diminishing its utility. 
 Since both jammers and EMPs have considerable drawbacks, the best method of countering 
robots may be simply to spot, track, and shoot them.  However, as Israel found out when the first 
Hezbollah UAVs entered Israeli airspace, the sort of unmanned aircraft likely to be used by networks 
are often too small, or fly too low to the ground to be noticed by traditional aircraft tracking methods.  
Therefore, improved radar, both on the ground and in the air to avoid interference from mountains and 
other obstacles, could spot smaller objects flying lower than typical planes.  Sensors that track 
electronic signals, such as those featured on Global Hawks and other large ISR drones, could intercept 
communications between a small UAV and its ground station.  Additionally, strong actors should 
consider developing drones dedicated to autonomously identifying and tracking unmanned aircraft.  
Once the location of an enemy drone is known, it could be shot down by anti-aircraft weaponry, 
including C-RAM systems, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles.  These missiles are frequently more 
expensive than the UAV they would be shooting down, but this should not be considered a problem 
482 Kopp, “The Electromagnetic Bomb – a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction.” 
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because it would be taking advantage of material superiority, the one clear advantage strong actors 
have in asymmetric conflict. 
 
The Smart SWARM, Robots, and Military Strategy (Keeping Humans in the Loop) 
 
At this point, we should probably talk about Skynet.  In the Terminator movies, the United 
States military creates Skynet, a powerful artificial intelligence system, to reduce reaction time and 
eliminate human error, and gives it control of all computerized military hardware, including stealth 
aircraft and nuclear weapons.  The system becomes self-aware and turns on its human masters, using 
America's arsenal to kill billions and take over the planet.  This is one of many science fiction stories in 
which computers and robots end up threatening human survival—2001: A Space Odyssey and The 
Matrix are among the most famous—contributing to a widespread wariness of military robotics, 
especially autonomous systems.  When thinking about how a computer would fight a war and what sort 
of technological developments would help achieve information superiority, it is worth considering the 
ethical questions relating to autonomous robots. 
 While pop-culture driven fears of current or forthcoming unmanned systems choosing to rebel 
against humanity are unfounded, military strategists and roboticists have raised reasonable concerns 
about the autonomy of killer machines.  Since the earliest targeting computers on bombers, machines 
have assisted humans with life-or-death decisions, and automated systems capable of killing on their 
own have been in use for at least three decades.  In the 1980s, the United States Navy began using the 
Phalanx close-in weapons system, a precursor of 21st century land-based C-RAMs, to protect ships.  
The Phalanx, Patriot missile batteries, and other anti-air and missile defense systems at sea or on land 




input.  Given the speed of missiles, the quickness of automated reactions has saved lives and 
equipment.  However, on rare occasions, the systems have mistakenly identified targets and destroyed 
civilian or friendly aircraft.  This precedent creates concern that human beings remain “in the loop” and 
retain control of most decisions to fire weaponry as unmanned systems become increasingly capable of 
autonomous decision-making in the 21st century.483 
 There are, however, numerous advantages to robots that can make decisions on their own, 
making increased autonomy inevitable.  Besides the combat advantages associated with rapid decision-
making, autonomous machines act as a force multiplier.  It is difficult for humans to actively operate 
more than one robot at a time, but autonomy enables multiple robots in the field per human operator.  
Additionally, if robots can carry out their primary functions without directions from a remote control, 
they cannot be thwarted by signal jamming or unintentional interference.  While many people remain 
hesitant to grant robots the ability to select targets or choose when to fire without direct human input, if 
unmanned systems can demonstrate a near-perfect rate of success, most will come to accept it, much as 
virtually no one fears the use of autopilot in passenger jets or denounces automated anti-air defenses. 
 Even as individual robotic systems become more autonomous, they will not be taking over 
military strategy in the foreseeable future.  It is dangerous to say technology will never be able to 
accomplish something—forever is an awfully long time—but strategy is so complex, and must take 
into account so many variables, as to be far beyond the capabilities of early 21st century computers.  At 
the highest level, military strategy is linked to political objectives, which are definitionally dependent 
upon human preferences.  However, even with human-determined objectives as inputs, the world's 
most powerful computers still could not handle strategy. 
483 Singer, Wired for War, chapter 6, especially pp. 124 - 125. 
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 Computers originally mastered tic-tac-toe and checkers, because there are a limited number of 
possible moves and situations.  There are considerably more in checkers, but in both games there exists 
a perfect strategy that will either win or draw against every possible opponent.484  Similarly, chess has 
a finite number of situations, albeit exponentially more than checkers.  The upper bound of the number 
of possible arrangements of chess pieces has been mathematically proven to be, at most, 10^46.25, and 
is probably lower by a few orders of magnitude.485  When playing chess, computers play out millions 
of potential games from a given point and then select the move that leads to the highest probability of 
victory.  Though no computer program has found an unbeatable strategy for chess like those for tic-tac-
toe and checkers, given the finite number of possible positions a sufficiently powerful computer could 
theoretically play every possible game and develop a formula for perfect chess. 
 Since IBM's Deep Blue first defeated grandmaster Gary Kasparov in a series of games in 1997, 
chess programs have had a strong record against human champions; but computers still cannot master 
poker.  Programs have proven quite adept at simple versions of the game, with just two players and 
narrow betting limits, but have greater difficulty determining optimal strategy in no-limit games where 
bettors may risk any or all of their chips at any point.  Furthermore, each additional player 
exponentially increases the factors a computer must take into account, and no machine has proven 
successful in multi-player no-limit games.486   
 Unlike chess, poker includes both randomness (the cards each player is dealt) and considerable 
unknowns.  What cards do opponents have?  If they bet, does it reflect the strength of their hand or are 
they bluffing?  What type of strategy do they prefer, and have they changed strategies since the 
484 Nelson, “Checkers computer becomes invincible.” 
485 Chinchalkar, “An Upper Bound for the Number of Reachable Positions.” 
486 Wilson, “Jeopardy, Schmeopardy.” 
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previous hand?  How has their recent performance affected their mood?  And how would they answer 
all of these questions about me?  These factors create many more possible situations than chess, more 
than any current computer program can handle.  War includes considerably more pieces than chess, and 
far more unknowns than poker, and if computers cannot win poker tournaments, they will not be taking 
over military strategy any time soon.   
 With this in mind, the goal of the Smart SWARM is to reduce the unknowns in warfare to 
improve the decision-making capabilities of the participants.  By providing soldiers and commanders 
with the outline of outdoor and indoor areas and the location of people and relevant objects, the 
SWARM could reduce strong actors' disadvantage in the asymmetry of information.  However, this 
system would not be capable of determining political objectives, guessing opponents' strategies or 
enemy fighters' intentions, determining civilians' allegiances, or handling any of the other complex 
human considerations incorporated into strategy. 
 Though the concept of the Smart SWARM draws upon ideas of how a computer would 
theoretically fight a war, it is a tool to assist human decision-makers rather than a replacement for 
them.  By focusing on gathering and processing information, the SWARM leverages the capabilities of 
robots and computers to provide soldiers and commanders with information dominance.  The robots act 
autonomously to ensure coverage of a targeted area, while the central computer autonomously 
organizes the streams of information and identifies potential objects or persons of interest.  However, 
since the SWARM would only be gathering and processing information, rather than destroying 
property or killing people, it raises fewer concerns about whether humans are sufficiently in the loop 




 It is likely that advanced militaries will increasingly rely on robots that decide on their own 
what and when to attack, but the Smart SWARM's function would be the same whether humans or 
robots are the ones firing upon targets.  The system therefore could provide an avenue for the 
development of military robotics that raises fewer concerns about human control.  The SWARM 
enhances informational, rather than destructive, capabilities and therefore not only avoids ethical 
questions regarding whether machines or humans should be responsible for decisions to fire weapons, 
but also improves the ability of human soldiers and commanders to remain in the loop, by keeping 





 Information-gathering robots networked to powerful computers could provide information 
superiority and bring the ideal of Network-Centric Warfare closer to reality.  As a doctrine for the 
United States military, NCW did not succeed in Iraq or Afghanistan because the information feeding 
into the network was of insufficient quantity and quality.  In particular, asymmetric warfare against 
insurgencies appeared poorly suited for a doctrine based on networking forces.  However, with a Smart 
SWARM of robots gathering considerably more information, and a dedicated computer system 
processing more information more quickly, networked forces could acquire the inputs they need to gain 
informational advantages as counterinsurgents. 
 Therefore, robotic technology could provide the means for a strong actor strategy designed to 




on superior local knowledge, the ability to surprise, and exploitation of strong actors' responsibility to 
protect everything at once.  If utilized in a comprehensive informational strategy, robots have the 
potential to neutralize many of these weak actor advantages, allowing strong actors to assert their 




Chapter 7: Robotics and Strong Actor Strategy in Irredentist 
Conflicts: Defending Israeli Civilians 
 
 Both a Smart SWARM and counter-robot technology would be useful to strong actors in 
irredentist conflicts, because, like localized insurgencies, they feature asymmetries of 
information.  However, in irredentist conflicts, unlike localized insurgencies, the strong actor's 
main territory is in close proximity to the weak actor.  While weak actor strategy in localized 
insurgencies focuses on prolonging the conflict and imposing costs upon the strong actor's 
military to convince the strong actor to withdraw forces, weak actors in irredentist conflicts can 
also threaten strong actors' civilians, and they use this ability to try to win concessions from their 
stronger opponents.  However, robotic systems could help protect strong actors' civilians, 
undermining this element of weak actor strategy. 
 While the localized insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan would have to travel thousands of 
miles to threaten civilians in the United States, Israel faces ongoing asymmetric threats from two 
non-state actors positioned on its borders: Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip.  When these conflicts escalate, both groups have fired various types of rockets against 
civilian targets in Israel.  These rockets, especially the homemade Qassams fired by Hamas, are 
fairly inaccurate, and do not cause many casualties.  However, when fired in larger numbers, the 
rockets have killed and injured Israeli civilians, and forced hundreds of thousands of Israelis to 
flee their homes or take shelter instead of going to school or work.  By disrupting normal life in 
Israel and imposing costs on Israeli civilians, Hezbollah and Hamas have compelled Israel to 




 However, if Israel can protect its civilians from rocket fire, it would reduce these 
networks' ability to exploit the asymmetries of responsibility and resolve.  To this end, the Israeli 
company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems has developed Iron Dome, which is probably the 
world's most famous counter-rocket system.  Unlike the C-RAM systems that protect military 
bases and convoys, Iron Dome is designed to protect population centers from more distant fire.  
Like other C-RAMs, Iron Dome utilizes a series of radar, sensors and cameras to determine the 
flight path of incoming projectiles.  However, Iron Dome's central computer only chooses to 
shoot at the rockets and mortars it determines are heading towards populated areas, and ignores 
the others.  It also aims to destroy incoming projectiles outside of the defended area, ensuring that 
debris does not fall where it could cause damage.487   
 Iron Dome has already demonstrated an ability to shoot down incoming rockets, and, if it 
can be expanded to cover all Israeli population centers, this robotic system could facilitate a shift 
in Israel's strategy against the adversaries on its borders.  By reducing the threat from rockets, 
Israel would have less need to launch attacks aimed at destroying rocket arsenals.  These 
offensive operations put Israeli soldiers at risk, incite retaliatory attacks against Israel, and 
regularly prompt international condemnations that harm Israel's relations with neighboring states 
and the international community.    Iron Dome could thus facilitate a more defensive strategy, in 
which Israel shoots down incoming rockets while refraining from retaliation, thereby protecting 
its population and nurturing international sympathy.  Additionally, in the event of a successful 
attack against Israel that Iron Dome cannot prevent, such as a cross-border raid, Israel would 
have greater latitude to retaliate knowing that its population faces less risk from rocket fire. 
 
487 “Iron Dome.” 
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As detailed in chapter five, Hezbollah's constant rocket fire into Israel during the 2006 
conflict was an essential part of its strategy.  In fighting that lasted from July 12 to August 14, 
2006, Hezbollah shot almost 4,000 rockets into Israel, primarily inaccurate Katyushas with a 
maximum range of 30km.488  These salvos killed 43 civilians and caused “serious” or “moderate” 
wounds to 76 and “light” wounds to an additional 614, while the threat of rocket attacks 
displaced about 500,000 Israeli civilians.489  Rejecting international calls for an early ceasefire, 
Israeli officials stated their intention to cripple Hezbollah and force the Lebanese government to 
assert control over Hezbollah's stronghold in southern Lebanon.490  As Israel's ambassador to the 
United States Daniel Ayalon put it, “we will go to the end now.  We will not go part way and be 
held hostage again.  We'll have to go for the kill – Hezbollah neutralization.”491   
 However, on August 13, Israel accepted a UN-brokered ceasefire despite failing to 
achieve this goal.  Not only did Israel's airstrikes and ground forces fail to neutralize Hezbollah, 
they were not even able to prevent daily rocket fire against Israeli civilians.  Hezbollah fired no 
fewer than 100 rockets into Israel every day of the conflict, and shot almost 250 on the final 
day.492  The Winograd Committee, an independent commission appointed by the Israeli 
government to investigate and draw lessons from the 2006 war, cited the rocket barrage, and the 
Israeli Defense Forces' inability to prevent it, as a primary reason that Israel did not achieve its 
goals.493 
488 Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War,” p. 3. 
489 “Middle East Crisis: Facts and Figures.” 
490 Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War,” p. 6. 
491 Wright, “Strikes Are Called Part of Broader Strategy.” 
492 Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War,” p. 3. 
493 “Winograd Committee Submits Final Report,” number 6. 
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 In the years since the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah has rebuilt its arsenal, and now possesses 
more than 40,000 rockets.494  These include some missiles that are more sophisticated than the 
inaccurate Katyushas, such as the Fajr-5, which Hezbollah acquired from Iran. With a maximum 
range of 75km, a Fajr-5 fired from southern Lebanon could easily hit Haifa and potentially reach 
the suburbs of Israel's largest city, Tel Aviv.495  Besides a longer range, the Fajr-5 is larger and 
flies faster than Katyusha rockets, which makes it harder for Iron Dome to intercept. 
 To address this threat, Rafael Systems is developing a more advanced anti-missile system 
with Raytheon known as David's Sling.  Unlike Iron Dome, which is designed for shorter range 
projectiles, David's Sling aims to intercept ballistic missiles and medium range rockets.  The 
system uses a similar combination of radar and electro-optical sensors to track the target 
projectile and guide an interceptor to collide with it.  However, the Stunner interceptor missiles 
used by David's Sling are faster and more maneuverable than the Iron Dome's Tamir interceptors, 
similar to a next-generation version of the Patriot anti-ballistic missile used by the United States.  
In a November 2012 test, David's Sling scored a direct hit on a vehicle simulating a medium-
range rocket.  Israeli officials expect the system to begin operating in 2014.496         
 The emphasis Hezbollah has placed on acquiring rockets reveals the importance 
projectiles play in its strategy against Israel.  In the event of another conflict, Hezbollah would 
likely employ an upgraded version of its 2006 strategy, firing more rockets daily, with some of 
them reaching further into Israel.  Meanwhile, this threat somewhat deters Israel from moving 
more aggressively against Hezbollah or its state sponsor Iran. 
494 Windrem, “Why Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 rockets and missiles and sitting out the Gaza conflict.” 
495 “Hezbollah Displays Iranian Fajr-5 Missile.” 
496 Eshel, “David's Sling Makes Direct Hit in Interceptor Test.” 
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 Even with a robust Iron Dome presence on the Lebanese border, complimented by 
David's Sling to defend against Fajr-5s and other more advanced rockets, some missiles would 
likely get through.  Nevertheless, intercepting a significant percentage of rockets would reduce 
Israeli civilian casualties, which would provide the Israeli military with greater latitude to sustain 
operations in the event of another conflict with Hezbollah.  Israel and Hezbollah are thus engaged 
in an arms race, with Hezbollah seeking to maintain the capabilities to repeat its successful 2006 
strategy and Israel aiming to neutralize a key component of that strategy. 
 
Hamas and other Palestinian Organizations 
 
A similar dynamic has played out on a smaller scale in Israel's ongoing conflict with 
Hamas, which took control of the Gaza Strip in mid-2007, and other Palestinian resistance 
groups.  Since withdrawing its settlements from Gaza in August 2005, Israel has faced ongoing, 
sporadic rocket, missile and mortar fire from Hamas' military wing, known as the Izz ad Din al 
Qassam Brigades, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Gaza-based militant groups.  
Supporters argue that these attacks are a justified response to Israel's ongoing occupation of 
Palestinian territory, while Israel has demanded that they cease, and launched multiple military 
operations aimed at preventing further fire.  As the following table demonstrates, the number of 
launches has varied, but the frequency has been sufficient to keep southwestern Israel under 








     Rockets, Missiles and Mortars Fired against Israel by Palestinian Organizations 2005-2012 
Year Rockets497 Mortars498 Total 
2005 401 854 1255 
2006 1722 55 1777 
2007 1276 1531 2807 
2008 2048 1668 3716 
2009 569 289 858 
2010 150 215 365 
2011 419 258 677 
2012 2200 196 2396 
 
 Rocket attacks are the best tool Hamas and other Palestinian organizations have for 
imposing costs on Israel.  Israel's borders with Gaza and the West Bank are tightly secured, 
greatly reducing the ability of operatives from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades or other groups to enter Israel to attempt suicide bombings.  According to Shin 
Bet, Israel's domestic security service, suicide bombings by Palestinian organizations declined 
from a high of 53 in 2002, to 26 in 2003, 12 in 2004, and 8 in 2005.  Following Israel's 
withdrawal from Gaza, suicide attacks further declined to 6 in 2006, 1 in 2007, 1 in 2008 and 
none in either 2009 or 2010.499  These figures include attacks against Israeli settlers in the West 
Bank and Gaza (up until the withdrawal in August 2005), civilian targets in Jerusalem and Israel 
proper, and military checkpoints throughout.  The decline in suicide attacks coincides with an 
increase in rocket and mortar fire from Gaza, indicating both Israel's improved ability to stop the 
497 2005 through 2010 from “2010 Annual Summary: Data and Trends in Terrorism,” p. 7; 2011 and 2012 from 
adding up monthly summaries from Israel's Shin Bet Security Agency. 
498 2005 through 2010 from “2010 Annual Summary: Data and Trends in Terrorism,” p. 8; 2011 and 2012 from 
adding up monthly summaries from Israel's Shin Bet Security Agency. 
499 “2010 Annual Summary: Data and Trends in Terrorism,” p. 6 
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former and continued inability to stop the latter, as well as a shift in Hamas' preference in favor of 
projectiles.   
 Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza can strike populated areas in Israel, allowing Hamas 
and other Gaza-based organizations to threaten Israeli civilians.  Their primary arsenal includes 
various mortars, the largest of which carries five pounds of explosives and, with a range of six 
miles, can reach the southwestern Israeli town of Sderot, as well as Qassam rockets, which are 
made in Gaza.  The first Qassam launch against Israel was in February 2002, with rockets landing 
between four and five miles from their launch site,500 but the latest versions, which carry a 20lb 
warhead, can fly up to 11 miles, putting the seaport city of Ashkelon in range.501  In addition to 
these homemade projectiles, Hamas has fired Katyusha and Grad rockets, which were originally 
produced by the Soviet Union and most likely acquired from Iran, that each carry 35 pounds of 
explosives and can reach a maximum range of 20 miles.  These crude rockets are fairly inaccurate 
and incapable of reaching Israel's largest population centers.   
 However, beginning in December 2008, Hamas utilized some more sophisticated, longer 
range rockets, placing more of Israel under threat.  Upgraded Grad rockets, which can travel 30 
miles and carry up to 100lb warheads, have hit the city of Beersheba.502  The WS-1E Weishi 
rocket, built by the Chinese company Sichuan Aerospace, can fly approximately 30 miles and has 
also hit Beersheba.  The WS-1E includes fin and spin stabilization mechanisms to improve 
accuracy, and is capable of carrying warheads that include thousands of steel balls, which shoot 
out up to 100 meters from the point of impact.503  Most harrowing for Israelis, Hamas has 
acquired Fajr missiles from Iran's Revolutionary Guard.  These 333mm military-grade rockets 
500 “Palestinians launch rockets at Israel.” 
501 “Hamas' Weapons Arsenal Continues to Grow.” 
502 “Two Grad rockets hit Be'er Sheva; IAF strikes Gaza launching squad.” 
503 Shachtman, “Hamas Fires Long-Range Chinese Rockets at Israel.” 
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can fly more than 46 miles, carry almost 400 pounds of explosives, and travel over 2,280 miles 
per hour, considerably faster than anything else in Hamas' arsenal.  Iran's Fars news agency, 
which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard, published an article in 2012 asserting that 
introducing the Fajr-5 would change the military balance in the conflict between the Israelis and 
Palestinians.504 
 Even though most of the rockets Hamas and other Gaza-based groups fire are inaccurate 
and infrequently hit a person or building, the ongoing threat is sufficient for many Israeli civilians 
to pressure their government respond.  As the following table demonstrates, rockets and mortars 
fired by Palestinian organizations into Israel have killed 45 Israeli civilians and injured an 
additional 1,994 in the period from 2006 through 2012.  On average, less than one fifth of the 
projectiles cause any civilian casualties.  However, additional costs include property damage, 
civilians who go to hospitals to be treated for shock, economic losses from business closings, and 
disruption of normalcy such as internal displacement and school closings. 
 
Israeli Civilian Casualties from Projectiles Fired by Palestinian Groups 2006-2012 
Year Rockets and Mortars 
Fired into Israel  
Israeli Civilian Casualties505 Civilian Casualty Rate Per Projectile 
Deaths Injuries Deaths Injuries 
2006 1777 9 371 0.51% 20.88% 
2007 2807 10 578 0.37% 20.59% 
2008 3716 15 611 0.40% 16.44% 
2009 858 2 11 0.23% 1.28% 
2010 365 5 35 1.37% 9.59% 
2011 677 3 81 0.44% 11.96% 
2012 2396 1 307 0.04% 12.81% 
504 Dehghan, “Iran supplied Hamas with Fajr-5 missile technology.” 
505 2006 through 2011 from “Hamas' Weapons Arsenal Continues to Grow;” 2012 from adding up monthly 
summaries from Israel's Shin Bet Security Agency. 
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In response to rocket fire, Israel has launched airstrikes, artillery shells, and ground raids, 
imposed an embargo of Gaza in an attempt to prevent weapons and rocket-making materials from 
entering the territory, and initiated two military operations designed to cease rocket and mortar 
attacks from Gaza into Israel: Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, 
and Operation Pillar of Defense from November 14 to 21, 2012.  Both conflicts ended in 
ceasefires; and, as with Israel's war with Hezbollah in 2006, both operations ended without the 
elimination of Hamas' ability to fire rockets into Israel.  However, these conflicts can be 
considered relatively more successful for Israel than the 2006 war against Hezbollah, because the 
rate of fire after each conflict declined significantly compared to the rate prior to the operations' 
beginning. 
 
The Lead-Up to Operation Cast Lead  
 Operation Cast Lead began after an Egypt-brokered truce between Israel and Hamas from 
June 2008 collapsed in November 2008, and cross-border rocket and mortar fire resumed.  From 
January through June 18, 2008, Palestinian militants fired 1,199 Qassam rockets and 1,072 
mortars into Israel, resulting in 10 fatalities.  Over the same period, Israeli shelling, airstrikes, and 
raids killed 388 Palestinians in Gaza.  The ongoing violence prompted Israel and Hamas to enter 
into an agreement mediated by Egypt's Minister of Intelligence Omar Suleiman.  Hamas agreed 
to halt rocket and mortar attacks and ensure that other Gaza-based groups did as well, and also to 
negotiate with Israel over the release of their prisoner, Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.  Egypt and 
Israel agreed to ease the blockade, and reopen crossings into Gaza, while Egypt would increase 
its efforts to prevent weapons smuggling and Israel would cease ground raids.506   
506 “Israel reopens third Gaza crossing.” 
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 The truce held for almost five months.  Hamas refrained from firing rockets or mortars 
into Israel and largely prevented other Palestinian groups from doing so.  From June 18th through 
early November, Israel faced a total of 19 rockets and 18 mortars, suffering only three deaths in 
an incident in July and none after.  Israeli forces killed one Palestinian in Gaza in July and none 
in the months that followed.  Meanwhile, Israel partially eased the blockade, opening the Sufa 
border crossing and permitting construction materials and an increase of fuel supplies into 
Gaza.507   
 Despite this relative calm, both sides accused each other of bad faith and the truce 
collapsed in November.  Throughout the five-month truce, Gaza remained under partial blockade, 
with border crossings and the flow of goods restricted, and Corporal Shalit remained captive.  
Additionally, Israel accused Hamas of continuing to build tunnels and smuggle weapons into 
Gaza.  To destroy a tunnel that Israel claimed was designed for a raid to kidnap Israeli soldiers in 
a repeat of the operation that captured Shalit, Israeli forces crossed into Gaza on November 4, 
2008, killing one Hamas fighter in the incursion.  In response, Palestinians fired mortars at Israeli 
forces, Israel responded with airstrikes that killed five more Hamas militants, after which Hamas 
retaliated by firing 35 rockets into Israel, one of which reached the city of Ashkelon but caused 
no fatalities.  As per usual, both sides accused the other of violating the ceasefire, with Israel 
identifying the tunnel as an immediate threat and Hamas citing the Israeli incursion as the first 
shots fired.508  After this incident, attacks escalated back to pre-truce levels.  From November 4 
to December 27, Palestinian groups fired 486 rockets and 309 mortars into Israel, killing two, 
while Israeli airstrikes and ground raids killed 17 Palestinians in Gaza.   
507 “Guide: Gaza under blockade.” 
508 McCarthy, “Gaza truce broken as Israeli raid kills six Hamas gunmen.” 
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 Tensions continued rising as December 19, 2008, the official expiration date of the truce 
agreement, approached.  A high-level Hamas delegation told Egyptian Minister of Intelligence 
Omar Suleiman on December 14 that they would be willing to stop rocket fire into Israel in 
exchange for opening all Gaza border crossings with both Israel and Egypt to commercial traffic 
and a pledge not to launch any attacks in Gaza.  A spokesman for Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal 
expressed skepticism that Israel would honor a ceasefire agreement, but confirmed that Hamas 
would halt attacks if Israel agreed to “lift the siege of Gaza” immediately after the cessation of 
hostilities.509  However, this was accompanied by a promise to continue violent resistance with 
rocket fire if Israel did not agree to lift the blockade.  According to Osama al Muzaini, an official 
Hamas spokesman, the ceasefire would “not be renewed as long as there is no real Israeli 
commitment to all of its conditions” because “there is nothing that encourages us to continue with 
a deal that did not achieve the results we hoped for,” namely an end to the blockade.510 
 Similarly, Israeli officials indicated that they would be willing to renew the ceasefire, but 
expressed doubt that Hamas would honor Israel's demands.  Primarily, Israel sought a complete 
cessation of rocket and mortar fire into Israel and credible verification of an end to weapons 
smuggling into Gaza, along with progress in negotiations to free Gilad Shalit.  Amos Gilad, a 
representative of Israel's Defense Ministry, expressed these demands in a mid-December meeting 
with Egypt's Omar Suleiman.511  However, like Hamas, Israel accompanied this expressed 
willingness with a threat.  “If Hamas doesn't come to its senses and calm the situation,” an Israeli 
defense official warned, “there will be no choice other than an Israeli military response.”512 
509 Porter, “MIDEAST: Israel Rejected Hamas Ceasefire Offer in December.” 
510 “Gaza-Israel truce in jeopardy.” 
511 Sofer, “Israel in favor of extending Gaza lull.” 
512 Quoted in Ravid et. al., “Hamas declares end to cease-fire, Israeli gov't sources fear violence in unavoidable.” 
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 The two sides were unable to reach an agreement and Hamas officially declared the truce 
over on December 18, one day before it was scheduled to expire.513  It is unsurprising that Israel 
and Hamas could not find common ground and chose not to renew the truce, because their goals 
were incompatible.  Hamas demanded a complete end to Israel's blockade of Gaza, which Israel 
would not agree to since it would permit the importation of weaponry.  Israel demanded that 
Hamas stop importing weapons, especially rockets and rocket-making materials, which Hamas 
would not agree to, because it would remove its main source of leverage in the ongoing conflict 
over the Israeli occupation without making tangible progress towards an independent Palestinian 
state. 
 Both sides seemed to believe they could get closer to achieving their goals by engaging in 
an escalated confrontation before returning to negotiations.  As with Hezbollah in 2006, Israeli 
decision-makers hoped that a limited war would enable Israel to destroy some of Hamas' 
weaponry and send a message that future attacks would be met with military escalation, which 
would hopefully deter Hamas from firing rockets.  Hamas, meanwhile, hoped to deny Israel a 
military victory while demonstrating its ability to launch enough rockets to harm and frighten the 
Israeli population despite Israel's efforts to prevent it, which would ideally deter Israel from 
attacking Gaza or tightening the embargo in the future.  This means that both sides wanted an 
eventual resumption of the ceasefire, but only after what they hoped would be a successful 
conflict that improved their negotiating position.  As Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel's domestic 
security agency Shin Bet, told an Israeli cabinet meeting, Hamas “is interested in continuing the 
truce, but wants to improve its terms.”514 
513 “TIMELINE – Israeli-Hamas violence since the truce ended.” 
514 “Israeli leaders 'to topple Hamas.'” 
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 Domestic politics likely played a role as well in both sides willingness to escalate.  
Hamas, which controls Gaza, is engaged in an ongoing competition with Fatah, which controls 
the West Bank, for domination of Palestinian politics.  In addition to Hamas' ability to provide 
domestic services, a significant portion of its popularity comes from its status as a resistance 
organization, willing and capable of standing up to Israel, in contrast to Fatah, whose security 
services coordinate with Israel's.  Therefore, if choosing between the two main factions, 
Palestinians who prefer a nonviolent approach based on negotiation and cooperation with Israel 
are more likely to side with Fatah, while Hamas' base is made up of Palestinians who advocate 
confrontation and violent resistance.  Hamas entered into a truce agreement with Israel that was 
supposed to include an end to the blockade of Gaza.  Instead, they got a slight relaxation of the 
embargo, which Israel often re-tightened in response to limited rocket fire from Islamic Jihad or 
other non-Hamas organizations.  Therefore, Hamas had an incentive to reestablish its resistance 
bona fides by engaging in violent confrontation with Israel, even if it could not achieve a more 
favorable bargain than the original ceasefire. 
 Meanwhile, an Israeli general election was scheduled for February 10, 2009, and 
politicians were trying to establish their security credentials.  The two main competitors for Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party, and the Foreign Minister at the time, Tzipi 
Livni of the Kadima party, both blamed Hamas for the end of the truce and vowed to use force to 
stop the rockets flying from Gaza.  Livni announced that “a government under me will make it a 
strategic objective to topple the Hamas regime in Gaza,” and that “Israel must react with force 
when it is fired upon, must re-establish its force of dissuasion and stop the rockets.”  Meanwhile, 
Netanyahu blamed Livni for being too “passive” and claimed that Israelis living near the Gaza 




accused the Israeli government of excessive passivity, and advocated an “active policy of 
attack.”515  This campaign rhetoric demonstrates that the two front runners for Prime Minister 
both believed that a hawkish stance towards Hamas and other Gaza-based organizations would 
appeal to many Israeli voters. 
  
The Gaza War (December 27, 2008 – January 18, 2009) 
 On December 27, 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead.  The campaign began with 
airstrikes against targets relating to Hamas' control of Gaza, including government buildings, 
police stations, and the group's headquarters.  As this demonstrates, the Gaza War was between 
the Israeli state and a state-network hybrid.  Hamas is effectively the governing body in the Gaza 
Strip, though it does not control Gaza's borders and is not recognized by much of the international 
community, and therefore would not qualify as a small state under the definition presented in 
chapter two.  However, its state-like status presented Israel with targets to attack with precision-
guided weaponry at the beginning of Cast Lead, allowing Israel to take advantage of its resource 
superiority.  As with big state – small state conflicts, Israel did not face an informational 
disadvantage; Israel knew where to strike and Hamas only learned that Israel was launching an 
air campaign when the first strikes fell.  The opening barrage destroyed numerous buildings used 
by Hamas, and primarily killed Hamas members.  Of the 225 killed, only 15 were confirmed 
civilians.516   
 However, after the first airstrikes, Hamas abandoned official posts, blended into the 
population, and called on other Palestinian militant groups to work together to resist Israel, giving 
the conflict a state-network framework.  In the air campaign from December 28, 2008 through 
515 “Israeli leaders 'to topple Hamas.'” 
516 “Death toll passes 225 in Israeli offensive on Gaza.” 
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January 3, 2009, Israel continued to attack targets associated with Hamas, including leaders' 
homes and mosques believed to be used for weapons storage, and dropped powerful bombs on 
suspected locations of smuggling tunnels under the border with Egypt.  However, the rate of 
civilian casualties rose from less than 10% to as much as 25%,517 demonstrating the relative 
difficulty in hitting military targets after destroying Hamas' official state-like buildings in the 
original surprise barrage.       
 The second phase of Operation Cast Lead, a ground invasion, began on January 3, 2009 
and lasted until January 17, when Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire.  Israel ceased military 
operations and announced that, if Palestinian groups stopped firing rockets, it would withdraw its 
forces from Gaza, but would reenter if rocket attacks resumed.  One day later, Hamas announced 
a ceasefire to allow Israeli troops to withdraw, effectively ending the war.518  Casualty estimates 
varied, with the Palestinian Ministry of Health claiming 1,314 dead, at least 522 of whom were 
civilians, and 5,300 additional wounded, split evenly between civilians and militants;519 while the 
Israeli Defense Forces reported 1,166 Palestinian deaths, including 709 fighters, 295 civilians, 
and the remaining 162 unknown.520  Using these figures, the percentage of Palestinian civilians 
among the dead was between 25% and 40%. 
 Israel achieved a number of its tactical goals, and Israeli political leaders declared victory.  
The IDF killed many Gaza-based militants, including numerous members of the Qassam 
Brigades,521 destroyed rocket batteries and other weaponry, and damaged or destroyed up to 80% 
of the smuggling tunnels,522 with only nine Israeli soldier deaths and 336 injuries.523  Israel drew 
517 “Israel steps up offensive in Gaza.” 
518 “Hamas announces ceasefire in Gaza.” 
519 “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator.” 
520 Lappin, “IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers.” 
521 Harel, “Senior Shin Bet official: Hamas completely lost Gaza war.” 
522 Ramadan and Ferziger, “Gaza Tunnel Owners Renew Smuggling Under Egypt Border.” 
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international attention to the issue of weapons smuggling into Gaza, and secured an agreement 
with the United States to increase security and intelligence cooperation and “work with regional 
and NATO partners to address the problem of the supply of arms and related materiel and 
weapons transfers and shipments to Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza.”524  
Notably, whether due to destruction or depletion of arsenals, or deterrence created by the military 
assault, rocket and mortar fire from Gaza slowed considerably, with around 300 total in the nine 
months after the end of Cast Lead, compared to approximately 600 in the month before alone.525 
 Though Israel achieved these short term military goals, the long term strategic outcome 
was more mixed.  Rocket and mortar attacks slowed considerably, but never stopped entirely.  
Tunnel operators based in Rafah reported that many tunnels were damaged but remained intact, 
and after clearing rubble and making some repairs they were able to resume smuggling.526  While 
the tunnel operators who spoke to the press discussed smuggling commercial goods, not weapons 
or weapon-making materials, their comments indicate that Israel did not destroy Hamas' ability to 
smuggle arms.  Overall, Operation Cast Lead did little to advance Israel's goals in the larger 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As Israeli analyst Aluf Benn pointed out, Hamas “won international 
legitimacy and sympathy, and its forces still control the Gaza Strip.”527 
 
Using Robotics to Enhance Israel's Military Capabilities in Asymmetric 
Combat 
 
Hamas' strategy vis a vis Israel leading up to and during the Gaza war fits the model of a 
weak actor in an irredentist conflict.  Hamas denied Israel victory while imposing costs on Israeli 
523 “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator.” 
524 “Text of U.S.--Israel Agreement to end Gaza arms smuggling.” 
525 Kershner, “Along Gaza, a Quiet (but Still Tense) Life.” 
526 Ramadan and Ferziger, “Gaza Tunnel Owners Renew Smuggling Under Egypt Border.” 
527 Benn, “Israel declares victory in Gaza, but at what cost?” 
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soldiers and civilians to pressure Israel into accepting a deal more favorable to Hamas than the 
status quo.  Given its resource disadvantage, Hamas would not be able to defeat the Israeli 
Defense Forces in open combat.  Additionally, unlike localized insurgencies against foreign 
powers, Hamas could not convince Israel to withdraw completely.  Therefore, to move towards 
its short term goals of cessation of all Israeli military activity in Gaza and a lifting of the 
blockade, Hamas utilized a strategy based on exploiting non-material asymmetries.   
 Hamas exploited the asymmetries of resolve and expectations by denying Israel an easy 
victory while harming and continuing to threaten Israeli citizens.  Once Cast Lead began, Hamas' 
fighters and other Palestinian militants in Gaza mostly avoided taking positions in the open, 
where they would be vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes, and prepared for urban guerrilla warfare.  
Perhaps learning from Hezbollah's tactics in the 2006 war with Israel, they dug an extensive 
network of tunnels, booby-trapped houses and other structures, and planted IEDs, especially in 
Gaza City, the largest urban area.528  This, along with the fact that Palestinian fighters dressed the 
same as Palestinian civilians, created an asymmetry of information.  Not knowing the location of 
explosives or enemy fighters slowed Israeli operations, while surprise attacks from IEDs or 
guerrillas emerging from tunnels accounted for a significant percentage of the injuries to Israeli 
soldiers.  An Israeli paratroop brigade commander that briefed reporters estimated that one third 
of the houses in Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah were booby-trapped, and that Hamas set up 
mannequins to distract soldiers, or draw them in for a closer look, whereupon Palestinian fighters 
would detonate explosives or pop up from a hole in the floor that had been covered with a rug.529 
 A networked swarm of ISR drones integrated with a dedicated computer server would 
help Israel neutralize this informational disadvantage.  Infrared sensors could easily distinguish 
528 Butcher, “Israeli soldiers shocked by tunnel network.” 
529 Bronner, “Israel Lets Reporters See Devastated Gaza Site and Image of a Confident Military.” 
248 
 
                                                 
 
between mannequins and people, and identify individuals hiding below rugs or other thin 
surfaces.  Aerial or ground-based robots equipped with Fido sniffers could identify explosives 
before troops enter houses, which explosive ordinance disposal robots could then remove.  
Notably, a Smart SWARM would help Israel locate rocket launching batteries before they fire, 
find weapons caches, and help distinguish between civilians and fighters by identifying who is 
carrying weapons.  Once the SWARM located any of these targets, the system could alert 
commanders, who could use the information to determine whether to order an airstrike, ground 
raid, alternative attack, or take no action. 
 While an integrated Smart SWARM would have a greater effect, Israeli forces did utilize 
unmanned systems in Cast Lead to counter Hamas' informational advantage.  High above Gaza, 
Israeli UAVs—primarily the Hermes 450, from Elbit Systems, and the Heron, made by Israel 
Aerospace Industries—carried out ISR missions using infrared and visible light cameras, and 
sensors capable of intercepting electronic communications.530  Both unmanned systems, which 
were developed and built by Israeli companies, are similar in size and function to the RQ-1 
Predator, transmitting information gathered from various sources in real-time to a ground station.  
Like the Predator, both the Hermes and Heron can be modified to carry guided missiles.  
Additionally, Israel employed at least one unmanned blimp, which remained tethered over the 
northern border between Gaza and Israel, monitoring the Erez crossing and relaying information 
from ISR drones to ground stations based inside Israel.531 
 In addition to this higher altitude aerial surveillance, Israeli ground forces utilized small 
ground-based drones as they moved through Gaza.  The Versatile, Intelligent, Portable Robot, or 
VIPeR, by Elbit Systems, saw combat for the first time in Cast Lead.  Similar to a smaller Talon 
530 Esposito, “The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza during Cast Lead,” p. 182. 
531 Ibid., p. 183. 
249 
 
                                                 
 
or more weaponized PackBot, the VIPeR is stout and moves around on adaptable treads that 
enable the robot to traverse uneven surfaces and climb stairs.  It weighs approximately 25 kg, 
depending on accessories, such as infrared and visible light cameras, an explosives sniffer, an 
electronic jammer to disrupt remote-detonated IEDs, a four foot arm with a gripper for moving 
objects, and a weapons mount capable of carrying a 9mm mini-Uzi or grenade launcher.  
However, unlike the PackBot or Talon, the VIPeR is operated by a harness and helmet-mounted 
display, which projects what the robot sees to the operator.532  In Cast Lead, the IDF primarily 
used VIPeRs to enter buildings ahead of soldiers to gather information and, if necessary, dispose 
of explosive ordinance.  
 Israeli soldiers also utilized, for the first time, a ball-shaped camera known as Bull Island.  
Approximately the size of a tennis ball, this robot can be thrown, dropped, or rolled into a 
building by soldiers, whereupon it rolls around providing 360-degree imagery of its 
surroundings.533  The functionality and limitations are similar to the Throwbot Scout, albeit with 
a greater ability to provide 360-degree video due to the ball-like instead of dumbbell-like shape.   
 Taken together, these systems provided what could be considered a preliminary test case 
of the utility of a Smart SWARM.  Gaza is a limited area—the entire Strip is 139 square miles, 
approximately twice the size of Washington DC—which means the entire territory could be 
monitored by ISR drones.  Unlike Hezbollah's base in southern Lebanon, there are no mountains 
in Gaza, and Israel directly controls its borders, with the exception of a small section in the south 
bordering Egypt.  The information gathered by aerial and ground-based robots helped Israel limit 
soldier casualties to 9 deaths and 336 wounded;534 an impressive rate for 20,000 soldiers engaged 
532 “Elbit Systems Unveils VIPeR a Portable Combat Robot.” 
533 Page, “Hurlable 360 cam-grenades used by IDF in Gaza.” 
534 “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator.” 
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in urban asymmetric warfare.  Nevertheless, IDF soldiers were still surprised by booby traps and 
ambushes.  Integrating the large UAVs conducting aerial surveillance and the ground-based 
robots entering buildings with smaller UAVs and a swarm of insect-sized drones, and processing 
all of this information through a dedicated computer system, could have reduced Israeli military 
casualties, sped up the ground operation, and improved the targeting of airstrikes. 
 
Countering Hamas' Rocket Strategy  
 However, Hamas' strategy did not depend on defeating Israeli ground forces in combat.  
Given its extreme resource disadvantage, Hamas expected to suffer considerable losses, and 
could not have hoped to maintain military control of Gaza in the face of an Israeli assault.  To 
achieve its goals, Hamas needed to survive the Israeli attack while exploiting the expectation that 
the stronger actor in asymmetric conflict has greater responsibility to avoid civilian casualties, 
shining a spotlight on the suffering of civilians in Gaza to garner domestic and international 
sympathy.  Perhaps most importantly, Hamas needed to demonstrate that it could maintain the 
ability to threaten Israeli citizens.  For that, it needed rockets.              
 During the Gaza War, Hamas and other Palestinian groups fired 571 rockets and 205 
mortars into Israel, maintaining their ability to fire on Israeli citizens throughout the conflict 
despite Israel's efforts.  These attacks resulted in four civilian deaths, 15 “severely” or 
“moderately” wounded, and an additional 167 lightly wounded.  In addition to these casualties, 
584 received treatment for shock or anxiety due to proximity to explosions.535  This places the 
ratio of civilians killed or wounded per projectile fired from Gaza during the conflict at 24%. 
535 “Operation Cast Lead: Israel strikes back against Hamas terror in Gaza.” 
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 While many rockets did not kill or injure anyone, the barrage from Gaza successfully 
disrupted normalcy for Israeli civilians.  Using longer range rockets, Hamas was able to hit the 
Israeli cities of Ashdod, Beersheba, and Gedera for the first time.  Many fled their homes or hid 
in bomb shelters, with an estimated 40% of Ashkelon's 110,000 citizens abandoning the city once 
the rockets began to fall.536  The projectiles damaged homes and other property, and rockets 
directly hit at least two schools, leading to closures throughout southern Israel.537  Numerous 
businesses closed, and those that remained open faced absenteeism.  With an estimated 50% of 
workers at businesses within range of rockets from Gaza choosing not to go to work, the 
Manufacturers Association of Israel estimated direct losses to Israeli businesses of 88 million 
shekels (about $25 million) and tens of millions more in indirect losses, such as delayed 
shipments or reduced patronage due to customers’ fear of rocket attacks.538  Despite Israeli 
airstrikes against rocket batteries shortly after they fired, and efforts on the ground to secure 
rocket-launching positions, Palestinian groups managed to fire rockets into Israel every day of the 
conflict. 
 This disruption of life in Israel demonstrates how Hamas uses rockets to exploit 
asymmetries of expectations and resolve.  Given Israel's resource advantage, Israelis expect their 
government to protect them from rocket attacks.  By contrast, Palestinians in Gaza do not expect 
Hamas will be able to fully protect them from Israeli strikes, and Hamas can therefore utilize 
Israeli attacks on Gaza to gain additional popular support as Gazans rally around the organization 
best capable of resistance and retaliation.  In hotter conflicts, like the Gaza War launched by Cast 
Lead, ongoing rocket fire from Gaza led some Israeli civilians to pressure their government to 
536 “Israel-OPT: Ashkelon empties, trauma teams struggle.” 
537 Curiel, “Rockets Reach Beersheba, Cause Damage.” 
538 Filut and Magen, “Manufacturers claim Cast Lead cost industry nearly NIS 90m.” 
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accept a cease fire.  The Israeli government debated a third phase of the war, which would seek to 
deal Hamas “a knockout blow,” but chose not to because intelligence assessments predicted that 
this would require prolonged operations that would likely cause heavy casualties on both sides, 
eroding domestic support for the war and prompting considerable international criticism.539 
 This implies that the Gaza War ended with a mixed outcome due to the asymmetry of 
resolve.  Despite Israel's tactical successes, and large advantage in casualties—1,166 to 1,134 
Palestinian deaths, depending on the estimate, compared to 13 Israeli deaths—Israel chose to 
unilaterally cease fire after achieving some of its immediate goals instead of pursuing a more 
complete victory.  Hamas, by contrast, vowed to fight on, and declared a ceasefire only after 
Israel ceased operations, which allowed it to consolidate power domestically and rearm.540  It is 
unclear whether the possibility of soldier casualties, Israeli civilian casualties, or international 
criticism played the largest role in Israel's decision not to pursue a more complete victory.  
Perhaps Israel lacked a plan for what to do in the event it was able to dislodge Hamas from 
power, and chose not to pursue the conflict further because it did not want to find itself militarily 
occupying Gaza indefinitely.  Whatever the reason, Israel's decision to unilaterally cease fire left 
its larger conflict with Hamas, and the associated threat of rockets from Gaza, unresolved. 
 Nevertheless, Operation Cast Lead succeeded in significantly reducing rocket fire from 
Gaza.  After the ceasefires in January, only 162 rockets and 152 mortars flew into Israel from 
Gaza throughout the rest of 2009.  Similarly, in 2010, Israel faced only 150 rocket and 215 mortar 
attacks.541  These figures represent a significant decline from the 2,048 rockets and 1,668 mortars 
fired on Israel in 2008.  Furthermore, Hamas did not claim responsibility for any of the launches, 
539 Esposito, “The Israeli Arsenal Deployed against Gaza during Operation Cast Lead,” p. 176. 
540 Al Mughrabi, “Israel plans ceasefire, Hamas vows to fight on.” 
541 “2010 Annual Summary: Data and Trends in Terrorism,” p. 7. 
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and announced, in November 2009, that it had secured an agreement with other Gaza-based 
militant groups to refrain from rocket fire, in part to avoid retaliation from Israel.542  Throughout 
2009 and 2010, it appeared that Israel's efforts to deter rocket attacks had mostly succeeded. 
 However, with the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict unresolved and the partial blockade 
of Gaza still in place, the calm did not last.  Islamic Jihad fired a mortar in early January 2011 
that injured two agricultural workers near the Gaza border.543  The group launched sporadic 
rockets and mortars into Israel from Gaza, demonstrating that Hamas was unable, or perhaps 
unwilling, to ensure that all militant groups refrained from firing.   
 In March 2011, Israel intercepted a shipment of sophisticated C-704 anti-ship missiles 
from Iran bound for Gaza aboard the Victoria, a cargo ship owned by a German company and 
flying a Liberian flag.544  The shipment was carefully camouflaged, but discovered by an Israeli 
intelligence operation, and confirmed when Israeli commandos boarded the ship and found the 
missiles.545  According to Israeli assessments, the concealed arms shipment was likely placed 
aboard the Victoria when it docked in the Port of Latakia in Syria, and was probably headed for 
the Port of El Arish in Egypt, whereupon smugglers would bring the missiles into Gaza through 
tunnels under the Egyptian border.546    
 This shipment demonstrates that Hamas used the relative quiet with Israel to rearm for 
future confrontations.  Such efforts make sense strategically, as Hamas' main goals remained 
unrealized and rockets proved its most useful weapon against Israel in recent years.  In 2011, 
Israel still maintained a partial blockade of Gaza, had not entirely ceased occasional military 
542 “Hamas: All Gaza militant groups agree to halt rocket attacks.” 
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545 Fishman, “Uncovering the missiles.” 
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activity in the territory, and, more broadly, still prevented the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state.  As in 2008 before the Gaza War, Hamas needed rockets if it wished to retaliate 
against Israeli action or escalate the conflict in pursuit of a more favorable status quo.  Even 
though Israeli intelligence discovered the missiles aboard the Victoria, the incident suggests that 
there were other shipments that made it to Gaza.  The blockade of Gaza may have delayed 
Hamas' acquisition of weaponry, but it could not provide a lasting solution for Israel to the threat 
of rocket fire.  
 By contrast, the Iron Dome counter-rocket system has the potential to protect Israelis 
rather than simply slow the growth of Hamas' arsenal.  From its first deployment, Iron Dome has 
demonstrated an impressive success rate against limited fire.  The first battery was deployed in 
March 2011 near the southern Israeli city of Beersheba, which had been a target of rockets fired 
from Gaza.547  In early April of the same year, Israel deployed a second battery near Ashkelon, 
which had recently faced a one-day barrage of 15 rockets that wounded two civilians.548  That 
battery recorded the first successful interception on April 7, 2011, when it shot down a Grad 
rocket fired from Gaza towards Ashkelon.549  Based on this early success, Israel deployed a third 
battery near Ashdod in August 2011, in anticipation of the start of the school year.550   After 
successfully intercepting 75% of targeted rockets in 2011, Iron Dome raised its success rate to 
90% in the first three months of 2012.551 
 Each attempted interception costs about $100,000, as Iron Dome typically fires two 
$50,000 Tamir interceptor missiles at a target to increase the chances of contact.552  Shooting 
547 “Israel deploys 'Iron Dome' rocket shield.” 
548 Ronen, “Second Iron Dome Battery Deployed – to Protect Ashkelon.” 
549 Pfeffer and Yagna, “Iron Dome successfully intercepts Gaza rocket for first time.” 
550 Katz, “IAF deploys third Iron Dome battery outside Ashdod.” 
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down an incoming projectile is thus far more expensive for Israel than the projectile is for the 
militant groups that fire them; the mortar shells and Qassam rockets manufactured in Gaza cost 
less than $1,000 each,553 while the more sophisticated Katyusha, Grad, and Fajr missiles, or the 
parts necessary to make them, are given to Hamas by foreign sponsors.  However, Israel receives 
money from the United States dedicated to missile defense—$211 million for Iron Dome and an 
additional $149.68 million for David's Sling in Fiscal Year 2013 alone, with a similar amount 
expected in FY2014—offsetting much of the cost.554  More importantly, as a “senior Israeli 
official” quoted in Time magazine points out, if “rockets actually hit a neighborhood, in terms of 
the human costs, the wounded, the destruction of infrastructure would be much greater.”555  
Furthermore, Iron Dome's ability to anticipate the path of projectiles allows it to refrain from 
firing at rockets or mortars heading for unpopulated or undeveloped areas, thereby saving Tamirs 
for interceptions that could save lives, streamlining the system's costs.  Factor in the cost of 
military operations designed to prevent rocket fire, and the indirect economic losses from Israelis 
fleeing or taking shelter in response to rocket barrages, and Iron Dome is a cost effective solution.   
 
Operation Pillar of Defense 
 Iron Dome's first real tests came in 2012, with the largest outbreak of violence between 
Israel and Gaza-based organizations since the Gaza War in December 2008/January 2009.  In 
March 2012, Israel launched a series of airstrikes that killed Zohair al Qaisi, the secretary general 
of the Popular Resistance Committees, because, Israel claimed, he was planning an attack.  The 
strikes killed at least 15 Palestinians, and Gaza-based militant groups responded with a two-day 
553 Thompson, “Iron Dome: A Missile Shield That Works.” 
554 Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” summary. 
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barrage of 95 rockets.  Iron Dome intercepted 25 of these, and only one Israeli was injured, while 
none were killed.556     
 After a string of relatively quiet months—a total of 76 rockets and mortars flew from 
Gaza in July, August, and September combined—October and November saw an increasing cycle 
of tit-for-tat escalation, with 171 rocket and mortar launches in October 2012 alone.557  The 
Israeli military fired tank shells at a suspected launch site near Rafah, injuring four children and 
damaging a mosque minaret.  A spokesman from the Qassam Brigades announced that “in 
response to the injury of civilians in the most recent strike on Rafah, the Qassam Brigades and the 
al-Quds Brigades fired a number of rockets at enemy military positions.”558  This was one of the 
few times Hamas claimed responsibility for rocket or mortar fire into Israel since the conclusion 
of the Gaza War in January 2009. 
 Border clashes continued throughout November, culminating in an attack on Gaza that 
Israel called Operation Pillar of Defense.  On November 5, 2012, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a 
Palestinian man approaching the Gaza border fence, who medics later said was unarmed and 
mentally ill.559  After an IED exploded near an Israeli border patrol, wounding some soldiers, 
Israeli forces crossed the border in search of bombs, leading to a gunfight with members of the 
Popular Resistance Committees on November 8.  A 12 year old Palestinian boy was killed in the 
crossfire.560  In what they stated was a response to the child's death, Hamas operatives blew up a 
tunnel near the Gaza border fence, which may have originally been constructed to stage a raid 
into Israel, wounding an Israeli soldier.561  Two days later, Palestinians fired an anti-tank missile 
556 “At least 15 killed in Israeli air strikes on Gaza.” 
557 Murphy, “How many rockets were fired from Gaza at Israel this year?” 
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at an Israeli jeep patrolling the border, injuring four soldiers, and Israel responded with an 
airstrike that killed four civilian teenagers but no militants.  Gaza-based groups responded by 
launching 25 rockets, none of which caused any damage.  24 landed in undeveloped areas, while 
Iron Dome shot down the one rocket headed towards a population center.562 
 These border clashes leading up to Pillar of Defense demonstrate the ongoing instability 
of the situation between Israel and Gaza, as well as Israel's inability to prevent attacks against its 
soldiers along the border.  Iron Dome cannot shoot down a ground-to-ground anti-tank missile 
fired at close range, and no defensive measure exists to prevent exploding tunnels.  However, 
these are threats to Israeli soldiers, not civilians, and measures like the tunnel attack require far 
more elaborate preparation than firing rockets.  Iron Dome was able to prevent any Israeli civilian 
casualties from these rocket attacks, and, if this can restrict Hamas and other Gaza-based groups 
to attacks against soldiers along the border when they wish to retaliate or escalate, it will weaken 
their ability to exploit the asymmetry of expectations.  Israeli civilians expect their government, 
as the stronger actor, to protect them from attacks, but accept that soldiers patrolling a volatile 
border face an ongoing threat.  They are therefore more likely to pressure their government to 
cease fire or make concessions in response to attacks that cause civilian casualties than after 
attacks that harm soldiers, and more willing to support a sustained military operation if civilians 
are not dying. 
 However, further escalation demonstrated that a larger rocket barrage could still harm 
Israeli civilians.  Hamas and other Gaza-based groups fired over 100 rockets in two days, directly 
hitting a house, a car, and landing near a school, injuring seven.  Schools and many businesses 
562 Barzak, “After attack on jeep, Israeli army kills 4 in Gaza.” 
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were closed, and some power lines were hit, causing outages.563  While Iron Dome did shoot 
down numerous projectiles, including a Grad rocket headed towards Beersheba, the system was 
unable to entirely prevent civilian casualties or disruption of normalcy in Israel when faced with 
many rockets fired at once. 
 Claiming that they needed to escalate further to counter these rocket attacks, Israel 
launched an operation it labeled Pillar of Defense.  It began with a surgical strike that killed 
Ahmed Jabari, the head of Hamas' military wing in Gaza, and lasted from November 14 to 21.  
The IDF launched airstrikes at over 1,500 targets associated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 
including commanders, rocket launchers and manufacturing sites, and tunnels.564  The attacks 
killed 139 Palestinians, at least 70 of whom were civilians, and injured more than 900.565  
However, unlike Cast Lead, Israel opted against following this air campaign with a ground 
invasion.  Israeli officials asserted that the airstrikes had accomplished the goal of stopping rocket 
attacks, while Hamas leaders claimed that their resistance to Israel's ground invasion in early 
2009 had established a deterrent.566 
 Following the assassination of Ahmed Jabari, the Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and 
other militant groups launched an operation they called Stones of Baked Clay.  According to UN 
statistics, Gaza-based organizations fired 1,598 rockets over the course of the week, 142 of which 
landed in Gaza.  Of the 1,456 fired into Israel, Iron Dome successfully shot down 409.  The 
barrage included 10 Fajr-5 missiles fired at the suburbs of Tel Aviv and ships stationed offshore, 
five of which were intercepted by Iron Dome, and three long ranged missiles that hit the outskirts 
of Jerusalem.  The rocket fire killed four Israeli civilians and one soldier, and injured an 
563 “Rockets hit homes in south as fire continues for second day.” 
564 “Operation Pillar of Defense: Summary of Events.” 
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additional 219 civilians and 16 soldiers.567  This demonstrates the increasing range of Hamas' 
arsenal, as well as its ability to get some rockets past Israel's defenses when firing many at once. 
 The conflict ended with a ceasefire brokered by Egypt and the United States with 
demands and terms similar to previous agreements between Hamas and Israel.  Israel agreed to 
halt all military activity in the Gaza Strip including the targeting of individuals, while Hamas 
agreed that “all Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza Strip against Israel 
including rocket attacks and all attacks along the border.”568  Additionally, Israel agreed to 
reopen the border crossings it had shut completely during the conflict, though it has maintained 
the partial blockade of Gaza and continues inspecting cargo to prevent weapons from entering the 
Strip.   
 For Israel, it appears that the operation was mostly successful.  In the six months after 
Pillar of Defense, only 41 rockets and mortars have been launched from Gaza and Sinai towards 
Israel, compared to 219 in the six months after Cast Lead.569  However, Hamas remains in control 
of Gaza, and its grievances, from the blockade of Gaza to the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
remain unresolved.  Furthermore, the ability of Gaza-based groups to fire almost 1,600 rockets in 
a week, including some missiles that were more sophisticated than any used during the Gaza 
War, indicate that Israel's efforts to prevent weaponry from entering the Gaza Strip were at least 
partially unsuccessful.  Given the frequency of cross-border attacks since Hamas took control of 
Gaza, it would not be surprising if another round of violence brakes out within the next few 
years. 
567 Ban, “Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council.” 
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 However, should hostilities escalate in the future, Israel's C-RAM defenses will be more 
robust.  While Iron Dome did not neutralize the threat of rockets from Gaza during Pillar of 
Defense, the system did demonstrate its ability to reduce the damage they cause.  As the 
following table shows, Hamas and other Palestinian groups fired more rockets during the week-
long Pillar of Defense than during the 23 days of Cast Lead, but were not able to kill more Israeli 
civilians.  Facing almost twice as many projectiles, at a rate of over six times as many per day, 
Israel suffered a lower rate of civilian casualties—approximately 15.3% deaths or injuries per 
projectile compared to 24% during the Gaza War.  And this does not account for the greater 
prevalence of rockets relative to mortars during Pillar of Defense, or the fact that the rockets used 
in 2012 were, on average, faster, more accurate, and carried larger payloads than those fired in 
the 2008/2009 conflict.   
 
Israeli Civilian Casualties: Cast Lead v. Pillar of Defense 
Conflict Operation Cast Lead Operation Pillar of Defense 
Duration 23 days 7 days 
Projectiles fired into Israel 776 1456 
Projectiles per day 33.74 208 
Civilian Casualties Deaths 4 4 
Injuries 182 219 
Rate of Civilian 
Casualties per Projectile 
Deaths 0.51% 0.27% 
Injuries 23.45% 15.04% 
  
Even though some rockets were able to harm Israeli civilians, the November 2012 conflict 




batteries, which means much of the country remains unprotected.570  Even with this limited 
coverage, the system was able to reduce the casualty rate from rockets; if Pillar of Defense saw a 
similar rate as Cast Lead, Israeli civilians would have suffered four additional deaths and over 
100 additional injuries.  Further expanding Iron Dome could cover more of the country, negating 
the advantage of rockets with longer ranges.  Additionally, placing multiple batteries around each 
city could create some redundancy and increase the number of rockets the system could 
simultaneously shoot down.  The individual batteries have increased their success rate, from 
hitting 75% of intended targets to over 90%, indicating that engineers have utilized data on Iron 
Dome's early performance to improve the system.  As Israel deploys additional batteries and 
improves the effectiveness of each interceptor, it will increasingly be able to protect its civilians 
from the threat of rockets fired across its borders. 
 
Conclusion: Using Iron Dome to Emphasize Defense 
 
 Israel's strategy against Hamas has not achieved its goals.  To prevent rocket fire, Israel 
has relied on the use of force: firing airstrikes against rocket launching sites to destroy launchers 
and kill militants, blockading Gaza to prevent or at least slow rearmament, and engaging in tit-
for-tat responses in an attempt to deter future rocket attacks.  Twice this strategy led to major 
escalations in Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense.  These measures have had 
some success at temporarily reducing rocket fire, but the overall strategy has not eliminated the 
threat.   
 Israel's attacks on Gaza have not prevented Hamas and other militant organizations from 
firing rockets and have not created a lasting deterrent.  Escalation has achieved short term aims, 
570 Lappin, “Fifth Iron Dome battery deployed in Gush Dan.” 
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as Egypt-brokered ceasefires in June 2008 and November 2012 created periods of relative quiet 
that lasted months.  Rocket and mortar attacks declined significantly after both Cast Lead and 
Pillar of Defense, with Hamas holding its fire and working to prevent other Gaza-based groups 
from launching into Israel.  However, all of the lulls in violence still featured some rocket and 
mortar attacks, rather than zero; and none of the ceasefires have lasted, so it would be naive to 
assume that the agreement that ended Pillar of Defense will lead to enduring peace.  Therefore, 
Israel's strategy resembles the crude metaphor “cutting the grass,” in which Hamas' arsenal will 
grow, and Israel will, from time to time, initiate military operations to shrink it back down to a 
more manageable size.571  This is a recipe for indefinite conflict; one that becomes more 
dangerous for Israel as Hamas acquires increasingly sophisticated missiles. 
 That the grass repeatedly grew to the point where it needed mowing demonstrates that the 
blockade of Gaza has failed.  While there have been individual successes, such as the interception 
of C-704 anti-ship missiles in March 2011, considerable weaponry has made it past the blockade.  
Despite Israel's efforts to restrict imports, destroy smuggling tunnels, and deplete stockpiles of 
rockets and launchers with airstrikes and ground incursions, Hamas and other organizations have 
managed to fire thousands of projectiles into Israel, including almost 1,600 rockets in one week 
in November 2012.  Clearly, the blockade has not prevented Palestinian resistance groups from 
acquiring rockets.  At best, it has slowed the grass' growth rate and extended the time between 
cuttings.   
 Though Israel asserts that preventing weapons from entering Gaza is the exclusive aim of 
the blockade, it is also possible that an unspoken additional purpose is collective punishment of 
Palestinian civilians in Gaza.  By restricting the supply of consumer goods into the territory, 
571 Bronner, “As Battlefield Changes, Israel Takes Tougher Approach.” 
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Israel makes life harder for the people living there.  Theoretically, residents of Gaza might blame 
Hamas for this state of affairs, and seek to replace the dominant party with more moderate 
leaders.  However, June 2013 marks six years since Hamas took control of Gaza, and they seem 
to be in no danger of losing power.  More likely, Palestinians in Gaza blame Israel for imposing 
the blockade and support Hamas for seeking its end, rather than faulting Hamas for pursuing 
weaponry to resist Israel.  Even if Israel sees the suffering of civilians in Gaza exclusively as an 
unfortunate but unavoidable side effect of its effort to prevent weapons from entering the 
territory, the result is anger towards Israel and increased support for Hamas.  
 Furthermore, the tunnel smuggling system has provided Hamas with considerable revenue 
and a stranglehold on Gaza's economy.  Hamas charges a one-time fee to set up each tunnel, and 
then taxes everything that comes through them.  This has generated as much as $750 million per 
year for Hamas' coffers.572  If Israel's strategy is to use the blockade to remove Hamas from 
power, it has been counterproductive. 
 In addition to increasing Hamas' popularity among Palestinians, the blockade of Gaza has 
created situations that have galvanized international criticism of Israel.  Some may dismiss the 
international criticism as expression of long-standing anti-Israeli sentiment, but there has been 
direct harm to Israel's relations with other countries.  Notably, relations with Turkey deteriorated 
after Israeli commandos raided a six-ship flotilla bound for Gaza. 
 In May 2010, a group of activists organized by the Free Gaza Movement and a Turkish 
NGO called the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief sailed 
from Cyprus towards Gaza aiming to break the blockade.  To enforce the blockade, the Israeli 
navy intercepted the ships and directed them to the port of Ashdod for cargo inspection.  On one 
572 Verini, “The Tunnels of Gaza.” 
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of the six ships, a fight broke out between Israeli forces and a group of activists that left nine 
activists dead, eight of whom were Turkish nationals.  Greta Berlin, a leader of the Free Gaza 
Movement claimed that the flotilla was exclusively carrying humanitarian supplies and that 
Israeli soldiers “opened fire on sleeping civilians at four in the morning,”573 while Israel claimed 
that the soldiers acted in self-defense.  According to an Israeli government spokesman, “roughly 
40 people on board were jihadis who came for violence.  They were preparing to attack, to kill 
and to be killed” and they attacked the commandos with knives and metal rods immediately upon 
boarding.574 
 For Israel's larger strategy towards Gaza, what actually happened aboard the ship is less 
relevant than the aftermath.  In response, Turkey recalled its ambassador from Israel and canceled 
joint military exercises.575  Israel's relationship with Turkey was arguably closer than with any 
other state in the region or Muslim-majority country in the world, and deterioration of that 
relationship and the associated military and economic cooperation harms Israel's position in the 
Middle East.  In March 2013, the United States brokered an agreement that restored relations 
between Israel and Turkey in which Israel “apologized to the Turkish people for any errors that 
could have led to the loss of life” and compensated the victims' families.576  Even if Israel's 
account of the flotilla raid is entirely accurate, and even though relations with Turkey were 
eventually restored, this incident illustrates the potential diplomatic costs of maintaining the 
blockade. 
 Israel's blockade of Gaza is costly and has not achieved Israel's goal of denying Hamas 
the weapons to threaten Israeli citizens, but Iron Dome and David's Sling could provide the basis 
573 Kershner, “Deadly Israeli Raid Draws Condemnation.” 
574 Sherwood, “Flotilla raid: Turkish jihadis bent on violence attacked troops, Israel claims.” 
575 Kershner, “Deadly Israeli Raid Draws Condemnation.” 
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of an alternative strategy.  Weak actors in irredentist conflicts seek to impose costs on their 
stronger opponents to win concessions and shift circumstances in their favor.  To do this, Hamas 
and other Gaza-based groups depend on rockets, which have proven to be their best means of 
harming Israeli civilians and disrupting normalcy in Israel.  However, if Israel's C-RAM 
protections can expand and improve to the point where they can shoot down any rockets headed 
for populated areas, Israel will be able to undermine Hamas' strategy without incurring the costs 
associated with the blockade or attacks on Gaza. 
 Iron Dome and David's Sling can facilitate a more defensive strategy, but would not 
entirely eliminate the threat posed by Hamas or Hezbollah, since a massive rocket barrage may be 
able to overwhelm Israel's missile defenses.  For example, Hezbollah shot almost 4,000 rockets 
into Israel in the 2006 conflict, and has reportedly rearmed with tens of thousands.  Similarly, 
Hamas and other Gaza-based groups fired almost 1,600 rockets during Operation Pillar of 
Defense, and may be able to acquire enough to score some hits in a future confrontation, 
especially if Israel eases the blockade.  However, by establishing a strong defense against 
projectiles, Israel would require its non-state opponents to expend far more rockets to cause any 
damage.  This would neutralize the threat of sporadic rocket fire, reduce Israeli casualties in the 
event of conflict, and discourage Hamas and Hezbollah from escalating and inviting retaliation if 








Chapters one and two presented theoretical arguments and empirical support for the claim 
that the world's most powerful states face a greater security challenge from non-state networks 
than from small states.  This effect increases in the wake of international transitions, as some 
networks rapidly adapt new strategies to take advantage of changing circumstances.  In particular, 
various networks have enhanced their capabilities by utilizing recent developments in 
information technology.  However, states can marshal their resources to develop new strategies 
and drive technological innovation in response.  As detailed in chapter four, the world’s most 
advanced states have produced a variety of ground-based and aerial robots that can help 
compensate for networks’ non-material advantages. 
State-network conflicts can be broken down into three categories—localized insurgency, 
irredentist, and global insurgency—and chapters six and seven propose ways that the most 
advanced states can use robotics technology to develop informational and defensive strategies to 
counter localized insurgent and irredentist networks.  However, global insurgency is arguably the 
biggest threat to the world’s most powerful states, and the one for which they are least prepared.  
Much as weak actor strategists of global insurgency combine lessons from the more localized 
types of asymmetric conflicts and invent the rest, strong actor strategies in localized insurgencies 
and irredentist conflicts provide lessons for countering the international jihadist movement.    
 The threat from this global insurgency is twofold: organized groups, such as al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, who are capable of mounting larger scale attacks; and self-starters, who 
are less capable of large scale attacks, but harder to identify.  The challenge therefore requires a 




grows large enough to execute a large terrorist attack or overthrow a friendly government; 
improving intelligence and hardening targets to thwart attacks by individuals; and reducing the 
supply of both by winning the war of ideas.  As with localized insurgency and irredentist 
conflicts, robotics can enhance this strong actor strategy. 
 
War of Ideas 
 
Dr. Fadl, one of the first senior members of al Qaeda and the author of “The Essential 
Guide for Preparation,” began denouncing violent jihad in May 2007.  Whereas the “Guide” 
justifies violence against non-Muslims and called fighting them a religious duty, Fadl's latest 
writings, which have been published in Egyptian and Kuwaiti newspapers, argue that “we are 
prohibited from committing aggression, even if the enemies of Islam do that.”577  Fadl's words 
always carried special weight based on his widely admired encyclopedic knowledge of Islamic 
teachings, and al Qaeda accordingly treated his shift from “fight fire with fire” to “two wrongs 
don't make a right” as a threat.  Ayman al Zawahiri released a video publicly dismissing Fadl's 
new position, indicating al Qaeda's concern. 
 However, Fadl's change of heart may not make much of a difference in the war of ideas.  
Though highly respected as a religious scholar, he is 63 years old and the international jihadist 
movement may have moved on.  The relevance of the central al Qaeda organization has 
decreased, and the movement has shifted towards the loosely connected network of autonomous 
nodes envisioned by Abu Musab al Suri.  Nidal Malik Hassan, a disgruntled Army psychiatrist 
inspired by Anwar al Awlaki, killed more Americans in the name of jihad on US soil in the Fort 
Hood shooting than any al Qaeda operative has in the 12 years after the September 11th attacks.  
577 Wright, “The Rebellion Within,” p. 1. 
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Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, self-starters sympathetic to the jihadist cause but unaffiliated 
with any organized group, executed the only successful bomb attack on American soil in the 21st 
century.  Additionally, online jihadist forums have become increasingly relevant, as fixed bases 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere have come under pressure.  It is 
possible that the rising generation does not consider Dr. Fadl or Ayman al Zawahiri's opinions to 
be especially important.   
 Efforts to win the war of ideas, from economic development programs, to the US-based 
Arabic language satellite TV channel al Hurra (“the free one”), to eloquent presidential speeches, 
can reduce the appeal of the international jihadist movement, but will do little to soothe the most 
radical adherents.  On June 4, 2009, President Barack Obama gave a speech at Cairo University, 
saying “I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims 
around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth 
that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.  Instead, they overlap, 
and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all 
human beings.”578  This attempt at reconciliation was well received, including by many who had 
been angry at the United States throughout George W. Bush's presidency.  But few, if any of 
those individuals aim to commit violence or directly support those who do, and the main political 
grievances motivating jihadists and their supporters remain.  The United States has not withdrawn 
support for Israel or Saudi Arabia and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  Without 
changing those policies, efforts to win the war of ideas can, at best, achieve improvements at the 
margins.  Similarly, the United States can withdraw troops from Afghanistan as it withdrew from 
578 Obama, “A New Beginning.” 
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Iraq, and can talk about closing (or actually close) the prison at Guantanamo Bay, but anyone 
radicalized by American policies in the years after September 11th will not easily forget. 
 There will be people who want to fight under the banner of al Qaeda, and they will 
continue to find like-minded individuals and terrorism instructions online, which means the War 
on Terrorism will continue.  Robots and information technology can facilitate a strategy designed 




As discussed in chapter four, attacks launched from unmanned aerial vehicles can 
increase certainty and reduce collateral damage by waiting for the opportune moment to strike.  
Drones provide the United States with a cost-effective measure of targeting known enemies.  For 
example, an attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011 killed Anwar al Awlaki of al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, who had recruited the underwear bomber, and inspired the Fort Hood shooter 
and would-be Times Square bomber, among others.  This method has drawbacks, creating anger 
in the countries where people are targeted as well as those that host American drone bases.  
However, it is the least bad solution compared to the others—manned airstrikes and ground raids 
usually result in higher collateral damage while putting American forces at risk, and doing 
nothing risks allowing terrorist attacks, whether directed or inspired.  For these reasons, targeted 
UAV strikes are likely to remain central to America's strategy against the global al Qaeda 
network. 
 However, demonstrating their strategic adaptability, al Qaeda has a counter-strategy for 
drones.579  Fleeing a joint French and African operation to push them out of Timbuktu, Mali, al 
579 “The Al-Qaida Papers – Drones.” 
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Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb left behind a number of strategic documents.  Among them were 
instructions on how to avoid drone attacks.  This provides further evidence that the global jihadist 
movement acts like a transnational advocacy network, as one node shares information that's 
useful to the entire group, increasing the effectiveness of each autonomous unit.  
 After explaining that UAVs provide the United States and United Kingdom with a cost 
effective method relative to manned aircraft, the document offers both technical and tactical ways 
fighters can protect themselves from unmanned aircraft.  This includes jamming or confusing the 
drone's signal with high and low-tech methods, using the SkyGrabber system mentioned in 
chapter five to “infiltrate the drone's waves and frequencies,” and spreading pieces of reflective 
glass on top of a vehicle or building.  Other than the glass, which may or may not work, those 
methods have a proven track record of success. 
 Tactical recommendations include: avoid congregating in the open, refraining from using 
a permanent headquarters, hide under thick trees, stay in places unlit by sun, and enter and exit 
through multiple entrances.  These are all logical methods of avoiding aerial surveillance, all of 
which could be thwarted by the Smart SWARM proposed in chapter six, since micro UAVs can 
fly below cover and into buildings.  Other techniques, such as “using dolls and statues to be 
placed outside false ditches to mislead the enemy” underestimate the sensor array on most ISR 
drones, as both infrared cameras and electro-optical sensors could distinguish the dolls from 
people.   
 However, the document does show an understanding of drones' electronic surveillance 
capabilities, as it instructs everyone to “maintain silence of all wireless contacts” and leaders to 
avoid all communications equipment “because the enemy usually keeps a voice tag through 




monitor electronic communications.  Nevertheless, this reaction demonstrates that the mere threat 
of drones provides strong actors' with strategic value, as al Qaeda operatives avoid both meeting 
in person and communicating with each other remotely. 
 Similarly, the document recommends getting out of and staying away from vehicles, 
“especially when being chased or during combat,” and fleeing in different directions “because the 
planes are unable to get after everyone.”  Perhaps without realizing it, this responds to the ability 
of Wide Area Airborne Surveillance Systems and other less sophisticated cameras to follow a 
vehicle and keep it in frame.  More powerful cameras could track individuals, and other objects 
smaller than vehicles, and the Smart SWARM could assign a couple of tiny UAVs to follow each 
fleeing suspect.  However, if al Qaeda fighters avoid using vehicles when fighting or fleeing, 
their mobility is already compromised. 
 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's methods to avoid drones show the value of UAVs just 
from the fear they spread.  With more powerful cameras, a complimentary swarm of drones 
closer to the ground, more sophisticated computers to process more information more quickly, 
and defensive measures that shield the UAVs from spoofing, most of these counter-drone 
techniques can be thwarted with technological solutions.  This is one example of many possible 
ways robots can enhance strong actor strategy in what will likely be a prolonged conflict against 




The Future of Asymmetric Warfare 
 
The end of the Cold War and the information technology revolution created a window of 
opportunity that various non-state actors were able to exploit.  Improved strategies and 
developments in robotics have helped powerful states respond, improving their capabilities 
against networks.  However, the record of the post-Cold War world still shows non-state 
networks as an ongoing security challenge for great powers.  Given their adaptability, some 
networks, perhaps a node of the global jihadist movement, will take advantage of increasingly 
available commercial robotics to gather information or attack targets.  The United States and 
other developed countries would be wise to develop counter-robot capabilities—which would 
also be useful in symmetric confrontations—instead of waiting until after a network surprises by 
using one. 
 As technology develops, the rate of change speeds up.  Public internet access is less than 
two decades old, widespread cell phone use began barely a decade ago, and smart phones and 
social media have been around for less than ten years.  The robotics revolution will bring 
profound changes, as might advances in other areas, such as biotechnology, creating windows of 
opportunity for networks to exploit.  Therefore, as long as nuclear states can check each other and 
easily defeat non-nuclear states, networks are likely to remain among the more serious security 
challenges they face.  However, while the level of threat will wax and wane, in part based on how 
well networks and states react to future transitions, terrorism and insurgency are both unlikely to 





















USA North Korea/China Interstate Small State 6 1949 7 1953 49 36516 0 Mixed 
USA Puerto Rican Nationalist Party Irredentist Network 11 1950 11 1950 1 1 0 Success 
USA Cuba Interstate Small State 4 1961 4 1961 1 4 0 Failure 
USA North Vietnam/Vietcong Interstate Small State 7 1959 5 1973 166 58178 0 Failure 
USA Iranian Revolutionaries Localized insurgency Network 11 1979 1 1981 15 8 0 Mixed 
USA Grenada Interstate Small State 10 1983 10 1983 1 19 0 Success 
USA Amal, LNM Localized insurgency Network 8 1982 3 1984 19 265 17 Failure 
USA Libya Interstate Small State 3 1986 3 1986 1 2 0 Success 
USA Panama Interstate Small State 12 1989 12 1989 1 23 0 Success 
USA Iraq Interstate Small State 1 1991 2 1991 1 235 0 Success 
USA Somali Rebels (Habr Gidr Clan) 
Localized 
insurgency Network 1 1991 12 1993 36 18 0 Failure 
USA Al Qaeda Global insurgency Network 12 1992 7 2013 224 104 3025 Ongoing 
USA Serbia Interstate Small State 3 1999 6 1999 3 2 0 Success 
USA Taliban Interstate Small State 10 2001 12 2001 2 14 0 Success 
USA Afghan Insurgency Localized insurgency Network 12 2001 7 2013 140 2246 0 Ongoing 
USA Iraq Interstate Small State 3 2003 5 2003 2 187 0 Success 
USA Iraqi insurgency Localized insurgency Network 5 2003 12 2011 103 4299 0 Mixed 
Russia/USSR UPA Irredentist Network 1 1944 12 1953 120 5750 456 Success 
Russia/USSR Hungarian revolutionaries Irredentist Network 10 1956 11 1956 1 722 0 Success 
Russia/USSR Czechoslovakia  Irredentist Small State 8 1968 10 1968 2 11 0 Success 
Russia/USSR China Interstate Big State 3 1969 12 1969 9 58 0 Mixed 
Russia/USSR Mujahideen  Localized insurgency Network 5 1978 2 1989 129 13310 0 Failure 
Russia/USSR APF Irredentist Network 1 1990 1 1990 1 35 0 Success 
Russia/USSR Republic of Armenia Irredentist Network 8 1990 12 1991 16 0 0 Mixed 
Russia/USSR Paramilitary Forces Irredentist Network 10 1993 10 1993 1 0 145 Success 
Russia/USSR UTO Localized insurgency Network 6 1992 6 1997 42   Mixed 
Russia/USSR Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Irredentist Network 12 1994 8 1996 20 4175 0 Failure 
Russia/USSR Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Irredentist Network 8 1999 7 2013 167 4611 1361 Ongoing 
Russia/USSR Wahhabi Movement of the Buinaksk district Irredentist Network 9 1999 9 1999 1 279 293 Success 
Russia/USSR Forces of the Caucasus Emirate Irredentist Network 11 2007 7 2013 69 667 0 Ongoing 























British Army  
Localized 
insurgency Network 6 1948 7 1960 144 509 1 Success 
United 
Kingdom Mau Mau 
Localized 






insurgency Network 1 1952 8 1954 32 59 17 Failure 
United 
Kingdom 
EOKA (National Org of 
Cypriot Fighters) 
Localized 
insurgency Network 4 1955 3 1959 48 116 26 Failure 
United 
Kingdom Egypt Interstate Small State 10 1956 11 1956 1 22 0 Mixed 
United 
Kingdom 
Revolt “led by Ghalib 
and Talib” 
Localized 






insurgency Network 12 1962 12 1962 1 7 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Indonesia Interstate Small State 4 1963 8 1966 40 114 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom FLOSY, NLF 
Localized 
insurgency Network 10 1964 11 1967 36 129 19 Failure 
United 
Kingdom IRA Irredentist Network 8 1969 4 1998 332 1114 621 Mixed 
United 
Kingdom 
Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Oman and 
the Arabian Gulf 
Localized 
insurgency Network 7 1972 3 1976 44 61 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Argentina Interstate Small State 4 1982 6 1982 2 257 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Iraq Interstate Small State 1 1991 2 1991 1 56 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom RIRA Irredentist Network 4 1998 7 2013 182 29 2 Ongoing 
United 






insurgency Network 9 2000 9 2000 1 6 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Taliban Interstate Small State 10 2001 12 2001 2 0 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Afghan Insurgency 
Localized 
insurgency Network 12 2001 7 2013 140 444 0 Ongoing 
United 
Kingdom Iraq (Saddam Hussein) Interstate Small State 3 2003 5 2003 2 33 0 Success 
United 
Kingdom Iraqi insurgency 
Localized 
insurgency Network 5 2003 4 2009 71 146 0 Mixed 
France FLN, MNA Localized insurgency Network 11 1954 7 1962 92 17456 2788 Failure 
France Tunisia Interstate Small State 7 1961 7 1961 1 24 0 Success 
France Gabonese military officers 
Localized 
insurgency Network 2 1964 2 1964 1 1 0 Success 
France National Liberation Front of Chad 
Localized 
insurgency Network 8 1969 6 1971 23 35 0 Success 
France Polisario Localized insurgency Network 12 1977 12 1977 1 0 0 Success 
France Frolinat Localized insurgency Network 4 1978 4 1978 1 2 0 Success 
France Followers of Hissene Habre 
Localized 
insurgency Network 2 1979 2 1979 1 0 4 Mixed 
France Corsican National Liberation Front Irredentist Network 5 1976 7 2013 433 0 103 Ongoing 




















France Goukouni Oueddei Localized insurgency Network 6 1983 1 1987 43 0 0 Success 
France Iraq Interstate Small State 1 1991 2 1991 1 9 0 Success 
France Serbia Interstate Small State 3 1999 6 1999 3 0 0 Success 
France Taliban Interstate Small State 10 2001 12 2001 2 0 0 Success 
France Afghan Insurgency Localized insurgency Network 12 2001 11 2012 131 88 0 Mixed 
France Ivory Coast Interstate Small State 1 2003 11 2004 23 9 0 Success 
China India Interstate Small State 10 1967 10 1967 1 9 0 Failure 
China Myanmar/Burma Interstate Small State 1 1969 11 1969 11   Mixed 
China USSR Interstate Big State 3 1969 12 1969 9 600 0 Mixed 
China Vietnam Interstate Small State 2 1979 3 1979 1 6954 0 Failure 
Israel Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq Interstate Small State 6 1967 6 1967 1 831 15 Success 
Israel Egypt Interstate Small State 7 1967 3 1969 21 118 0 Mixed 
Israel PLO/Fatah Irredentist Network 7 1967 8 1970 38 183 12 Mixed 
Israel Egypt Interstate Small State 3 1969 8 1970 17 330 140 Success 
Israel PFLP, PLO Irredentist Network 8 1970 12 1987 208 239 239 Mixed 
Israel Egypt, Syria Interstate Small State 10 1973 10 1973 1 2674 0 Success 
Israel Syria Interstate Small State 3 1974 5 1974 2 83 0 Mixed 
Israel Palestinians (various) Irredentist Network 12 1987 9 1993 69 63 100 Mixed 
Israel Fatah, PLO Irredentist Network 3 1978 3 1978 1 34 38 Mixed 
Israel Lebanon, Syria, PLO Irredentist Network 6 1982 5 1983 11 657 0 Mixed 
Israel Hezbollah and other groups Irredentist Network 5 1983 5 2000 84 256 90 Failure 
Israel Iraq Interstate Small State 1 1991 2 1991 1 0 2 Success 
Israel Palestinians (various) Irredentist Network 9 1993 9 2000 84 86 186 Mixed 
Israel Palestinians (various) Irredentist Network 9 2000 2 2005 53 303 654 Mixed 
Israel Hezbollah Irredentist Network 7 2006 8 2006 1 116 43 Failure 
Israel Palestinians (various) Irredentist Network 2 2005 12 2008 45 216 77 Mixed 
Israel 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, 
and other Gaza-based 
militant groups 
Irredentist Network 12 2008 1 2009 1 9 4 Mixed 
Israel Palestinians (various) Irredentist Network 1 2009 11 2012 46 11 34 Mixed 
Israel 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, 
and other Gaza-based 
militant groups 
Irredentist Network 11 2012 11 2012 1 1 4 Mixed 
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